Reconciliation between China and Japan: Short Papers

Reconciliation between China and Japan:
A Search for Solutions

Australian National University
17th and 18th August 2006

All participants in this workshop were asked to respond briefly to the question: "In your opinion, what are the three most promising things that can be done to advance reconciliation between Japan and China, and why?" They were asked to list their three suggestions and to explain their choice of each.

Answers were contributed by the following workshop participants:

Amitav Acharya
Tomoko Akami
Chris Braddick
Chen Mumin
Malcolm Cook
Mel Gurtov
Horiuchi Yusaku
Wenran Jiang
Jin Xide
Mindy L. Kotler
Tessa Morris-Suzuki
Katherine Morton
Shi Yinhong
Tamamoto Masaru
Richard Tanter
Takahiko Tennichi
Mark Valencia
Willem van Kemenade
Peter Van Ness

Separately available are longer papers by Chris Chung; David Hundt and Roland Bleiker; Jin Xide; Kokubun Ryosei; Takahiko Tennichi; Mark Valencia; and Willem van Kemenade.

* * *

Amitav Acharya

I consider the history book and Yasukuni controversy to be the two most important issues in the bilateral relationship. But military confidence building also needs to be taken into account.

My suggestions for addressing the mistrust in Sino-Japanese relations include the following steps:
1. A working group of scholars from China, Japan as well as other specialists in East Asian history to suggests ways to addressing the "textbook" controversy.
2. Removal of commemorative items related to the 14 Class A war criminals at Yasukuni Shrine.
3. A ban on visits to the Yashukuni by Japanese prime ministers and cabinet members.
4. Creation of an alternative war dead memorial which where Japanese leaders can pay there respects to the victims of war.
5. Institutionalisation and regularization of meetings between Chinese, Japanese and Korean leaders on the margins of all regional groups of which they are members, such as APEC, ARF, ASEAN-PMC and EAS. This could be a prelude to the creation of a regular Northeast Asian forum.
6. A hot-line between Chinese and Japanese prime ministers to nip controversial developments in the bud before they escalate into public recriminations and reproach.
7. Development of a network of citizen groups and civil society leaders in China and Japan to promote understanding and prevent popular venting of anger during sports or cultural events involving the two sides.
8. Bilateral summits, at least two a year, between the leaders of the two nations.
9. Invitation to China to observe and sometimes participate in US-Japanese military exercises.

* * *


Tomoko Akami

1) Bringing diverse opinions in each country on key and controversial issues of China-Japan relations more into public domains.
Diverse opinions exist on key and controversial issues in each country, while the government line and policy may only reflect one section of these opinions. More sensationalist and outrageous views are also often more reported. No government would like to appear as too divided, as it would consider this as a sign of the weakness domestically and internationally. The exercise of putting diverse views in public forum will be also more difficult in China. Yet, at least in Japan, the government or semi-governmental organizations as well as independent organizations could facilitate this trend more. These views are not official views, and could oppose governmental views, but the other side of the nation-state could see that while the government policy is one thing, there are many other views, which could be influential in Japan. They could also found many may hold views that are very similar to the views of many in the other country.
This could be brought into as a book project, presenting diverse views of each country with evidences on several specific issues that are key for the reconciliation.

2) Citizenship of the East Asian Community.
In the book, Multitude, Negri seems to present a new kind of citizenship in a broader community beyond the nation-state boundaries: if a certain policy within a broad community (such as EC) affects one's life, one has a right to have a say on the policy despite its national origin. The East Asian Community is very very remote from the reality of the EC. Yet there are some key and fundamental issues on which many people in the region can agree for the future of the region (peace, environment ...). If they can identify these issues, they should have a say on policy matters on these issues, even that are originated in the other nation...

3) A broader and comparative framework of reconciliation is useful.
While reconciliation of China and Japan needs to be understood within a specific historical context, as Funabashi's book on reconciliation argues, most nation-states on the earth have a serious issue or two of reconciliation. It is important that this forum is held on a third ground, and a similar perspective as well as a comparative perspective will be also useful.

* * *


Chris Braddick

I could suggest literally hundreds of things to advance reconciliation, but I will confine myself to just three:
1). Short-term: the LDP should select a leader to replace Koizumi who is willing to abjure from visiting Yasukuni Jinja while Class A war criminals are still enshrined there. This would be viewed as a positive step by most Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese.
2). Medium-term: the PRC should support Japan's campaign for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This would acknowledge Japan's substantial contribution to the organisation and international stability during the past half century, and give it greater responsibility to help maintain world peace.
3). Long-term: the Chinese and Japanese governments should embark on a campaign to educate the younger generation about the realities of past and present Sino-Japanese relations, beginning for instance with the publication of history textbooks that contained translated extracts from each others' perspective on controversial topics.

* * *


Mumin Chen

Approaches to reconciliation between China and Japan

In March 2005, a series of anti-Japan demonstrations erupted in several Chinese cities. Demonstrators attacked and damaged Japanese consulates, supermarkets, and even restaurants, prompting the Japanese government to demand an apology and compensation for damages. The Chinese government allowed the demonstrations to occur in the first place, and then ordered state media to calm down the protestors. The crisis finally ended when Ministry of Public Security declared any "unauthorized marches" to be illegal.
The crisis is just one of the contentious events in China-Japan relations in recent years. Despite of the fact that China and Japan are now biggest trade partners with each other, political relations between both countries are rapidly deteriorating. Many in China show serious concerns over potential Japanese military resurgence, while more people in Japan worry about China's military modernization and growing nationalism. The causes of the existing tension between China and Japan are complicated, but one can label them to either psychological or strategic factors.
From psychological point of view, people from China and Japan can hardly consider each other as friendly mainly because both societies are still haunted by past war experiences. From 1874 to 1945, Japan and China fought three times (1874, 1894-1895, 1931-1945), but the wars generated different interpretations in both societies. The memories of Japanese war brutality have deeply influenced the way Chinese people look at Japan-even today a movie or novel that portrays how Chinese people bravely fought against Japan during WWII is still popular in China. On the other hand, Japanese people today generally consider that war crimes were done by previous generations, and they shall not be responsible for those mistakes. Different interpretations of past experiences constitute the primary cause for mistrust between both societies.
From strategic point of view, China and Japan are two major powers in East Asia, and the strategic interactions between the two will definitely determine the security environment of the region in the future. Japan has become very active in international affairs in recent years. The most famous developments include deployment of armed forces overseas and re-definition of the area covered by US-Japan Security Treaty. The policies have been largely supported by Japanese people who are convinced that Japan should play a dominant role in maintaining peace and stability of the region. On the other hand, thanks to the success of economic reforms in the past two decades, Chinese has been rapidly rising to be another superpower with enough capabilities to challenge status quo power balancing in Asia. More people in China presume that Japan is China's primary competitor, and defeating Japan, being it politically or militarily, will be inevitable if China wants to achieve supreme status in Asia.
Discussion of China-Japan reconciliation should take above two factors into considerations. In my view, three most promising things that can be done to advance reconciliation between Japan and China are removing major war criminals from Yasukuni Shrine, forming a joint team to supervise and draft history textbooks, and establishment of strategic dialogue between China and Japan.
Since the late 1970s, Japanese politicians' visit to Yasukuni shrine has given Chinese an excuse to blame Japanese government for tolerating resurgence of militarism. If Yasukuni shrine is wrongly interpreted by Chinese people as a symbol of militarism, why not removing the names of those main war criminals from the shrine? Japanese people could still visit the shrine to mourn the dead in past wars, but without the tablets of war criminals, the visits will be less controversial.
Approval of a controversial history textbook by Japan's Ministry of Education was the main reason of the eruption of massive anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in 2005. To avoid similar incidents in the future, Chinese and Japanese government, and perhaps independent scholars from both sides, may consider forming a team or organization to provide "standard interpretations" about WWII and the relations between both countries, and forward them to both sides as guidelines for drafting new textbooks. The purpose is to create a neutral team to carefully examine the historical events that may cause misunderstanding and even hatred in both societies. By doing so both countries may also prevent the other side from using textbooks to promote xenophobia or hyper-nationalism in the society.
To create a stable and peaceful strategic environment in Asia, Chinese and Japanese government may also consider forming a second-track security dialogue mechanism, to meet and discuss security-related issues that both countries consider as strategic interests. This mechanism may consist of strategic analysts, policy-makers, and independent scholars from both sides, with the purpose of creating a new strategic culture that no longer sees power-balancing as the only way to keep peace and stability of the region. If China and Japan can work together to create a strategic partnership, I would suggest both countries to consider including Taiwan into such a strategic mechanism.

