Papers on historical reconciliation & cooperat ...

Pictures from the August 2006 Workshop at the ANU

2006-12-10T14:03:00.000+11:00

Mark Valencia on the East China Sea

2006-11-30T17:02:00.000+11:00

THE EAST CHINA SEA DISPUTE: WAYS FORWARD

Mark J. Valencia

Maritime Policy Analyst

Kaneohe, Hawaii, USA

The East China Sea is one of the last unexplored high-potential resource areas located near large markets. But the development of oil and gas in much of the area has been prevented for decades by conflicting claims to boundaries and islets in the area by China, Taiwan and Japan.

Such disputes over small islands and ocean space are usually ancillary to more fundamental geopolitical dialectics. However in certain situations of big power rivalry and competition for scarce petroleum resources such issues may become the tail that wags the dog of international relations. The intensifying competition between China and Japan for gas resources in the East China Sea could become just such a situation. However, conflict is not inevitable. China's June 2004 proposal to jointly develop the hydrocarbon resources of the East China Sea is an opportunity to cap rising tension, and at long last harvest the resources in the disputed area.

The Current Situation

Over the last several years, China has been drilling ever closer to the equidistant line between undisputed territory of both countries that has been unilaterally declared as the boundary by Japan. And it is now producing gas from the Chungxiao field situated just on its side of that line. Tokyo has protested the drilling and production because it fears China will siphon off gas from its side of the "boundary" and is now considering allowing Teikoku oil company to drill on Japan's side of it. Just the possibility of such drilling by Teikoku has been fiercely protested by Beijing which claims most of the continental shelf in the East China Sea.

In September 2005 the dispute turned dangerous when five Chinese naval vessels including a guided missile destroyer were observed near the Chunxiao gas field. One of the warships pointed its gun at a Japanese P3-C surveillance aircraft. A day before bilateral talks on the boundary were to resume, China confirmed that it had established a 'reserve vessel squadron' in the East China Sea. It was announced that the squadron was capable of "fighting during wars" and was equipped to "eliminate obstacles at sea". For Japan, this assertive act combined with the November 2004 detection of a Chinese nuclear submarine in Japanese territorial waters, increased electronic surveillance by Chinese aircraft, and the incursion of some 25 Chinese exploration ships into Japanese waters in the previous six months meant China was a potential threat. Indeed, in its "Security and Guarding Plan," the Japanese Self-Defense Forces for the first time identified China as a threat and suggested several threat scenarios including a brigade size invasion of the Senkakus. Meanwhile Taiwan has reminded all of its claims in the area by vowing to send patrol vessels to protect its sovereignty over oil and gas reserves.

Conflicting Claims

The claims to the area are complicated and involve sovereignty claims to territory, and claims to both continental shelves and 200 nautical mile (nm) Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).

Both China and Japan claim sovereignty over the Diaoyu (Senkakus in Japanese) --- eight uninhabited islets and rocks about 120 nm southwest of Okinawa. Japan controls the features but both China and Taiwan have formally incorporated them into their territory.

China holds that the Diaoyu Islands are small, uninhabited, and cannot sustain economic life of their own, and thus according to the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 UNCLOS) are not entitled to generate a continental shelf or a 200nm EEZ. Taiwan also holds that "The Diaoyudao Islands themselves are not entitled to have a continental shelf or EEZ, and thus have no significant legal effects on the boundary delimitation in the East China Sea." However Japan argues that the features are legal islands and are therefore entitled to have continental shelves and EEZs. Moreover it uses them as base points for its continental shelf and EEZ claims in the East China Sea.

Even if the conflicting sovereignty claims to the features did not exist, China, Japan and South Korea have overlapping claims to continental shelves in the East China Sea. The parties cite different principles of international law to support their claims. China uses the principle of natural prolongation of the land territory. "The East China Sea continental shelf is the natural extension of the Chinese continental territory. The People's Republic of China has inviolable sovereignty over the East China Sea continental shelf." Taiwan also uses the natural prolongation principle as does South Korea in the East China Sea. China and Taiwan argue further that the Okinawa Trough delineates the edge of the continental margin and that the axis of the Trough thus serves as the boundary between the continental shelves of China and Japan. Japan on the other hand argues that the Trough is just an incidental depression in a continuous continental margin between the two countries and thus the continental shelf boundary should be the line equidistant between the undisputed territory of the two countries.

China also argues that the delimitation should be effected by agreement, and that agreement through consultation on the basis of equity takes precedence over the equidistant line principle. South Korea also insists that "the presence of the [Okinawa] Trough constitutes special circumstances under which the median line principle cannot be applied."

All claimants are also entitled to a 200 nm EEZ. In its EEZ, a country exercises sovereign rights over the living and non-living resources of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and jurisdiction with regard to marine scientific research and the protection and preservation of the marine environment. The delineation of EEZ boundaries was not an issue until February 1996 when Japan and South Korea almost simultaneously declared 200 nm EEZs. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all express their claim to a 200 nm EEZ in conformity with the 1982 UNCLOS, i.e., the outer limit of the EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. South Korea says that in the areas where its EEZ overlaps with those of neighboring states, the boundary will be delimited by agreement in conformity with the relevant rules of international law. Since all (except Taiwan) are party to the 1982 UNCLOS and the extent of the EEZ is determined by distance there should not be a problem.

But there is. The different positions stem from the different baselines and from the dispute over the ownership of features from which the EEZ is measured. Japan's position is that because it owns the group of islands called Danjo Gunto, it is able to make claims to an EEZ extending from the islands to the equidistant line between South Korea and Danjo Gunto. South Korea does not dispute Japan's ownership of Danjo Gunto, but its position is that these are Japanese islands situated on South Korea's continental shelf and thus should be discounted in drawing an EEZ boundary. Japan uses the Diaoyu/Senkaku features as a base for its EEZ claim although it has declined to specify its extent vis-à-vis China.

An additional complication is that the boundary for the EEZ and continental shelf will not necessarily be the same. The EEZ claim can be only up to 200 nm from baselines while a continental shelf claim can extend as far as 350 nm from baselines, depending on the morphology and geology of the continental margin.

Ways Forward

Fortunately, there are factors at work that could ameliorate these disputes. The realization that a positive China-Japan relationship is simply too important to be destroyed by these disputes may be the catalyst necessary for wise leaders to forge at least a temporary solution. And despite chilly diplomatic relations, Japanese-Chinese trade and investment increase every year. Finally, there is growing pressure in both China and Japan to proceed with development of oil and gas in the area--- and therefore increased motivation to reach a compromise.

Although both seem to agree in principle on joint development, part of the problem is that the two sides have different interpretations of what joint development means or implies, and what area should be 'jointly developed'. Japan believes it means that China must cease its current exploration and development in Japanese claimed areas and that China should share the gas on China's side of the Japanese-claimed equidistant line. But China thinks it means that Japan will not interfere with Chinese exploitation of fields on its side of the line and the area for joint development is that between the median line claim and China's claimed continental shelf boundary including the area around the disputed islets.