* * *


Malcolm Cook

Ideas to Promote Japan-China Harmony

I believe each one of these three ideas is feasible in the present climate of bilateral relations. None require either government to significantly change its approach to the other. None of these would likely have much immediate impact beyond a symbolic one. In the longer-term, each would strengthen politically salient ties between the giant neighbours and help take some chill out of the present climate.

Chinese immigration stream to Japan: One of Japan's most significant challenges is the decline of its working age population and the need to open up much more significantly and systematically to foreign workers. On the other hand, as shown in the early stages of the Australia-China FTA, the Chinese government is keenly seeking greater access to Australia's labour market. Given this powerful convergence of interests, Japan could announce - with appropriate political fanfare on both sides - a much larger intake program for working age Chinese. This immigration change would highlight the intense economic complementarity of the two economies, help Japan shift towards a more globally open labour market and provide a political deliverable to both sides that emphasises their shared interests. This should not be a guest worker program but one that would allow participants the right to apply for permanent residency and it should not too limited in its sectoral scope.

Joint work on demographic change: Focusing on common problems rather than trying to overcome problems that divide the two countries would seem to be more feasible and less open to political backlash. One of if not the largest common problems facing Japan and China is preparing for the social, economic and fiscal ramifications of aging populations. Japan is already facing population decline while China will face it soon while still being a poor country. The two relevant lead agencies could establish a joint research centre to be opened by both political leaders and provided with substantial funding so the centre does not quickly become forgotten. South Korea could also be invited to participate in the centre given its similar problems. Including South Korea could also limit the centre's risk emanating from upsurges in bilateral tensions between China and Japan. This centre - if properly resourced - could also provide key research for the global search to answers to demographic change. The establishment of such a centre could also send a powerful domestic message to each participating country about the urgency and importance of demographic change.

Regular two-party talks on North Korea: While Japanese and Chinese positions on how to deal with North Korea's testing strategic behaviour are certainly not the same, North Korea is a significant problem for both countries. For China, North Korea is one of the litmus tests (Iran is another) of its status as a "responsible stakeholder." For Japan, North Korea's missile diplomacy is a serious strategic threat that exposes its military shortcomings. Regular, closed-door and low-key consultative meetings between either ministers or top-level bureaucrats from the foreign affairs and defence agencies on North Korea would provide very useful information-sharing opportunities. They could also increase the pressure subtly on North Korea by showing that China - taking a relatively soft line on Pyongyang - is willing to talk with Japan who is taking a harder line. Such meetings could also help minimise the chances for bilateral problems over the ways to deal with North Korea such as we witnessed over responses to the latest North Korean missile tests.

* * *


Mel Gurtov

Three Paths to Conflict Management

Resumption of High-Level Diplomacy
There has not been a Japan-China summit since 2002, and China has deliberately avoided direct conversations with Koizumi at multilateral venues because of the Yasukuni issue. It is essential that direct dialogue resume, both for its symbolic importance and for its practical possibilities, such as issuance of a new joint statement of friendship and cooperation.

Preliminary Talks on a Northeast Asia Security Dialogue Mechanism
The Sept. 2005 joint statement of principles issued at the conclusion of the Six Party Talks in Beijing held out the prospect of a multi-party security forum that might evolve from the Talks. Although making headway on such a forum clearly depends on a satisfactory ending of the current nuclear impasse with North Korea, preliminary discussion of the scope and organizing principles for a dialogue mechanism could begin now. It would be one way to engage China and Japan on East Asia security issues.

Track II Gatherings
Apart from high-level diplomacy, the peacemaking possibilities of Track II activities should be considered. Chinese and Japanese media, business, academic, and scientific circles have much that they could explore with each other. A gathering of such specialists, together or on separate occasions, might promote mutual understanding, reduce stereotyping, and change popular opinion in both countries that currently has very low regard for the other. Track II gatherings might also encourage particular groups to lobby their governments for improvements in China-Japan relations-as Japanese business groups have already done on the Yasukuni issue.

* * *


Horiuchi Yusaku

In my opinion, the most promising thing that can be done to advance reconciliation between Japan and China is to have many close and good friends. This may sounds too simplistic but after spending 13 years outside my home country (i.e., Japan) and having met many friends and colleagues from many countries (including China, of course), I found that this is the most effective way to improve our mutual understandings, which, I believe, lead to reconciliation between Japan and China. The logic is simple: If we have a good friend from a particular country, we tend to build a good image about that country and its people. If we have another close friend from the same country, we tend to update our belief that people from that country are nice and trustworthy. By contract, if you meet many people from a particular country and they tend to be nasty, even when the truth is that you (unfortunately) happen to meet nasty people by chance, you update your belief that people from that country are bad. This psychological process of "information update" (know as, "Bayesian inference" in the literature of statistics) is, I think, an inevitable fact of life, and something that I want to test empirically as part of my research projects. There is an important implication of this argument: All people, particularly those outside their home county, should realize that their behavior can critically shape images, of their home country, among people from other countries. We are all "private diplomats" and should take responsible actions.

* * *


Wenran Jiang

1. In the short term, Japanese leaders should stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine so the two countries can put their relationship back on track for the "second normalization" process, that is to have regular bilateral meetings at all levels, especially the summit.
Why - First, the Yasukuni Shrine remains the central issue of the current deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations. Second, Yasukuni has damaged Japan beyond its relations with China. Third, solving the Yasukuni issue, even temporarily, will form the basis for further efforts of reconciliation.
Why promising - First, Beijing has been seeking a way out in improving relations with Tokyo. Second, there are growing forces in Japan against visits to Yasukuni by future Japanese PMs. Third, Emperor Showa's comments, as the recently released memo indicates, adds further pressure for stopping the prime ministerial visits. Fourth, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is stepping down, leaving the door open for Shinzo Abe and other potential successors not to make a firm commitment for visiting the shrine.

2. In the medium term, Japan and China should establish a number of mechanisms to manage the bilateral relationship in the new century: institutionalized official dialogues that address bilateral differences; private sector associations that deals with bilateral business ties; regular track-two style meetings that bring government officials, business, academics and public opinion leaders together.
Why - First, while history issues may dominate the headlines, China-Japan relations are multi-dimensional and require much more extensive care at many levels. Second, the existing institutions are either outdated or ineffective. Third, meaningful and effective working institutions will improve communications, benefit mutual understanding and lead to reconciliation.
Why promising - First, there is growing realization in both countries that communication channels established in the 1970s and 1980s are no longer suitable for the 21st century, and something new has to be worked out for the new generations. Second, while coping with pressing issues such as the East China Sea energy dispute and the North Korea nuclear crisis, there are already existing management mechanisms (although not institutionalized) between Tokyo and Beijing. Third, both countries have a much younger and more professional diplomatic, business and academic work force that can facilitate such tasks.

3. In the long term, Japan needs to go through a thorough national reflection on its war past while China should be a lot more self-reflective and forgiving in order to establish a future-oriented, healthy bilateral relationship; but this must be an international effort.
Why - First, true reconciliation must be based on soul-searching and nationwide reflections of the past. Second, both countries must confront negative nationalism and leaders of both countries should resist the temptations of using nationalism for political gains. Third, both peoples need to come to terms with each other at the emotional level, and manage the "superiority-inferiority complex." Fourth, external forces, international institutions and world opinions can affect the behaviours of Japan and China, even though both are powerful states.
Why promising - First, a nationwide debate is going on in Japan about its own past while internal and open debates about China's Japan policy have also been going on for some time in China, both healthy signs of long-term reconciliation efforts. Second, China continues to grow economically and open up politically while Japan is stabilizing as one of the largest economies, laying foundations for both as equal players on the world stage. Third, world opinion, assisted by rapidly growing communication technologies, will have more and more impact on the leadership and the public in both Japan and China.


* * *


Jin Xide

The Three Things of Top Priority for Reconciliation between China and Japan

Recent years relations between China and Japan have been in a state of "worst situation since 1972" or "cold political relations and hot economic ones". This aroused deep concern among not only in various circles of Chinese and Japanese society but also in the international community.
As many results of research and observation show, China-Japan relations have been undergoing a long process of structural readjustment. It doesn't seem any simple measure could have immediate effects for realizing total reconciliation between them. Even so, trying best to find out a way leading to reconciliation has become common task and responsibility for the government and people in both countries.
In my opinion, the following three things will be most promising for achieving the above purpose.

1. To control and manage the history problem.
The history problem has become the main reason for provoking political frictions and mutually deteriorating the public opinion and the feeling of the people in the both countries. But the reasons behind this problem are so complicated that to thoroughly solve this issue in a morning seems like a mission impossible.
Based on this judgment, an intermediate solution will be to control and manage this problem. The following measures will be necessary for the solution.
The first one is to hold dialogues in various levels between them to make clear and confirm the contents of the history problem and try to find out solutions for resolving them.
The second one is to mutually adopt the principle of controlling and managing this problem under the framework of their bilateral political relations and restricting themselves from taking any actions to further worsen the situation.
The third one is to try hard mutually to separate history problem with the other bilateral issues in economic relations, the other non-political fields and people-to-people exchanges.
The meaning of this suggestion lies in an assumption to stop the trend of sliding down into a worse situation of history problem and change it into an improving track.
To compare with some other radical suggestions the above one may seem too conservative. However it is the most realistic and promising one in present time the effectiveness of which has been proved by the practice of last decade of China-Japan relations.

2. To hold comprehensive strategic dialogue
Recent years some kinds of political and security dialogues between the two governments have been in progress.
The top leaders of the two countries have met in the third countries several times but failed in reaching consensus on the main issues especially the history problem. The meetings even worsened the atmosphere of the political relations between them.
There also have been some foreign ministerial meetings held by Li Zhao-xing and his Japanese counterparts Machimura Nobutaka and his successor Aso Taro. But no any meaningful breakthrough was made in the meetings.
In vice foreign ministerial level, there have been five times dialogues called "strategic dialogue" by China and "comprehensive policy dialogue" by Japan with Dai Bing-Guo and Yachi Shotaro as the leaders of both sides.
In vice foreign ministerial level there has been another dialogue channel called security dialogue. The leaders of the two sides in the recent tenth meeting were Wu Da-wei and Nishida Tsuneo.
Dialogues have also been held on the Issue of East China Sea. The recent sixth negotiation was held between Hu Zheng-yue and Sasae Kenichiro both of who were chief of Asian Bureau of Foreign Ministry.
From these dialogues we can see how difficult they are! Under the circumstances of lacking favorable internal and external conditions and strong political wills and good methods, these dialogues have had little gains for both sides.
Nevertheless a high level framework or mechanism of regular comprehensive and substantial strategic dialogue will be absolutely necessary for the present relations between them. The purpose of the dialogue will be multiple.
The main contents of the dialogue will be: confidence building, exchanging views and information, preventing conflicts, mutually improving public opinion, and making grand design for their overall cooperation in bilateral as well as multilateral cooperation.
To compare with the hitherto ones the suggested strategic dialogue needs at least the following improvements.
Firstly, it is necessary for both sides to have the sincere wills to hold a meaningful strategic dialogue.
Secondly, the rank of the dialogue should be high enough to influence the both sides' decision-making.
Thirdly, the contents of the dialogue should be comprehensive and substantial.
Fourthly, the dialogue should keep stability and consistency.

3. To improve the people's mutual feeling
Recent years the worsened public opinion and the people's feeling have become one of the new and main obstacles for China-Japan relations. Without improvement of this situation it will be very difficult to make substantial compromise for the leadership and government of both sides in the main issues between them.
In the other side, the general political posture of the leadership and government will also be one of the basic factors for improving the public opinion and the people's feeling.
For this end the leadership and government of the two sides should take very cautious attitude towards the sensitive issues between the two countries so as to preventing the public opinion being stimulated in negative ways. They should actively push forward all kinds of people-to-people exchanges beneficial for improving the mutual understanding in the fields of business, academic activities, mass media, culture, tourism, education, etc.

Conclusion
By pushing forward the above things it is expected to change the situation of bad circulation into a good ones between government and public opinion inside the both societies and between the two countries.