Focusing on the specifics of the dispute, three basic agreements in principle are necessary before details of any solution can be negotiated.

a.. The first is agreement that the disputed territory (Senkakus/Diaoyutai) cannot be used as a basis for EEZ or continental shelf claims. Since Japan claims an EEZ and continental shelf from the Senkakus, this would be a concession by Japan that could be compensated by the division of the shares in a joint development scheme. If the two parties cannot agree on this point then the sovereignty issue will impede the boundary negotiations indefinitely. If they can agree, then the sovereignty issue can be separated from the boundary issue.

b.. The second agreement necessary to negotiate a solution is that there be a unified boundary for both the EEZ and continental shelf. This would be a major concession on China's part which could be compensated by the location of the boundary or the division of the shares in the joint development scheme. Having two boundaries would be politically messy and impractical as well as a constant source of irritation and provocation as bilateral relations wax and wane.

c.. The third agreement necessary is that regardless of where the boundary is located joint development of fish, minerals and hydrocarbon resources will be undertaken. This has essentially already been agreed in principle and in practice for fisheries. It would assure both parties that they would retain a share of the resources --- both known and unknown. It would also help to solidify the relationship because of the common goal of developing the resources.

If these three basic agreements can be reached, then myriad possibilities open up. Variables that can be negotiated include the location of the boundary, the area of joint development, and the split of the resources and responsibilities-and the latter may vary with location. If the division of the shares in the joint development agreement and the boundary location are considered as a package there will be more to balance and tradeoff.

In all options, the first step would be to agree to a 12 nm territorial sea enclave around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islets and to leave that area either as a "no-go" zone or for joint use and future settlement. The options also assume that China's claim to the Japan/South Korea JDZ will be quietly dropped as part of this settlement and that the tiny overlap between China and South Korea due to China's use of the Dandong feature as a basepoint will also be separated and quietly resolved.

A Modus Operandi

The major issue is between China (including Taiwan) and Japan. As a first step towards a solution, Japan and China could tacitly agree on an equidistance line ignoring the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as a non-precedental "working" boundary. Taiwan and any remaining foreign concession holders could perhaps be persuaded by inducements from Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing to abandon any remaining offshore concessions on Japan's side of the equidistance line. Under this "working" agreement, Taipei would not advance its claims to the seabed beyond the equidistance line based on its claim to jurisdiction over the mainland. Beijing and Taipei might then cooperate in the development of the resources on the Chinese side of the equidistance line.

The United States and Japan could help make this scenario a reality by making clear that its recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China carries with it recognition of the PRC as the sole representative of Chinese continental shelf and EEZ claims. This would encourage Japan to do likewise, and could incidentally help improve Sino-Japanese relations.

The U.S. government and companies should then tacitly encourage China and Japan to explore an agreement. China and Japan could then enter into negotiations for continental shelf and EEZ boundary-making in good faith, and during that time conduct joint exploration to determine the size of any hydrocarbon resources in an agreed area---perhaps the area of original overlapping claims. This would be similar to the modus operandi in the South China Sea involving China, the Philippines and Vietnam. When the time is right, a full-scale joint development program could be launched in part or all of the area.

In the Meantime

Given that swift resolution of these disputes is unlikely, the most pressing immediate task is to find effective mechanisms to manage them and prevent any escalation of incidents that cannot be prevented. The key problem lies not so much with governments, but nationalist political constituencies within the polity of each state and the pressures that they can bring to bear. In the short and medium term, it is therefore critically important that the governments involved in these disputes take seriously the fact that governments of other claimant states are also constrained by domestic political considerations. There has been a marked failure to do so in the past.

Second, while governments may feel unable or be unwilling to prevent citizens embarking on provocative actions like the 1996 erection of a lighthouse on the Senkakus by Japanese nationalists, or the August 2006 attempted visit by Taiwan activists to the disputed islands, they should certainly refrain from conferring official status on such actions. Moreover, if they disapprove of them, they should have the courage to say so publicly. If this is perceived to be too politically difficult, they should at least ensure that their disapproval is communicated to the government of the rival claimant state.

Third, greater emphasis needs to be placed on the role of preventive diplomacy. This has been taken up by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, but so far with little practical impact on policy. None of the claimant states have indicated any interest in taking the disputes to formal legal adjudication, but it might still be possible via the offices of the Chairperson of the ARF for an "eminent persons' group" to be created. Such a group should preferably undertake its preventive diplomacy task during a spell of relative calm. The task would not be to seek resolution, but rather to consider ways of managing the dispute non-violently and preventing, or at least controlling escalation should there be more flare-ups.

Urgently needed is bilateral agreement on guidelines for the regime of military vessels in foreign EEZs as a form of conflict avoidance. This might in turn lead to a 'Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East China Sea' similar to but more robust than that reached by the multiple claimants to the South China Sea of which China is the most prominent.

Fifth, if the creation of an eminent persons' group is considered premature, Track II meetings involving scholars, "think tank" analysts, and officials "acting in their private capacity" could be set up to investigate a range of confidence-building measures designed to foster conflict management and to prevent conflict escalation, rather than to seek a long-term solution. The Canadian-sponsored, Indonesian-hosted Track II effort, the South China Sea Working Group, which involves China and Taiwan and which deliberately avoided engaging in discussions on sovereignty issues, provides a possible precedent. Here, the focus was on building confidence among claimant states by encouraging maritime cooperation between them in non-controversial areas such as marine scientific research, environmental protection, including biodiversity, fisheries assessment and management, and mineral resource assessment. The focus was on what is achievable at the time. Although these were formally 'Track II' meetings, officials from the claimant states take part under the polite fiction that they are acting in their "private capacity". This Track II cooperation eventually provided the basis for formal official cooperation.

Prognosis

Obviously, the tone and tenor of China/Japan and China/Taiwan relations will affect the possibility of a solution. If these relations deteriorate, the issue may well become a flash point. The following analysis assumes these relations remain stable.

There are both specific positive and negative factors at work. Positive factors include the claimants ratification of the 1982 UNCLOS; China and South Korea's rapprochement and discussion of joint development in the Yellow Sea; China and Taiwan's discussions on, and their agreement to jointly develop any hydrocarbons in their portion of the East China Sea; China's relative restraint in not exploiting the Diaoyu issue and its control of its nationalists in that regard; and Japan's reciprocal attempts to control its nationalists; agreement in principle to joint development; precedents and experiences with joint arrangements -- China with the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea and Japan with South Korea in the northern East China Sea; and a previous compromise between the two regarding fisheries in the disputed area.

But these positives have to be weighed against negative factors such as Japan's agreement with the United States to provide logistical support in the defense of Taiwan against China; China's increasing incursions in Japan's sea and air space; Japan's declared perception of China as a threat; South Korea and Japan's declarations of EEZs which encompass areas claimed by China; Japan's use of the Senkakus as a basepoint for its EEZ claim; China's specific reaffirmation of its sovereignty over the Diaoyutais in its 1992 Territorial Sea Law; the domestic public reactions to the exploits of nationalists on both sides; and the apparent unwillingness of one or both to resolve the issue.