* * *


Mindy L. Kotler

Geo-political considerations of regional economic and military competition notwithstanding, social and cultural anxieties appear at the heart of Sino-Japanese tensions. The Chinese and Japanese people share many of the same societal dislocations, economic uncertainties, and personal insecurities. One view of rising nationalism in these two countries is that it is a convenient distraction from these issues that has been engineered by political elites. Another is that nationalism's manifestations in China and Japan are the result of incomplete nation building where social change encourages an idealization of a mythic past.
Both China and Japan are ancient societies forged into nation-states by foreign ideologies. Both have citizens with weak national identities and leaderships that aspire to build stronger ones. Both are confronting inward-looking, individualist trends that distance their citizens from the state. Both societies are struggling with expanding personal responsibilities after a period of rigid conformity. In short, both China and Japan have witnessed a decade of social change brought about by rapidly transforming economies in an era of acultural globalization.
China and Japan now share a unique period in their nation building. The central governments are faltering in their ability to provide social stability and cohesion-a sense of safety and material well-being. Security is being defined by making Chineseness or Japaneseness a civil, rather than an ethnic quality. It is the "national" in national security with which both societies are grappling.
Solutions are sought in pursuing moral reeducation. For the majority of Japanese leaders this is found in retelling the glory days of Imperial Japan and the Greater East Asian War. For Chinese leaders, this is found in the saga of struggle in War against Japanese Aggression. Each sees these times as nobler of purpose and clearer of duty than those of today. Leaders in both countries want to pursue a form of "patriotic education" in order to relive their pasts to regain their futures. Interestingly, both see nobility in the retelling of these "failures." In identifying themselves as "victims" though their dogged support for losing causes, Chinese and Japanese find proof of moral sincerity.
The Chinese and Japanese people are beset with anxieties about their future. Their leaders both want to restore and confirm pride and prestige to their people. As interactions increase between the two, the tendency to project these fears upon the other is great. Until the Chinese and Japanese governments recognize and respond effectively to these worries and foster a sense of national confidence and security internally, the current negative perceptions of the other will persist. Significant progress in Sino-Japanese relations is unlikely. Once popular concerns are met, however, we can likely see a more balanced relationship between the two countries.
Current Sino-Japanese tensions reflect more each country's domestic stresses than they do any inherent regional strategic competition. Restoration or the establishment of prosperity and social certainty in both countries is necessary before China and Japan can have any meaningful resolution of their historical and geo-political issues. Indeed, reconciliation between China and Japan is less a history issue than a future issue.
I believe that reconciliation between China and Japan must first be found in internal national reconciliations. The process of rebuilding social cohesion, however, must equally develop trust between these two countries. Ways must be found that make the future less frightening and insecure. First measures must be immediate, tangible, and mutually understandable.
Japan needs to come to terms with loss of the war and confirm its commitment to democracy. Toward this end:
a. Legislation similar to that in Germany that restricts hate speech, denial of wartime misdeeds, and protects those who try to educate about the war are important. For example, positioning a guard at the comfort women museum in Tokyo would be a powerful symbol. Removing the uyoku trucks and people from Yasukuni would be another.
b. A national day of remembrance should be established, similar to Memorial Day in the US or ANZAC day in Australia.
c. A government restitution commission similar to those in Germany and Austria should be established to address grievances by comfort women, POWs, slave laborers, non-Japanese nuclear victims Japanese orphans left in China, and others. Legalistic solutions to these issues have engendered contempt and distrust.
d. Memorials to the victims of the war should be created that school children can visit. Examples include: plaques at the docks where the Hellships and Korean laborers arrived; an interactive museum created from one of the Mitsubishi or Mitsui mines (the best being Battleship Island), and greater recognition of the Juganji Buddhist temple near Osaka that holds annual memorial services for foreign POW dead.
China and Japan must recognize that the time of empire is over. As the Europeans have learned, borders change and principalities come and go. Lingering historical claims over islets and boundaries are formulas for trouble and opportunities for demagogues. Every effort should be made toward practical, ahistoric resolutions all territorial disputes. Allies of both countries need to indicate that they will not support or defend every territorial claim.
China needs to show appreciation for Japan's efforts and seek ways to reassure Japan of its intentions. China too needs to confront it wartime history. Not all Chinese were freedom fighters or heroic. Popular culture should be encouraged to present a more balanced picture of Japan and Japanese history. China also needs to take the high ground and not react to every provocative action by Japan.
Yasukuni seems to be a separate issue. It is symbolic of all that is wrong with the Sino-Japanese relationship. More important, it is a Japanese issue representing all of Japan's unresolved national identity and war angst. It is world of mythic history and state religion. In many respects, it is on its way to being resolved. The subtle but clear involvement of the imperial house will go far to define the role of Yasukuni in Japan. After all, the Shrine was created by and for the Imperial house to glorify death in war for the Emperor. It his job to depoliticize the memorial.
Shinto is theologically unbound. If there is a consensus that the 14 Class A War Criminals (crimes against peace) should be dis-enshrined, it can and will happen. More difficult is to decide whether Yasukuni is a religious or state site. There are excellent arguments for both. In either case, the Yushukan (museum) must be removed or substantially altered. The argument that the site is private falls apart when claims are equally made that it is a national place of mourning.
One area of discussion would be the acceptability of the PM or Emperor visiting the Chinriesha Shrine at Yasukuni. This Shrine enshrines all those who fought against the empire. It is to pacify their souls. Although they are enshrined collectively they receive twice daily, Shinto rites and have their own festival day July 13. For now, the Chinriesha is fenced off and to the side of main shrine. The symbolism of the Chinriesha being unfenced, recognized, and guarded against right-wing fanatics has promise as a dramatic symbol of reconciliation.

* * *



Tessa Morris-Suzuki

This is a huge and complex question, and much thought would be needed to provide a good answer. However, as quick response and as a starting point to provoke discussion, I would suggest the following three (in no particular order):

The United States should enter into direct negotiations with North Korea, in order to re-start the stalled regional process of dialogue on the problems of the Korean Peninsula. - This may seem a counter-intuitive response, as it does not directly involve Japan or China. However, in the long run I think that the greatest risk to future China-Japan relations lies in the danger of a violent or chaotic end to the North Korean crisis. On the other hand, restoring the possibility of regional dialogue on North korea would provide a good basis for further developing regional dialogue on other issues. However, at present it seems that this will not happen until the US overcomes its reluctance to negotiate directly with North Korea.

Japan should create a secular "peace memorial" to the war dead as an alternative to the Yasukuni Shrine - This should be based on widespread debate and consultation, both inside and outside Japan. It should draw on the recent rich experience of the design of memorials developed particularly in countries like Germany, but also embodied in existing Japanese memorials such as the Okinawa "Cornerstone of Peace"

Japan, China and Korea (possibly in cooperation with other parts of the region such as Mongolia and Far Eastern Russia) should cooperate in establishing a jointly-managed East Asian TV network - The network would show news and entertainment material from all parts of the region, including co-produced programs, language education programs etc. One of its main purposes would be to overcome the grass-roots mutual fear and misunderstanding between the countries of the region, particularly amongst younger generations.

* * *


Katherine Morton

Reconciliation between China and Japan

Suggestion one: Establishment of an Integrated Environmental and Energy Conservation Cooperation Framework
For over a decade, scholars and policymakers in Japan have stressed the importance of developing environmental cooperation with China. By the late 1990s it was seen as a way of expanding beyond the bilateral relationship to enhance regional cooperation. This vision has yet to be realized. But environmental cooperation on a bilateral basis is developing fast, largely driven by Japan's ODA program. It is no longer the Japanese side that is pushing the agenda. Environmental concerns are now taken seriously in Beijing and it is widely recognized that Japan's experience and expertise in pollution control is highly relevant in the China context. Both countries also share a deep interest in energy conservation. For China, rapid growth in energy consumption on such a vast scale means that it has little choice but to improve energy efficiency and re-orient its economic development towards the sustainable use of resources. As an energy resource poor nation, Japan is also keen to promote energy conservation amongst its neighbouring countries to reduce the risk of regional competition for energy supplies.
An agreement between the two governments has already been reached to initiate a policy dialogue on energy conservation. My suggestion would be to establish an integrated framework for environmental and energy conservation cooperation. This could help to facilitate a common agenda for addressing the nexus between environmental protection and energy conservation. In the case of most other countries these areas are treated separately - for example the US-China Energy Policy Dialogue or the EU-China Environmental Policy Dialogue. Past experience has shown that efforts to reduce industrial pollution in China are most effective when linked to incentive schemes for improving energy efficiency. Likewise, in order to achieve long-term results, energy conservation needs to be linked to broader environmental concerns such as afforestation and the rehabilitation of wetlands (ie: carbon sinks).
Such a cooperative framework would need to involve the private sector on both sides. Without the support of corporations new initiatives will not succeed. Japanese yen loans to China will cease in 2008 to coincide with the Olympic Games. Hence corporate investment will be necessary to sustain specific projects at the operational level.
Cooperation in an area that promises mutual benefits can strengthen dependency and moderate hostility thus reducing the potential for conflict. However, Sino-Japanese differences will not simply fade away on the basis of functional cooperation. To help mend relations and build trust it is also necessary to address sensitive issues (perhaps on an incremental basis) within a broader framework of cooperation. Such issues include the disposal of chemical weapons left by the Japanese military in northeastern China, intellectual property, and the development of gas fields in the South China Sea.
Suggestion two: Establishment of a Third Sector Dialogue
Over the past decade, both China and Japan have witnessed a rapid increase in civil society organizations working to improve social welfare, environmental protection, gender equity etc. These organizations differ widely with respect to their degree of autonomy from the government, organizational capacity, and scope of activity. The development of civil society, also known as the third sector, is of interest to both the Japanese and Chinese governments. However, there has been very little cooperation within this sector on a bilateral basis. This is largely because Japanese aid to China has tended to circumvent NGO participation. It is also because bilateral relations have tended to be centered at the elite level.
The benefit of such a dialogue lies in its potential to infuse more public involvement into the bilateral relationship. A bottom up approach to building trust at the societal level can help to expand openness, reduce tensions, and promote longer-term interests. Fostering a thicker web of connections between the two countries may also help to increase interdependency.
Ideally, the dialogue should be broad based and inclusive of NGOs, networks, media, artists, scientists, etc. The Internet could provide a means of building networks and soliciting common concerns. A public forum could then be organized (perhaps every two years) in cities outside of Beijing and Tokyo hosted by local mayors. This would provide a source of alternative ideas to be channeled into central policy decision-making in both countries. On a practical basis, it may also be possible to set up volunteer programs for Japanese volunteers to spend time working in NGOs in China and vice-versa.

Suggestion three: Co-sponsored Research Project - Japanese Aid to China 40 years On
As mentioned above, Japanese aid to China is planned to end in 2008 to coincide with the Olympic Games. Historically Japanese aid to China has been seen as de facto war reparations. It therefore has a high symbolic value which explains the difficult negotiations that took place between China and Japan over the planned 25% reduction in aid to China in fiscal 2001. Many Japanese remain deeply suspicious that ODA to China is somehow linked to increases in military spending. There also exists a common feeling that ODA is not appreciated in China. A fully transparent research project that looks back over the past forty years at Japanese aid and its contributions to the Chinese economy may help to assuage some of these suspicions. This could be carried out on a similar basis to the World Bank 50 years on project that brought in independent researchers to look at the role of the Bank on an objective basis with a balanced assessment of actual outcomes on the ground. The benefit of such a project is that regardless of some of the limitations involved it would help to highlight some of the contributions that remain invisible to the public eye. The project would need to be co-sponsored by both countries with the aim of publishing a book in Japanese and Chinese.

* * *


Shi Yinhong

Three Things to Advance Reconciliation between China and Japan

To control the confrontational dynamics in China-Japan relations by setting rules of "status quo maintenance", "fields de-linkage", "agents de-linkage", "case by its own merits", and "initiative in making concessions"
One might say without too much exaggeration that there is already between China and Japan a kind of political/strategic cold war situation, with some prominent features of a classical Cold War. The political relationship between the two countries seems to have become a "zero-sum" game, whether in terms of its fundamental structure or of those concrete disputes, resulting at an protracted and almost total stalemate because of the consistent refusal of either side to make any substantial concession first to the other. Especially, the problem of visiting Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese prime minister has become the paramount test of strength or the chief battleground, over which either side has confronted the other for months and years, and on which according to their fixed perceptions enormous symbolic and substantial significances are at stake. By the very nature of "zero-sum" game, every major effort by one in the game aimed at a significant "gain" will be surely resisted strongly by the other who is to suffer a significant "loss" if no counteraction is done to neutralize effectively the striving of the former in the first place. The result of the contention and stalemate in this manner will be the increasingly aggravation of mutual suspicion, apprehension and hostility.
Between China and Japan, lasting tensions may of course escalate into protracted cold war confrontation or even armed conflict. If the escalating deterioration of the China-Japan political relations not mitigated or stopped, it will surely bring grave dangers to the vital interests of these two nations and to the East Asian stability and security. Therefore, at the present and in a relatively long period of the future, the imperative and practicable task in general is not (or at least not primarily) to solve the major dispute, but to mitigate tensions, to strive for stability, and to control as much as possible the confrontational dynamics in China-Japan relations, which are inherently unstable and potentially dangerous.
For this, the two national governments in Beijing and Tokyo are required to set in urgency a most essential rule for dealing with their major disputes and striving for the fundamental stability: the rule stipulating that neither country should take any action aimed at changing the status quo unilaterally on any issue over which there is major dispute between them. Besides this first priority in importance, there are four other basic rules that need to be established step by step. These are: To differentiate as firmly as possible four distinct major fields of China-Japan relations, i.e., the history disputes, strategic rivalry (including territorial disputes and various security problems), diplomatic intercourses, and economic interdependence, for the purpose of preventing or "interdicting" as much as possible such development that the grave tension or crisis happened in any one of these fields influences excessively the other fields; To differentiate without reservation the statements and acts of national government from those of private persons or institutions and local governments, taking the former as the only standard for assessing and judging the intentions and policy of the other country, for the purpose of preventing, "interdicting", or reducing the impact of the private or local anti-Chinese or anti-Japanese actions respectively in Japan and China upon the working relationship between the national governments; To treat the statements and acts of the national government on the other side concretely, mainly in a manner of case by case according to its own merits, not escalating the nature of things in official assessment or governmental public comments without strict limitations; On the basis of reasonable success to control the grave tensions, both sides should realize that it will be helpful to take initiative to offer some limited and appropriate concessions on the existing major disputes, at least for exploring the other's intentions and creating chances for their possible mitigation or solution.
In short, it is imperative to set the above basic rules of "status quo maintenance", "fields de-linkage", "agents de-linkage", "case by its own merits", and "initiative in making concession" for controlling the dangerous confrontational dynamics. In order to generate and implement these rules, a kind of much more comprehensive, concentrate, regular, and intensive China-Japan Strategic Dialogue and its institutional mechanisms must be created and developed as soon as possible. Moreover, in view of the existing tensions, especially in the sea areas between China and Japan resulted from serious territorial and natural resources disputes and military activities, together with other potentialities for conflict, including those from the Taiwan problem and the increasing forward existence of U.S.-Japan military alliance, formal regular dialogues on the higher political, functionary institutional, and professional military levels for setting rules and procedures of crisis management are also imperative and relatively urgent. So much in national and international security is at stake in their launching, progress, rule-formation and implementation.