Seizing the Moment

The Sino-Japanese maritime conflict has two fundamental dimensions: the sovereignty dispute over the Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands and the delimitation of a boundary for the vast EEZ and continental shelf of the East China Sea. Many commentators have considered the issues inseparable. They view settlement of the first as a necessary condition for the second. However, this view is outdated. Recent legal developments, international adjudications, state practice, and the ratification of the Law of the 1982 UNCLOS by the claimants point to the possibility of separating the two issues. Islands of similar location, economic utility, and legal status to those of the Diaoyutai/Senkakus have invariably been ignored in seabed boundary delimitations between opposite states. This suggests that regardless of their ultimate owner, the features will only have a maximum 12 nm territorial sea around them. They will not be permitted to generate their own continental shelf or EEZ beyond that limit. The implication of this conclusion for the Sino-Japanese maritime conflict is that the territorial and jurisdictional issues are separable and that the latter may be dealt with before the former is finally resolved. Agreement on the irrelevance of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku territorial dispute to, and detaching it from, the Sino-Japanese jurisdictional controversy would therefore be a major milestone on the path toward a solution. Indeed if such agreement were reached it would indicate that a boundary ignoring these features can be negotiated.

Domestic nationalist politics is a prime factor in these disputes. But nationalist politics seem to run in cycles of intensity. When the cycles in the respective nations reach their next common positive peaks, wise and courageous leaders should seize the opportunity to hammer out a preventative modus operandi to manage these conflicts. The alternative is continued mutual suspicion, unstable relations, unmanaged and undeveloped resources, and an increasing frequency and intensity of incidents, fueling nationalist sentiments and resultant political conflict.

Rapporteur's Report prepared by Joe Narus

2006-11-30T16:55:00.000+11:00

Reconciliation Between China and Japan: A Search For Solutions

(an international workshop held at the ANU in August 2006)

Thursday, August 17^th 2006, Morning Session

Peter Van Ness: Opening remarks. Acknowledges the conference’s bias towards reconciliation, and the goal of ‘working things out’ because it is more than a bilateral problem. Everybody will pay the price if there is conflict between China and Japan. Description of the Blog, with reference to important articles in the archive.

Mel Gurtov: A further introduction of workshop origins and goals. The genesis of the project is a belief by the four organizers that ‘we scholars and practitioners’, as a Track 3 grouping, have a role to play beyond research, writing, publishing. Where will the dispute lead? With the potential global implications, perhaps we scholars can impact the direction it will take. All of us are here because we share a similar concern, even if we do not know how to fix it. This is very specifically a workshop, not a conference or symposium. A ‘workshop’ means we are all in this together – not to assess responsibility or take sides. We all know the issues, what we are trying to do is work together collectively. How will we answer when asked, ‘what did you experts finally come up with that is worthy of attention by other scholars and governments?’ We all have responsibility in that product, and there is no shirking of that responsibility. We need to support one another to create realistic ‘solutions’.

Richard Tanter: Describes work with Nautilus, and how this project fits in with the idea that all scholars need to be engaged with a wide variety of groups. Not much is being done on this issue, so scholars need to act positively to encourage governments, NGO’s, etc, to become positively involved. In addition to Mel’s suggestions in terms of realistic solutions, we should also think beyond realistic. We are not here to persuade each other, but rather that we can all think something new than we thought this morning, thanks to new proposals and new understandings.

Peter Van Ness: The agenda here is not to read long papers, rather to take up topics one by one. A few people from each session will be invited to start topic sessions. The First topic is history, beginning with the co-authored textbook, and impressions on the process. But first, introductions and hopes for what can be achieved.

The History Issue

Richard Tanter: Dr. Akami will discuss the textbook achievement, and Dr. Hundt will discuss the Korean perspective.

Tomoko Akami: Introduces the history textbook that was produced jointly by historians in China, Japan and Korea. It was prompted by the publication of the history textbook by ‘Atarashii rekishi o tsukuru kai’ in Japan in early 2003. Work began in 2002 and finished in 2005, and the second edition is out now. Its main point is that we must face past wrong-doings not to repeat mistakes, and to construct a peaceful and bright future, particularly for younger generations; we needs a history which will be open for the future. Hence, Nicchukan sangoku kyotsu rekishi kyozai iinkai, Mirai o hiraku rekishi: Higashi Ajia sangoku no kingendaishi (Tokyo: Kobunken, 2005) [The three country joint committee to produce teaching materials for a common history of Japan, China and Korea, History Which Opens a Future: Modern History of Three Countries in East Asia (Tokyo: Kobunkan, 2005, second edition)]. Description of the four chapters and prologue.

Is it a successful tool for reconciliation? Its immediate and direct impact may not be great, but it is important in a few significant points. First, its symbolic meaning is great. Because of how a textbook is used in Japan, an impact of a history textbook may not be great among high school students. But the fact that this book is out is symbolically important. Second, it is important because it creates a sense of a shared regional community and regional citizenship, which suggests a responsibility to the community beyond the nation-state boundary. Third, it is important to demonstrate diverse opinions on Japanese history within Japan. Although overseas media reports had focused on Tsukuru kai’s history textbook, not this textbook, and sensationalized the revisionist history move in Japan (which is indeed growing), this textbook demonstrates that there are other opinions against the revisionist move. There have been fierce debates among scholars of Japanese colonial pasts in the postwar period, and the text book is one example of the different view points on the issue. It is, however, more significant at the present, because in the sixties and seventies, the orthodoxy in Japan was an emphasis on peace and horror of history. This orthodoxy has now been shifting to revisionism.

Richard Tanter: This is a very good introduction to our discussion. It is particularly important to recognize the pedagogical framework in which this is taking place. Those who have taught in Japan recognize this.

David Hundt: A discussion of collaborative paper on learning from attempts at reconciliation by North and South Korea. Three main recommendations on China-Japan reconciliation.

First, reconciliation needs to be a political project and requires Track 1 efforts. Other countries have had to deal with this, and much can be learned from them. Reconciliation is not about reestablishing a preexisting order, for those days are past. The break from the past must happen at an elite level.

Second, there is a need for Track 2 and 3 work, like the textbook work, which is a promising example of what can be done. Looking at bare minimum facts of what has happened, there will always be differences, but the order of this project was a unified narrative about history. In terms of shortcomings, it is not a comprehensive account of East Asian history. There were no Taiwanese or North Korean scholars, and the narrative tended to take on an invasion, not liberation, type theme, so it read somewhat as a history of Japan’s invasion of its neighbors. Thus it cannot replace history textbooks, and is more of a supplement. There is a need to add key issues that are not explored.

Third, there needs to be a Track 3 notion of respecting differences between actors. There will always be a ‘remainder’ of issues that cannot be resolved right now, so there should be acceptance that there will be differing accounts for a time. In the textbook, a lot of first hand testimony was used, which can be helpful and is also indisputable. Also, we reiterate the importance of there being no monolithic national positions. There has been debate in Japan for forty years over history. In Korea there has also been a debate, including but not limited to Japan. Korea has its own difficult period over this past century, which is being redressed even today. South Koreans are asking big questions, difficult questions, but ones that are very important. Perhaps that type of discussion can lead to the resolution of bigger issues.

Richard Tanter: Thank you, those are good points on Track 1,2 and 3 suggestions. They are relating questions of what happens between societies and within societies. It is important that reconciliation is international and intranational. Questions?

Mel Gurtov: How widely is the textbook used in the three countries? Are there any figures? Does this type of a project have a future, and how can it be built on?

Tomoko Akami: Don’t know the exact figures, but the recent second edition is a promising sign. History teachers at the high school level in Japan may not use it as a textbook, but may use it as a resource for their teaching.

Mel Gurtov: And what about in China?

Shi Yinhong: We need a national history in China that is not biased, that is objective. International history abounds in China, but national history is also important. Perhaps it is the most important? How can national governments reconcile national histories of their own? Maybe textbooks are downplayed by most people. East Asian history is not only about war, it is about post war history and much more. Often people selectively discuss history. For example, maybe in Japan they only think China’s post-1978 history is good, that before is bad. In China, nobody talks about what happened after 1945. The same is true for Korea and the Korean war. How can different countries have a common approach to deal with the Korean war?

Also, textbook publication numbers will not reflect the power of the project. Maybe the influence of the textbook project is among scholars, not students or teachers. In China, there is Chinese history and world history, but not East Asian history. Even in China largest university history departments, there is no discussion of East Asian history, or at least it is too limited. But most important to reconciliation is a restructuring of national history.

Chris Braddick: There is often too large a distinction between world and national history. Like in Europe, national history and national myths needed to be separated and cleared. But that is a tall order in East Asia.

Chen Mumin: I recently went into a large bookstore and couldn’t find the joint-textbook in the textbook section, only in the best-seller section. It is important that students be forced to read this textbook, by being asked questions that force them to read it. So governments need to include specific questions on entrance examinations. In Taiwan the book wasn’t published because Taiwan was excluded from the project. Students in Taiwan aren’t reading it because they read what they are tested on.

Tessa Morris-Suzuki: This textbook comes from one collaborative project, of which there have been a number, and of various combinations. It would be interesting to look at how those different projects have gone. Other endeavors have deliberately not produced textbooks, instead arguing that the communication and collaboration is most important. These different efforts should be compared and evaluated.

There is also a need to find other ways to get the ‘message’ to a broader audience, not simply through textbooks. What about a television drama produced by the three countries? Another thought is a really good website on historical reconciliation, that links historians in various countries with archival and video material, and provides something that textbooks don’t provide, a space for dialogue.

Jin Xide: In China, it is not viewed simply as a textbook, but is much higher than that and is read by high-up people. If it will become a textbook in China, there is a long way for it to go. There is still criticism in other countries, and young people need to be educated in a more balanced way. Much of the history issue is not a textbook issue, but a political issue.

Chris Braddick: If the goal is to achieve a consensus view of history, this is difficult if not impossible to achieve. Maybe reconciliation doesn’t require complete consensus. But what is important is what becomes the mainstream view that matters. In the battle for hearts and minds, how can that be influenced through other channels?

Mindy Kotler: Traditional pedagogical ways of teaching through textbooks do not reach students. National myths take time to come down, look at Americans for example. Today, South Korean myths are coming down. To look at 19^th/20^th century Asian history apart from world history is to miss the whole picture. For example, how well covered is the topic of the United States helping to liberate China by stopping Japan? There also needs to be more school trips, but there is no Dachau or Auschitz. People need to understand that history is going to be full of realities that aren’t wonderful.

Malcom Cook: Political elites need to be moved, and the larger mass audience need to be moved as well. But the ways of doing it are different, and need to be. The mainstream will not swallow a ‘reconciliation message’.

Tea Break

Richard Tanter: Lets now continue with the question of approaching reconciliation through history, self-understanding, the understanding of others, and particularly Yasukuni.

Ryosei Kokubun: Very impressed by this morning’s discussion. The joint-textbook is very meaningful, especially for our children, if it is achieved. But the problem in Japan is that in high school, students don’t always use their textbook, or even open them. In some college classes only 20% of students read their textbooks. Entrance exams are so difficult that students only memorize the facts, and Oriental or Asian history is not taught.

What sources, then, are they looking at for information in both Japan and China? According to polls, in Japan, most people say news media. Books and textbooks account for only 12.9%, while television is the highest at 74.7%. The Internet is a small percentage. In China, most answer news-media as well, with TV accounting for 77.9%. The Internet is a small percentage, as are textbooks. So textbooks are limited in usage in both countries.

A right and conservative group for writing a new textbook has been split because they failed in their promotion campaign. Now Japanese government is trying to organize a joint study teams with China on modern history. The Foreign Ministry tried to find scholars and professors to participate in the project, but all people who were approached were reluctant because it is too political, it is too loaded a subject, and they risk being criticized from all angles.

So the government has been commissioning historical studies between Korea and Japan. When times were good between countries this was more successful and both countries could write parallel histories easily. And that kind of joint work went well, lots of people were involved, friends were made, and confidence building took place. But the second stage of the project has not yet started because the political atmosphere has changed.

Recently, in the Bingdian(Freezing Point) Weekly, a Chinese professor wrote an essay about the problems with China’s textbooks and history, which he said are distorted. He cited the very nationalistic look at the Boxer Rebellion, and this Sino-centric view was criticized. When this view was published, the editor of this publication lost his job, then openly criticized China’s leaders by name. The criticism is still going on today. So, maybe in China, that type of discussion is alive. But this year is forty since the start of the Cultural Revolution, and thirty years since the ending of it – yet it is not mentioned or written on in China, because it is too dangerous to write about. So, in China, it is a very critical moment in writing its own modern and contemporary history

Richard Tanter: Yes, international and domestic issues are closely tied, which flows to the wider issue of Yasukuni. I’d like to open the discussion.

Tomoko Akami: If there are diverse opinions in China, Japan, and South Korea, is there a possibility for network developments to connect these diverse groups?

Ryosei Kokubun: Yes, and there are already networks - look at Dr. Shi and Dr. Jin and I, who see each other several times per year.

Peter Van Ness: That is true, when I mentioned Dr. Kokubun was coming to our Chinese guests, they both said ‘yes, we’ve met several times this year already’.

Richard Tanter: The relationships that are made in collaborative projects are very important. In working on Indonesia, it is surprising how little others are known in other countries.

Jin Xide: In China, academic research is looking at WWII and the post-war era more closely. Non-governmental research and journals are also growing. Many journals and publications are already having lively discussions, and there are so many out there, Bingdian Weekly is only one of them. And there are many books and publications about the Cultural Revolution, so it is not a mum subject. Much has also been put forth by Taiwan-based and Kuomintang investigations.

Jiang Wenran: The view of history is indeed evolving and changing. Many years ago, a student wanted to research the role played by the Kuomintang in fighting the Japanese. Back then, it was discouraged. Today the atmosphere has changed and that type of research would be accepted. Over the decades there has been a lot of opening up. So the main point is that things are indeed changing, and there are fewer freezing points in discussions.