To prepare to accommodate the respective core interests, national sensibilities, and aspirations of both China and Japan by partially restructuring the fundamental regime of bilateral relations ("the 1972 regime")
For three decades since 1972 when the China-Japan diplomatic normalization dramatically began and quickly realized until the most recent years and months, there had been a political and almost legal regime for China-Japan relations which was defined and most authoritatively demonstrated by the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement of September 29, 1972 as well as the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded on August 12, 1978 as the former document's legal completion.
This regime, called by many prominent Japanese scholars and political leaders as well as some Chinese experts on the Japanese studies as "the 1972 regime", takes its stipulation on the issues of history and Taiwan as its core norms, which defines in both words and spirits Japan's war against China in 1930s and 40s as totally unjustifiable armed aggression and Taiwan as part of China and under China's sovereignty. As to the broader power realities which generated such a regime three decades ago, U.S.-China rapprochement and the so-call "Nixon shock" suffered by Japan are the most important. And strategic purpose of the both sides then in checking the Soviet geopolitical power and "hegemonism" had provided one of the major dynamics for the regime. It is obvious that the 1972 regime has been highly favorable to China (and one might also say that it much more so to China than to Japan), whether in consideration of its core norms or of its power relationship background and even the primary strategic purpose held by the both sides at the time of its birth. It has been more so because of the passiveness and reactivity of the Japanese government in the related decision-making under the international political circumstances then drastically emerged following Nixon's visit to China.
Since then, due to China's dramatic rise in recent years the structure of power relationship between China and Japan has changed and continues to change, becoming much more favorable to China even than what it was temporarily as it like in 1970s due to the particular circumstances then existed. However, the 1972 regime that had been highly favorable to China have not been strengthened or more solidified, but on the contrary impinged seriously by the various actions of the Japanese government under Koizumi in the past three years or so. Why? Because not only there has been no common strategic purpose between China and Japan since the drastic decline and then collapse of the Soviet Union, but these two nations, in the context of the rise of the former and the increasing change of national will of the latter in a rightist and nationalistic direction, has been developing mutually conflicting strategic purposes. In terms of the 1972 regime, China is a one hundred percent status quo power, while Japan has become one that strongly inclines to revisionism. Moreover, it has virtually begun to treat, both explicitly and implicitly, the revision of this regime with its core norms on history and Taiwan as a major component of its new state will to pursue political status and military rights as a "normal state".
The 1972 regime very clearly stipulates and upholds two of the vital interests of China in her relations with Japan-those on the issues of history and Taiwan. However, it seems not to do so (or at least far from in a same degree) for Japan. The vital interests of Japan defined by herself was ambiguous at the time of regime birth and is recently in major change or redefining. The 1972 regime is bound to be difficult in maintaining intact without change, because of both the change of Japan's basic willingness and those have happen for most of the fundamental circumstances since 1972. It would not be possible to maintain the status quo one hundred percent. However, the problem of this regime is definitely not that it has become fundamentally out of date, even not that it needs any change in its stipulating and upholding the vital interests of one of its parties (China), or that China could tolerate that change. Any possible new regime of China-Japan relations must still provides and upholds China's lasting vital interests on the issue of history and Taiwan in her relations with Japan, and therefore must inherit the principles provided by the 1972 regime on these two major issues. Otherwise there will be no possibility that China would consider or accept any new regime for her relations with Japan or she should do it at all.
But on the other hand, because of the changes that have happen for most of the fundamental circumstances in the past three decade, the 1972 regime has indeed become quite insufficient or inadequate. It should be expanded. In other words, beside the existing core norms on the issues of history and Taiwan, three sets of new norms should be added, or at least the following first set of new norm added as soon as possible: (1) the norms for controlling the China-Japan confrontational dynamics and establishing "crisis management"; (2) those for helping to produce the constructive political/strategic effects from the economic interdependence between China and Japan; (3) those concerning East Asia security, involving the military strengths and their development of the two countries, China's relations with the U.S.-Japan military alliance, the scope and extent of Japan's "military rights" that could be accepted by China, peace and stability in the Korean Peninsular, and regional non-proliferation. Of course, this last set of norms is most difficult to be constructed, with most numerous and greatest uncertainties. Meanwhile, it is obvious that Japan's aspiration to become a "normal state" that with a peaceful normal relations with its neighbor countries, together with her legitimate rights as a sovereign state and one of the very important nation in Asia and beyond would be addressed or even respected in the expanded new regime.

3. As far as possible to prevent the establishment among the Japanese people of an image of an "increasingly powerful but strongly hostile China"
This is an advice exclusively for China and the Chinese ourselves. Whatever strategy China pursues and however negative the state of the political relations with Japan becomes, the "thesis of differentiating (the people from the small minority of militarists)" which had been raised and relentlessly implemented by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in treating the history of the Japanese aggression and conducting PRC's Japan policy and which is characterized by its political and strategic feature as reasonable, expedient, and moderate must be insisted firmly and practiced with the greatest possible sophistication as one of the primary working guiding principles of China's policy toward Japan and of almost all her activities in the relations with Japan. It is in this dimension that China's performance in the recent years up to know has left too much to be desired. Both the Chinese government and public must do their best in ways that are reasonable and capable of winning gradually the hearts and minds of the majority of the Japanese public for (to say it prudently) contributing to the cause of preventing them accept the Japanese rightists' outlook on history and political affairs and establish fixedly in their own minds a image of a China which is becoming more and more powerful while strongly antagonistic toward (or even hating) Japan, and alter thereby a series of their fundamental notions concerning national security. For these purpose, China's great efforts to strive for mitigating the tensions and controlling the potentially dangerous confrontational dynamics in her relations with Japan are also quite important and capable of generate substantial effect.
As to the Japanese public opinion about China and their attitude and perception on a series of major related issues, China is certainly not in a position of being able surely to realize what she wants without major discount. However, this does not mean at all that there is no need to try very seriously with great care for its realization to an extent as great as possible. China should try in this manner and do her best. This kind of efforts is indeed an important factor in participating the shaping of Japan's national orientation and her future state of affairs, and a demonstration of being highly responsible for China's security environment and vital interests. Moreover, It itself is an major aspect of the struggle against the Japanese rightists, for it closely relates to the imperative of preventing those people to obtain the evidences of "China's threat" to facilitate their endeavor of capturing as much Japanese public as possible. It also closely relates to the winning of international opinions, making them sympathize with China's just attitude toward Japan. Empathic understanding of both the Japanese public and the international "audiences" is indispensable for any wise major policy and behavior on the part of China toward Japan, and the sense of proportion based on sophistication in political actions and moderation in moral judgment a precondition for strategic success.

* * *


Masaru Tamamoto

Wanted: An Elite Conspiracy

The Problem
There needs to be the recognition that, for the first time in East Asian modern history, Japan and China now live in the same world, bound by and sharing the logic and rules of global capitalism. Relations are interdependent to a degree not seen before. Such interdependence has only become evident during the last fifteen years or less, with the rapid integration of China into global capitalism. There is an identity of the future of Japan and China, and of Japan and China in the world. The problem is insufficient recognition in both countries of this seemingly obvious phenomenon. Instead there is talk of rivalry and competition and exclusivity.

Comparison with France and Germany, of Europe and East Asia
The basic of European integration has been economics with two conditions: the approximation of per capita wealth and middle class development. (When a critical mass of society turns middle class, more democratic governance comes. Property rights are key to a stable middle class, and a set of social and political rights flow from property rights.) Now there is a Europe whose pillars are denationalization and demilitarization of politics.
East Asia will not be ready for a European-type integration until China's per capita wealth approximates the Japanese, which will take several decades. During this process, interdependence will deepen and tend toward integration; borders will become increasingly porous and eventually open. And inter-state relations will become increasingly functionally differentiated, as relations between advanced economies already are.

"Elite Conspiracy"
Before the current regimes in Tokyo and Beijing, there was certain understanding between the elites of the two capitals. The 1985 Nakasone visit to Yasukuni shrine is indicative; the Japanese premier secured prior consent of the Chinese president. When mass protest erupted in China, to "save" the Chinese president, Nakasone ceased any further visit.

Reconciliation entails the establishment of justice. The meaning of justice must be shared. Historical justice is a demand of politics. With populism and nationalism on the rise in both Japan and China, needed is an elite construction of a commonly shared value of justice.

Things that can be done
Cooperation on environment and related health issues. (from Japan to polluting China)
Cooperation on energy security including nuclear power development and safety.
Cooperation on labor migration. (from China to ageing Japan)
These three issues are central to further Chinese economic development, to improve the welfare of both societies, and to the eventual integration of the two societies by capitalist logic.

* * *


Richard Tanter

1. Recognize that reconciliation depends ultimately on civil society, not governments. This is not to avoid questions of state authority and capacity, but to specify the optimum conditions under which they may be activated. Governments have only acted to facilitate reconciliation in other cases where civil society actors have so transformed the public sphere as to create a structure of interests whereby state-managers perceive an interest of their own or no alternative. Accordingly, impediments to transnational civil society opinion formation and public influence on the informational miliieu relevant to reconciliation must be addressed. This includes recognition of government coercion and repression. Using methodologies developed for the mapping of global civil society, one preliminary research task is a mapping of transnational civil society networks involving China and Japan, their characteristics and strength over time, and historical contribution to reconciliation - positively or negatively.

2. Recognize that the failure of reconciliation and its manipulation by governments is a threat to both national and human security within the region and beyond. Accordingly states and civil society outside the region have a right to demand changes within it. Failure of reconciliation between these two countries is a problem of global consequence. As a starting point researchers should document the costs and dangers to the rest of the world of this ongoing failure and blockage of change - both by economic analysis of benefits foregone and costs incurred, and by standard risk analysis of potential cascades of political, military, economic and cultural negative sequences. Such analyses should become the basis for regional and external civil society and state pressures on the governments of the two countries that their behaviour is a risk to the security of all.

3. Recognize that the thwarting of reconciliation has been assisted and aggravated by both civil society actors and by national governments within the region and beyond. Accordingly researchers can contribute to reconciliation by documenting the historical and ongoing activities of the formateurs of a state of non-dialogue. This could include the activities of the Chinese government and its organs, the Japanese government and especially the Ministry of Education, nationalist groups operating through and on the LDP and comparable organisations and movements within China, and the wider framework of American hegemony both through the structuring of domestic political possibilities and active intervention to inhibit dialogue.

4. Conversely start by documenting and publicising the positive initiatives and achievements of governments (including sub-national) and civil society in both countries over the past half century. Going further, actively look for and encourage initiatives from both, based where possible on an identification of overlapping interests in the amelioration if not resolution of the issue.
5. Recognize that an effective politics of reconciliation cannot take place absent a widening and thickening of civil society relations between the two societies on all matters of social concern. China and Japan are no different from any two other neighbouring advanced countries where the component groups of civil society in fact share a number of sets of interests, especially in regard to global problems the causes of which are largely external to their societies but the results of which are only too evident locally. Accordingly movements for reconciliation will flourish when they exist within a wider context of normalised transnational civil society-based politics. This may appear to be putting the cart before the horse, but in fact it is not. Given the level of active blockage on the reconciliation issue, broadening the avenues of communication and bases for the formation of trust will buttress direct work on reconciliation. This is in large part a matter of social movements reframing their expected arenas of action and influence on a global and regional scale.

6. My own very rough suggestion on one such matter is as follows:
Where power and ethnicity overlap in international relations, sexuality will engage with both. Much has been written on the western version of this regarding "the Orient". The same set of factors is relevant to relations between China and Japan. The damage this issue can cause can be seen in the explosive Chinese reaction to the Japanese corporate party over a number of days in September 2003 in a Guangdong hotel to which several hundred Chinese sex workers were brought to service visiting Japanese company workers. The fact that this took place on the 72nd anniversary of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, with the inevitable reminders of wartime sexual slavery, increased the resonance.
If one had to choose one single policy initiative by which the Japanese government could improve relations with China, it might well be to impose effective Japanese regulation on Japanese involved in the organization of sex tours outside the country, and prosecute such acts even when committed outside Japan. Even better, both in terms of the basic politics and the rapid expansion of Chinese international tourism, would be if both countries were to initiate such legislation controlling the activities of their citizens abroad.
It would be relatively easy to form a coalition of civil society and state actors in the two countries, in concert with international groups and the United Nations, for example through the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and its Trafficking in Human Beings Initiative. The Japanese government has been involved in positive cooperation with the UN and other bodies on studies of trafficking, but while Japan is a signatory to the Protocol To Prevent, Suppress And Punish Trafficking In Persons, 2000, but has not yet ratified the Protocol. China has neither signed or ratified.
The Australian legislation on prosecution of sex crimes against children by Australian citizens committed outside the country may well be a useful guide here. The point is to be seen by China to be willingly doing something of substance to the limits of practical possibility.

* * *


Takahiko Tennichi

Redefine the relationship between Japan and China
In recent 10 years the relationship between Japan and China has deeply been changed. China is remarkably growing. We, Japanese, are now reviewing our systems, namely the Constitution, security system, intelligence and so on, because some Japanese argues that our systems are not suitable for the world today. If Japan and China see each other as their unchangeable old friend, they will be disappointed. Both Japan and China should accept the fact that they are changing. Today, East Asia has two great rivalry powers, Japan and China. This is the first experience for our region. In this sense, we should redefine our relationship between Japan and China

China should not say much about history and Japan should consider its history.
Since history of international relations is very complicated, it is difficult for different countries to have exactly the same perception towards history. In this perspective, it may be wise for China not to say much about Japanese history. However, the Second World War was disastrous not only for Chinese but also for Japanese. We, Japanese, should consider Japanese leader's responsibility for the war not because China condemn us but because the war was wrong.

A high-level trilateral meeting should be institutionalized among Japan, China and the United States.
There are a lot of key issues in East Asian region, namely energy problems, democracy, common rules of conduct in East China Sea. And US-led regional order is slowly transforming. At this point, roles of these three powers are crucial for the stability of this region. Exchanging views among these three countries is very important.

* * *


Mark Valencia

Possible Ways To Advance Reconciliation Between Japan and China

Premise
The relationship between China and Japan has soured because of several inter-related fundamental dichotomies: competition for regional political, economic and cultural leadership/dominance; Japan's alliance with China's potential enemy (the United States); and growing domestic politys that support a narrow-minded nationalistic leadership. Indeed, the two countries appear to be caught in an escalating action/reaction warp of history that may well lead to conflict. I am thus not optimistic that the relationship will improve. However, there are several key changes that could be the sine qua non for an improved relationship.

Suggestions
Japan should stop reminding China of World War II. For China and Chinese, Koizumi's Yasakuni Shrine visits are the manifestation of a nationalist pro-remilitarization movement in Japan which thus generates fear of another wave of Japanese aggression.
Instead of strengthening the military terms of its alliance with the United States, Japan should distance itself from the United States' more aggressive, anti-China policies and actions, particularly those that involve Taiwan. Otherwise China has little choice but to plan its defense against both Japan and the United States in the event of a crisis over Taiwan.
China should be more transparent as to its defense spending and preparations and their rationale, and refrain from military activities around Japan. Otherwise Japan and its domestic polity have little choice but to perceive China as a threat and to react accordingly.
A change in leadership attitude and style in both countries may be necessary for an improved relationship. Current leadership is supported by and panders to a nationalistic polity. It needs to be transformed to one that is more pragmatic, and that emphasizes complementarities and co-operation between the two nations.
Urgently needed is a greatly expanded, robust cultural and education exchange program between the two countries at all levels. Both Chinese and Japanese are rather culturally arrogant and ethnocentric, believing that they are superior to all and especially to each other. Yet there are obvious links and similarities between the two cultures and these should be emphasized while differences are muted or at least better understood.

* * *


Willem Van Kemenade

Three Issues:
Sino-Japanese Reconciliation through the "Re-Asianization" of Japan;
Sino-Japanese Reconciliation through a de-politicized Rule of Law;
Sino-Japanese Reconciliation through Civilian Soft-Power Europe.