A second point is that neither Japan or China is monolithic. Japan is often discussed as having diversified views, but China too has diverse views, open discussions, etc. For example, look at Dr. Shi and the New Thinking on Japan movement, which was an olive branch by the CCP that was somehow missed. We need to recognize the diversity of opinion, and plurality of views, on both sides. This is a very important step for reconciliation. Otherwise, misconceptions have the potential for being exploited by politicized leaders. For example, on the internet, there are many sites about the ‘coming war’ with Japan. These extremists cannot hijack the discussion, and be allowed to by being misperceived by the other side. Political leadership and commitment is needed. How do we, in this workshop, go from Track 3 to Track 2 and Track 1 action?

Richard Tanter: Which raises the question of, what is the role of the media?

Tessa Morris-Suzuki: In China and Japan relations, we are at a critical point with important changes, specifically with the changing of the Prime Minister in Japan. In Japan and China there are many sides of the debate, but they are not all reflected in the media. Even though Chinese and Japanese media are quite different, they both have their own problems. In Japan it is a free media, but certain issues get enormous coverage, like the North Korea kidnappings. But others don’t. For example, nowhere in the last few days’ news are there reports that after a prominent politician criticized the Yasukuni visit by the Prime Minister, his house was burnt down by a right wing extremist. Why was this not more publicized or reported?

Shi Yinhong: China’s media? It is an issue raised by many all over the world. From China’s point view, is modern history still compatible with China’s rise? Maybe China’s own view on modern history is not compatible with China’s communist history. In the Mao era, the Japanese atrocities weren’t as well publicized, yet today they are much more so. A strong China has more victim sense, a weak China had less victim sense. Pre-Deng history was more oriented to the building of the Communist state. But in terms of modern history, China’s own books don’t focus on Roosevelt, Churchill, etc, but only on Japan and its victims. Social change is the most important thing now, and with the open door policy there is change in domestic China. But now it is a more nationalistic Japan and a more nationalistic China.

Tomoko Akami: Its easy to say ‘do this and do that’ from far away and from a safe place. But there are extreme right-wing groups that could present serious threats. So what sort of risks are we people in Japan taking by addressing the topic of reconciliation? (This question was specifically addressed to Mr. Tennichi and Professor Kokubun)

Chris Braddick: Yes, it is true that views have become more nationalistic. If we look at the 1950s and 1960s, it was a time of divisiveness, and the war guilt on the Japanese was profound. There were apologies back then, but the Chinese Communist Party was saying ‘thanks for your help, but you weren’t at war with us, only the Koumintang’, etc. Perhaps the precedents from a different era can inform the present.

Jin Xide: In China, in order to improve the news reporting, it is very risky to promote certain reforms or ideas. Like in Japan, there can be repercussions from outspoken positions, and perhaps it is easier to stay silent or say something hard-line rather than something constructive. Scholars in China and Japan are in a very difficult position.

Richard Tanter: What risks do scholars face?

Jin Xide: The influence of the internet is very powerful in China, because it is the most ‘free-talking’ space. This is true particularly for intellectuals, for whom much publishing is done on the internet. In Japan, scholars can publish what and where they want.

Richard Tanter: So people who take a friendly Japan position are criticized?

Jin Xide: Yes. I have been criticized.

Ryosei Kokubun: In joint history studies, many scholars are reluctant to engage in joint studies with China because its too political.

It is true China has been changing, and the internet is full of different opinions. But the official lines of the CCP have not been changed though. Because it is a Communist Party, making the Japanese a cornerstone to the CCP cannot be changed. If joint studies are to be conducted government to government, this poses problems with ‘official lines’.

A second point is that most people are becoming concerned about Sino-Japanese relations, and the Yasukuni visits. While some newspapers are not critical of these visits, many are very critical. Yasukuni is a domestic Japan issue, not necessarily China’s issue. Koizumi is the only recent Prime Minister not criticized by right-wingers. He has apologized about invading Korea, but has not been criticized by the right wing because of the Yasukuni visits.

Lastly, if you look at Sino-Japanese relations, the two top leaders have no communications. But among normal people there is communication and interaction; among school people, among scholars, non-mainstream media, etc.

Richard Tanter: Perhaps the point is that we need to have a wider sense of all that is going on, and what has gone on. There are sub-national, sub-elite connections, and important connections between civil-society. These need to be mapped and shown, because more is there than meets the eye.

Takahiko Tennichi: The right wing is very critical, but not extremely dangerous. For example, the diaries leaked about the emperor were detrimental to the right wing, and there was a bombing that may or may not have been related. But the newspaper is more careful of terrorism. Terrorism depends on the case.

Willem van Kemenade – What about another bombing? With Mr. Kobayashi?

Ryosei Kokuban: This had to do with the 21^st Century Commission of Sino-Japanese Friendship. Mr. Kobayashi, Japanese side Chairman of the Commision, during an interview, mentioned that he ‘personally’ does not agree with the Yasukuni visits. This statement was then singled out and put on newspapers. Then there were various kinds of menace.

Richard Tanter: Were you surprised, Tessa, that the recent bombing wasn’t publicized?

Takahiko Tennichi: I might suggest that it wasn’t publicized immediately because on August 15^th much about it was still unknown. So more may be known and written about it later.

Tessa Morris-Suzuki: Yes, that may be. But it is still surprising that it wasn’t mentioned on the NHK website, and in today’s news it is still not there.

Richard Tanter: There have been other attacks that have not been reported.

Malcom Cook: If you look at the last fifteen years, China has been doing much reconciling. In SE Asia, fifteen years ago, it was there that the China threat was most present. Today, this view is held in the United States and Japan. Thus, changes may not only have to do with domestic political shifts, but also much larger geopolitical shifts.

Chen Mumin: How does the general public in Japan view China? Especially if most of what is learned comes from the media and television, not textbooks? How does the media portray modern China, not historical China? In China, a lot of inaccurate and negative information is circulated on the internet. Is it similar in Japan?

Ryosei Kokubun: In 1980, there was very little if any contact between countries, but they had favorable impressions of each other. The TV show “Silk Road” gave friendly impressions. In those times, China was still a developing country, and it was isolated. Japan began ODA because it believed China should be a part of the international community. Now, China is rising, but we are still wondering what direction China is moving for.

Today, opinion polls show that Japanese impressions of China are very simple. The top five impressions of China, according to opinion polls, are: Communist, status - oriented, socialistic, militarist, chauvinistic. In China, the view of Japan is: Militarist, nationalist, economically-driven, stateist, democratic.

Richard Tanter: What about the Bush doctrine? How does what is happening in China and Japan fit in with what is happening in the USA? Also, assuming Abe will win, and that he supports constitutional revision, the question is: is remilitarization a good idea?

Mindy Kotler: There is too much of a fear factor in Japan, and politicians are fearful of being attacked for their views. It is shameful that the US government is not speaking up about this. But to compare Japan and China is to compare apples and oranges. In China, the state keeps close tabs on the media. In Japan, there is the perception of shared values between the U.S. and Japan, in terms of democracy and freedom of speech. So there shouldn’t be a fearful atmosphere. But why are these things still allowed to happen? Why is the comfort women museum still getting threatening phone calls? In Germany there are laws etc about this, for example, the Holocaust-denier who is in jail in Austria. Is it against free speech? Maybe, but maybe not. Why are sound trucks allowed in Japan? It is very troubling.

Mel Gurtov: As a footnote, the U.S. Government never feels bad about commenting on undemocratic activities in other countries, particularly in China, despite its own obvious shortcomings.

Mindy Kotler: The Bush administration did not have much to offer on foreign affairs. Richard Armitage was going to lead the ‘contain China’ policy with the Japan alliance. Japan relations were cultivated for along time. The men in the current administration have not had problems with the Yasukuni visits. Bush went to Japan and then China in November, and it is likely there were discussions. Bush realized there is a problem that is affecting relationships, but wanted to keep the problem at arms distance from the White House. But now at least they realize it is a problem.

Chris Chung: China is moving away from this victimhood mentality to a great power mentality. With regard to Japan’s bid for a seat on the United Nations Security Council, and China’s opposition, wouldn’t it be useful to reconciliation if China helped Japan get a seat on the Security Council? It would indicate China’s magnanimity on the history issue.

Richard Tanter: I am longing to see the person who can redesign the security council.

Willem van Kemenade: On the history issue and German and Austrian justice, yes, there has been legal redress in court, but most of these cases were lost because of some intervention. In Germany in 2000, Germany adopted a law ordering compensation for East European forced laborers, and the cost would be shared by the German government and the companies involved. In Japan, there is almost a complete rejection of these issues.

Mark Valencia: We have been focusing on history this morning, so I’ve been silent. About the U.S., it is the elephant in the room. Part of the problem is the changing nature of the US-Japan alliance - against who and against what? It is not hard to understand why China feels threatened. Japan is being encouraged by the US to be a deputy sheriff (like Australia). Japan would maybe approach the East China Sea issue differently if it did not have US support. The Japan-U.S.-Taiwan alliance is also very important.

Peter Van Ness: With regard to US-China-Japan relations, Thomas Christensen at Princeton, who has just joined the Bush administration, published an article (Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," International Security, Vol 23, No. 4, Spring 1999), in which he argued that there was an inevitable security dilemma between China and Japan, and that the US should seek to ameliorate that dilemma. I don't believe that there is an inevitable security dilemma between China and Japan. What the US role has been is to play the two Asian powers against one another: Washington does not want outright conflict, but it is deeply concerned that China and Japan may work strategically together in a way to make the US unnecessary in East Asia. Chris Chung has written a paper on the East China Sea, pointing out that Japan has territorial disputes with almost all of its neighbors, while China meanwhile has negotiated territorial agreements with most its neighbors. The fact that Japan has not resolved its territorial disputes has to do with its reliance on the US. What is the answer? Japan may need to return to Asia. Is Japan a part of Asia or of the West? This is a question that has been asked in Japan since Meiji. Since the end of WWII, Japan's reliance on the United States has stood in the way of Japan's reconnecting with its neighboring Asian countries.

Richard Tanter: We are loosening the knot, one issue at a time. And these important issues can be embedded in a broader framework.

Lunch

Mel Gurtov: It is worthwhile to make one comment on where we are. Clearly what we did this morning was interesting, and we appreciate the participation. I would like to remind all of us why we are here, in the sense that our purpose is to look for ways to take present realities and convert them into something better. We often tend to fall back on exchanging information on things we’re familiar with, which is interesting, but we need to keep in mind why we are having this event, and to what purpose we are putting this information. We want to come up with an agenda for improving the current relationship. Dr. Valencia has been asked to focus on the options for dealing with the East China Sea dispute.

Mark Valencia: [see Mark Valencia paper]

Chris Chung: What is at stake? Resources, and their potential to feed into the broader bilateral relationship, for better or worse. There is potential for the dispute to be co-opted by nationalists. Where does it all go?

We’re on a road to nowhere – since 2004 there have been six meetings by foreign officials, but very few results. There needs to be an expert panel and emergency hot line set up. The threat is that provocations could spill over into greater problems, or a tipping point. There is increased frequency and intensity in military intelligence gathering in disputed areas.

How to go somewhere? A three-step process: 1) Establish a co-chaired senior official advisory group. 2) Build confidence through functional cooperation. 3) Strike a grand bargain. Need an epistemic community to put it into a forum. Taking issues out of the polemical forum of Track 1 senior official meetings provides opportunity for unique solutions. A grand bargain would be based on mutual agreement not to settle the territorial dispute, for 50 years, and then move ahead with joint development. Sharing percentages are possible, and this is a well-established process in the oil and gas community. Political and economic advantages would result from a grand bargain. It would be a demonstration effect for other issues, and it would give political substance to rhetoric on friendship. In terms of economics, it would circumvent the opportunity costs in energy supply, unlocking revenue streams.

The political will must be there. Both sides mention the Law of the Sea and historical precedents, but political will needs to be there. It is truly a win-win opportunity.

Mel Gurtov: This is a specific case, but what lessons could be learned from this case and applied to other issues? There are many steps that need to be taken, such as preventive diplomacy and intermediate steps, steps that could provide spillover effects.

Richard Tanter: A few things. First, the optimistic part is that if you talk to energy people in Japan, the message is that at the vice-minister level and below there has been some very serious thinking and reasonable and informal discussions with Chinese counterparts. Though the political framework is impeding, it is optimistic that the bureaucrats are discussing this. Second, on the other side, it is perplexing that, after many years of exploring in the area, that Japan has waited so long to begin exploratory work on their side. Why is that? This breeds skepticism about rational calculations in Japanese politics. Third, the military aspect is deeply worrying. There is the Chinese submarine issue, but I’m more worried about planning documents in the Japanese military that have been leaked on the issue. There have been moves and developments, militarily. In the national defense policy outline in Japan, there is much talk about Special Forces, which mention defending the islands. There is also an almost primitive level of communications, militarily speaking, leaving the door open for conflict, all of which is dangerous.

Katherine Morton: Where do corporations sit on this issue? Is there any space for corporations to be involved in preventive diplomacy? Would it be helpful or hurtful?

Mark Valencia: There have been attempts, by companies, to drill and be involved. Conoco went to both China and Japan seeking a joint concession, regardless of the boundary, but neither would agree. With joint developments, once an agreement is struck and implemented, there is often little problem of cheating, and usually they go rather smoothly. Agreements can happen, its implementation that is hard.

Mel Gurtov: Can we generalize that reaching an agreement is dependent upon the overall state of political relations?

Mark Valencia: There are many factors, one of which is politics, and another is the need for energy and resources. If there are other resources, then a country may be inclined to wait awhile. For example, the recent discovery of giant gas reserves in the China’s portion of the South China Sea may give China some time and bargaining leverage.

Shi Yinhong: Do you think there is any real possibility of a grand bargain between countries? There are many complicating factors, particularly domestically. Chinese view the East China Sea as a major part in future interests and strategic planning, so any concession would not be good. It is probably the same in Japan. It is imperative to not try and solve major disputes, but manage them.

Richard Tanter: How can this be controlled?