1. In the first piece, I argue that relations between the political classes of the two countries have for the time being, deteriorated beyond repair. Although some analysts pin some hope on the very different personality of Koizumi's likely successor, Abe Shinzo, it seems difficult that he can reconcile his ultra-conservative patriotism with a new non-ideological pragmatic line towards China.
In that case "Cold Politics - Hot Economics" will continue for some time. This need not necessarily be disastrous. Chinese president Hu Jintao has set the trend. He didn't get dinner at the White House and was insulted in all possible ways by a devious or incompetent White House. However, he got his dinner at Bill Gates' mansion in Seattle where everything was chummy.
Bill Gates will still be around for two decades or so and Bush will probably spend his post-presidential life in ignominy.
Something similar is going to happen in Sino-Japanese relations if the politicians don't do their job, as my interview with Kobayashi Yotaro illustrates. The Trilateral Commission, which in another era used to bring together the business (and political) elites from Europe, North-America and Japan has been expanded in that Japan no longer only represents this part of the world. It has transformed into a committee representing the Asia Pacific, Europe and North-America, in which China is well represented.
As Kobayashi said: "We have to make Japan part of Asia again". He knows better than politicians whose trade is to coin simple slogans to win the next election.

2. The Franco-German model of post-WWII reconciliation is often upheld as a blueprint for China and Japan. Japanese usually don't like it and that's why the Chinese love it. The German and European approach in Japan is not to promote their post WWII experiences actively. Japanese officials say that due to the very poor political relations and the absence of democracy and civil society in China, improvement of relations from people to people is severely hampered.
However, there is at least one area where Chinese citizens, - former forced laborers, victims of atrocities and comfort women with the help of Japanese lawyers working pro bono and of civic groups - have won cases for redress and compensation in Japanese courts. The victories are not too many and Japanese lower courts have regularly been overruled by higher courts invoking constitutional, international law or political factors that in Europe would be fully unacceptable.
The Chinese government also has obstructed a number of cases and treated redress activists generally as political dissidents. The Chinese government also obstructed that Japanese legal activists would work in compensation cases with Chinese individual activists on the ground that these were opposed to official state-level Sino-Japanese friendship and used foreign media to publicize their concerns.
Some of the Japanese lawyers, working for the victims have become folk-heroes in China. One of the major inhibiting factors for further progress is Japan's statute of limitations of 20 years. In Germany there is none, and Germany has even, after the end of the Cold War in 2000 introduced a new law to enable forced laborers of former Soviet satellites to still claim compensation and the burdens will be shared between the state and the companies.
Japan should take heed and seize this opportunity to improve its image in the world and consider ways to introduce a similar law. This is a question of civil courage of politicians.

3. A European perspective on the prospects for Sino-Japanese reconciliation: Europe hasn't played a role in regional security in East Asia since the liquidation of its colonial empires in the 1940s and 1950s. Since the 1980s, Northeast Asia, in particular the three nations of China (including Taiwan), Japan and South-Korea together emerged as one of the three major hubs of economic dynamism, i.e. comprehensive technological development, trade- and investment flows in the world, the other two being North-America and Europe. The European Union is already a fully integrated trading bloc and as such the Union as a whole has huge interests in this region. Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the EU has been developing a Common Security and Foreign Policy and is increasingly acting as a global player, but only as a civilian soft power engaging in multilateral, incrementalist, consensus-seeking negotiations, global rule-making and global governance reform.
The European Union is not exerting influence by playing a pro-active role per se, but just by being a distant role model, sometimes cooperating with the hard power of the United States (Afghanistan), sometimes distancing itself from it (Iraq). China is following a distinctive soft power model in regional and global affairs by active membership of the global network of the UN and its agencies and the WTO. Its approach is similar to the European Union. China shuns military alliances and the only regional organization it participates in as a leading member, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is not a military pact, but a civilian organization for regional security and cooperation.
Japanese and Chinese government officials stress that they want to learn from the European Union and more specifically the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe in setting up a permanent Northeast-Asian multilateral security mechanism.
Civilian power EU and the OSCE are always reminders to East Asians and others that there is an alternative to the American approach of military alliances, unilateralism and misguided preemptive war.

* * *


Peter Van Ness

1. Paradigm change in how we think about resolving conflict. One important example, in my opinion, would be to encourage policy-makers to think in terms of the opportunity costs of the diplomatic positions that they take.
Wikipedia defines opportunity cost as "the cost of something in terms of an opportunity forgone (and the benefits that could be received from that opportunity), or the most valuable forgone alternative".
For example, more than 60 years after the end of World War II, there is no formal peace treaty between Japan and Russia because of their lingering territorial dispute over several of the Kurile Islands northeast of Hokkaido. Moreover, when you ask Russian and Japanese diplomats and analysts about the problem, they typically tell you how difficult it would be to make the concessions needed to achieve a resolution of the dispute. Never discussed, at least in my experience in observing this situation, is the opportunity cost of the lost potential benefits that cooperation might have brought to the two countries if they had resolved their differences. Think, for example, of the immense potential mutual benefit that might have been gotten over those many years from creating a positive diplomatic environment for a greater linking of Japanese capital and technology with Russia's immense natural resources to create projects for joint exploration and development.
This dispute over the Kurile Islands is, in my opinion, a classic case of what happens when government officials limit themselves to pursuing status-quo policies of confrontation. It is especially common with respect to contested issues where the continuing confrontation is perceived to be virtually inevitable, despite the substantial benefits that mutual cooperation might provide to both parties to the dispute. In other words, there is an insufficient accounting for the price of failure to resolve the conflict, i.e., the opportunity cost of maintaining the confrontational status quo.
If one were to apply the concept of opportunity cost to the East China Sea dispute between Japan and China, for example, it would be important to compare the potential benefits for both countries of a collaborative exploitation of the resources of the area, with the price of the current contestation and confrontation over competing territorial claims. Such an analysis would include both an evaluation of the lost opportunity to benefit and the cost of continuing to mobilize forces to defend the current competing claims. Thinking this way might help to break the vicious cycle of reinforcing confrontation, on the one hand, and help to build a positive cycle of reinforming mutual benefit, on the other.

2. Cooperation between major business interests in each country that have extensive trade and investment interests in the other country. Some steps have been taken in Japan in this direction. For example, the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyukai) has asked PM Koizumi to stop making visits to Yasukuni Shrine and has proposed the building of an alternative memorial to the war dead; and Akio Mimura, Vice Chairman of Nippon Keidanren and President of Nippon Steel Corporation, has called for dialogue and cooperation with China in the fields of environment and energy conservation. But what about the business interests on the Chinese side?
If one compares Japan's relations with China to Sino-US relations, one finds that whenever the political relationship between the US and China goes sour, the US-China trade council and American businesses with major interests in China begin to actively lobby the White House to contain any deterioration in the general Sino-US relationship. This kind of lobbying activity in both Japan and China (and between business interests in the two countries) could have a major influence on reconciliation.

3. Symbolic Initiatives by Emperor Akihito. Recent events suggest that the Emperor might take steps to enhance reconciliation. In July, the diary of Tomita Tomohiko, grand steward of the Imperial Household Agency during the reign of Emperor Hirohito, revealed that the late Emperor was opposed to the enshrinement of Class-A war criminals at Yasukuni Shrine, and that is why he no longer made visits to the shrine. And, last year, his son, Emperor Akihito, visited a memorial for Korean war dead when also paying his respects to other victims of the battle for Saipan, and he also commented on a different occasion that he thought Japanese loyalty to the national anthem, Kimigayo, and the national flag, Hinomaru, should not be compulsory but voluntary.
One might say that these are only very modest steps, but no other person in Japan has the same potential influence as the Emperor to help resolve important historical disputes of the past and to symbolize new beginnings for relations with Japan's Asian neighbours. Perhaps these recent events indicate that Emperor Akihito might be receptive to suggestions for initiatives he might take to enhance reconciliation.

* * *