Shi Yinhong: Governments realize there needs to be concrete plans to control disputes. It is imperative that any accident is not allowed to become a major conflict. The idea of dispute resolution is harder than people think. More emphasis should be placed on damage control.

Jiang Wenran: Yes, the dispute is very complicated. China and Japan won’t go to war over historical disputes, but the East China Sea is different. Look at the size of the oil reserve. 100 billion in East China Sea, whereas Iraq has about 95 billion, Saudi Arabia has 250 billion, Canada has 175 billion. So the stakes are very high, for Japan and China. It goes beyond simple negotiations. One country’s exploration of energy is perceived on the other side as invading one’s own resources. This makes it a military issue, a tense issue, and it is a multifaceted and long-term issue. Nationalism and national security interests complicate the issue in a major way.

Shi Yinhong: There is no possibility of a deliberate conflict, but an accidental conflict is very possible. In an incidental conflict, where a gun is fired, domestic national sentiments create problems.

Chris Chung: Somewhat worried about the figures on the resource potential. Estimates vary quite widely. There may need to be clarity on what exactly is under the sea, cooperatively. The East China Sea may or may not be a major contribution to China’s energy demand. China is making a worldwide search for sources of energy. What is striking is that neither side has given a contract to a US oil company. Could this be an issue?

In terms of a grand bargain, yes it is ambition, but there is a need to develop oil, there is an opportunity cost. Militarily, the East China Sea is important, but so is the South China Sea. China does not want a disruption in the sea, as that is how China’s exports move around the world.

Ryosei Kokubun: This issue very important, but it is also related to China’s energy consumption issues. If Japan’s energy consumption per GDP is counted as 1, EU is counted as 2, USA is counted as 4, China is counted as 8. China’s energy demands are going to grow tremendously. Japan has technology and a scarce resource base. Japan will, after 2008, start something other than ODA type of assistance in the field of energy and the environment. China’s energy consumption, and inefficiency, is a world issue. China’s energy crisis is a worldwide issue. The East China Sea issue – if you talk to business people, they are very rational. They say that in fact China must be losing money in the East China Sea, maybe or maybe not. Japanese companies have no strong interest in investing in that region, because there is a lot of uncertainty about oil and natural gas.

Another point, on Senkaku in 1978 there was the big incident when 200 fishing boats came to the Senkaku region from China, with machine guns, while the countries were talking about a friendship and peace treaty. The 200 boats had communicated with China’s mainland, one was the military port in Shanghai and the other in Shandong, but the top leaders in China did not know about this incident itself. Deng came in and reeled in the situation, calling it an accident, and shelving the issue to future generations. But there is no Deng in China now. I worry now too, about some accidental incident. There is no network, no hotline between the top leaders.

Shi Yinhong: Beijing and Washington have good communications, but there is no Beijing-Tokyo communication.

Malcom Cook: Moving forward two possible solutions. One, the East Timor resolution was helped by the fact that there was clear knowledge about how much oil and gas was in the reserves. Two, maybe bilateral issues can be moved forward by connecting them to larger, multilateral global discourses. Maybe this would change the way the issue is discussed. Also, there are two views on energy resources, there is the economic view of energy, and a security view on energy. Economists and security strategists have different views. Maybe the economists’ view is the safer one.

Mel Gurtov: There is yet another approach to this though, called enlarging the pie, not just as a scarcity issue, but in the larger context of energy and environmental security for all, which opens up larger possibilities.

Peter Van Ness: This topic is important because it is the most potentially explosive, yet there is also great potential benefit if some agreement can be reached, to build cooperation on the principle of mutual benefit. It’s also important because of its urgency, because if the energy potential is accurate, the concern about that potential will either create conflict or provide for cooperation. It is an energy-security dilemma. From a security point of view, it doesn’t have to be seen as a security dilemma – just like the Sino-Japanese relationship doesn’t have to be a security dilemma. The opportunity cost here is huge, as the world energy market grows - in terms of security issues and cooperative security, in terms of countries agreeing to resolve issues where there is obvious mutual benefit. But diplomats and defense officials are trained to think in terms of worst-possible-case scenarios. That is reasonable so that they can anticipate future security dangers, but they also should be taught about the opportunity cost when states choose not to cooperate.

Mark Valencia: We should be careful about the 100 billion barrels of oil equivalent figure. There has been very little actual drilling, and this is data figured based on comparison and extrapolation. And most of it the resources appear to be gas. Sometimes in joint development schemes, the unknown is often a helpful factor. The South China Sea Agreement is a step forward, and there are initiatives to explore, but the problem is China waited long enough that it got the Philippines to agree to joint development in an area where China had no legitimate claims. Another pessimistic view is that if China does find significant reserves elsewhere, then maybe it is in China’s interest to keep Japan out of the East China Sea, and wait out Japan. Also, Professor Shi is right, it is a strategic issue of control over space and resources. Because of this, there must be a code of conduct for military activities and scientific research. I agree that it is a very dangerous situation.

Richard Tanter: On whether or not it is desirable or helpful to know more about what is or isn’t there - why are there uncertain estimates? Because China won’t share its data on what it knows. And again, there is the question of why Japan has not explored. In terms of what we’re talking about here, the precursor to reconciliation is avoiding conflict. The situation is urgent, and there are no rules or codes of conduct as of yet. That is dangerous. The chances of accidental confrontation are too high.

This is also a classic area of the realm of imaginary war, with both countries doing a lot of planning, which has potency. There is also something about oil that sets people off – it’s not seen just as a monetary resource, but as more than that, in terms of political imagination. It has a multiplying effect. So what do we want out of this? The urgency is there in terms of establishing military codes of conduct.

Lastly, we need to think politically because there are political steps that need to be made, and conditions that need to be met, for there to be progress. We should be encouraging our government and other governments to explore this issue and take steps. It has global implications.

Willem van Kemenade: There has been much talk of setting up an East Asian multilateral security dialogue. There has been talk that the six party talks could be expanded to this. But those are not going very well. Is there any other proposal on the table? The Asian Regional Forum? There needs to be steps to set up an early warning system. There are European precedents for this – look at the steps taken to prevent another war, steps putting German coal and steel resources under wider control, which became the coal and steel community, which led to bigger things. Is this possible in Asia?

Mel Gurtov: I’m reminded of what Richard said, correcting me, that we must propose ideas that today seem realistic, mixed with some idealism. Nautilus has done work on this.

Katherine Morton: We need a Jean Monet, who can make this happen. Much has been discussed, but for this type of architecture there needs to be an architect.

Shi Yinhong: China has tried to use a framework to solve Sino-Japanese problems. But there are differences between post WWII Europe and today’s Asia. All of Asia is rising. The power dynamics of the region are not favorable to some kind of experiment. China and Japan lack strategic dialogue. Beijing is realizing that Track 1 dialogue between China and Japan is the key.

Peter Van Ness: We here, neither Chinese or Japanese, hear that in your bilateral discussions you fire shots at each other. Would a multilateral setting be more conducive to building cooperation? For example, the benefit of the 6 party talks is that not all parties see it as a zero-sum game.

Shi Yinhong: The Chinese government is paying more attention to global sentiment on the China-Japan relationship. But I don’t think multilateral discussions will work for either government, even though each is increasingly aware of global opinion.

Chen Mumin: In terms of cooperative security, no matter if you are realist or liberal, both agree that two great countries can cooperate only when there is common interest. In China Japan, it is difficult to find a common interest.

Shi Yinhong: The common ground is to prevent conflict.

Chen Mumin: National interests and energy security issues are both vital to finding common ground between the two countries. It is also very dangerous if the general public jumps into the debate on energy security issues before leaders from both countries reach a consensus.

Shi Yinhong: Yes, the public always takes a simplified view. But China is not a democratic society, so public opinion is less important.

Tim Stoddard: What can be learned from the South China Sea meetings? Is there any indication that this type of dialogue could begin in the East China Sea?

Mark Valencia: No, it is unlikely there could be something similar. There have been any number of attempts by Chinese and Japanese scholars to have Track 2 dialogues, etc. The South China Sea workshop was led by two people who really made it happen. And it is doubtful that two major powers would accept an intermediary approach.

Jiang Wenran: My pessimism is not something that I advocate. What actually dominates the discourse is that neither side really wants to find a way to solve the problem, perhaps because popular sentiment on both sides is too strong. This shouldn’t be the case, but it is. So there needs to be a way to move away from the deadlock, by averting people’s view from what is at stake and the possible confrontation. Really, what is the larger context of the debate? China is energy hungry, is in manufacturing, and is at a stage of industrialization that requires much energy. Japan is doing well in energy efficiency and conservation, so maybe these factors need to be included in discussions, and in doing something to these effects. Look at the Energy Conservation and Cooperation agreement, with 800-900 people gathering in Kyoto to discuss what they can do together. Perhaps this could be an annual dialogue. There is benefit from working together. Fuel efficiency is crucial, there needs to be tangible ways forward.

Mel Gurtov: That’s an example of enlarging the pie.

Jin Xide: There needs to be a more comprehensive approach to the East China Sea issue. We can see progress in some ways at the previous 6 rounds of talks on this issue between China and Japan. The two countries have reached agreement on some issues. In China we are pushing forward the improvement of the environment, it is very important. It will be very difficult to reach an agreement on the median line in the East China Sea. China needs oil, but is also concerned about the security of oil imports and shipments into China.

Shi Yinhong: Both China and Japan have high aspirations about their own power and interests, with regards to the East China Sea. But on the other hand both capitals know much more clearly the dangers of territorial disputes, maybe leading both sides to making some concessions. With small steps, at least it could prevent deterioration of relations, and eventually more and more can come.

Mark Valencia: There has been some progress. There was almost an agreement on joint development and that is still the focus of the discussions.

Shi Yinhong: There are linkages to be made. If the prime minister were to agree not to go to the shrine, maybe there would be concessions in other areas.

Katherine Morton: There needs to be an important first step towards joint exploration. Like in the environmental issues, there is in the beginning a lack of cooperation, but gradually it evolves. For example in the area of glaciology there is cooperation, which is perhaps leading to greater cooperation on other environmental issues.

Mel Gurtov: We’ve arrived at some consensus on the issues in the problem, and without necessarily solving the problem, we could take some intermediary steps. To our two presenters, what are the most important things we can do to move forward on this?

Chris Chung: I like the idea of enlarging the pie, putting the East China Sea within a broader framework. The incremental approach is also important to building trust. Environmental issues, for example, are non controversial but provide a first step.

Mark Valencia: I would like to see some op-ed pieces, which get wider circulation than academic papers. So I would like to see some sort of statement, or summary, or consensus, written by the organizers, that would outline the dangers and the opportunity costs, then praise the progress being made, then propose some control mechanisms like guidelines or code of conduct. I would shy away from joint development details, and also try and embed this within a larger framework.

Ryosei Kokubun: There is a need for discussion on political and non-political issues. Political problems contain Taiwan issues, history issues, East China Sea issues, security issues, no war cooperation treaties (learning from the European experience), and others. Extreme nationalism must be contained. Then there is the non-political: high school exchanges, pop culture exchanges, bureaucrat exchanges, women exchanges, language programs, joint studies of natural sciences, such as environment studies, sustainable development studies, energy sustainability. We should start from non-political aspects first, then gradually engage the political.

* * *

Friday, August 18^th Morning Session

Richard Tanter: Welcome back, everything went well yesterday, thank you. Today we are shifting gears. The general theme today is ‘what is to be done’. We are generally moving from analysis to action and initiatives, in hopes of loosening the knot in this region. To begin with, there will be a brief discussion, initiated by Horiuchi Yusaku, on Friendship During Crisis.

Horiuchi Yusaku: This paper is based on re-analsyis of data, which my former student initially used for her master thesis. A question examined is quite simple: Do people in Country B who have a friend from country A have more positive attitudes towards country A than those who do not have such a friend? For this project, we surveyed more than 1,000 students in 13 Chinese Universities. What is interesting and important about this dataset is that during the period of data collection, there was a sudden anti-Japanese movement following an incident at Northwest China University in 2003. This provided a natural experimental situation, which allows us to compare Chinese students' attitudes before and after the crisis. Specifically, we ask the following three questions: What is your image of the Japanese government? What is your image of the Japanese people? And, is Japan trustworthy? With these question, we examine whether answers to these questions are different if a respondent has a Japanese friend?.

Our data show that the friendship effects are significant only after the incident but not before it. We argue that friendship has no immediate positive effect, but it works as a "buffer" during the crisis. We should note that the magnitude of the effects are small, and thus we cannot simply claim that making friends lead to building mutual trust.

Mark Valencia: The word friend is a rather widely used and misused term, so maybe the term friendship needs to be defined better or the results may seem rather speculative.

Chris Braddick: Same, is the definition of ‘friend’ self-defined? And, is the number of friends worth counting, or does it matter?

Horiuchi Yusaku: Yes, the data are based on a master's thesis research, and there obviously needs to be more appropriate questions for future research.

Jin Xide: Our institute has done similar research, asking ‘have you ever been to Japan’ and ‘are you familiar with Japanese people’. People who have experience with Japan and Japanese people have a more positive feeling.

Horiuchi Yusaku: Yes, we did control the effects of some other variables on Japan, including whether respondents speak Japanese.

Tessa Morris-Suzuki: Did people who lived in Japan have a positive impression, or did their stay in Japan leave some people with negative feelings?

Jin Xide: Right away, upon returning, people have different views. But they are mostly positive.

Chen Mumin: Maybe the geographical distribution of where the people were from, and how that relates to the WWII occupation, affects the opinion.

Horiuchi Yusaku: In our analysis, which is based on the method of exact matching, many other possible determinants are held constant.

Shi Yinhong: Opinion polls are often misleading. For example, it depends when the poll was taken, and how different political climates may affect the results. There are other factors, like tensions, Koizumi, etc.

Richard Tanter : Thank you Yusaku, you’ve introduced today’s topic very well. Surveys and results need to be explained with great care. Now we need to move to another set of answers of what is to be done. Now maybe we can discuss the role of mass media. I want to remind people that in Japan, like in other countries, there are different views from different media outlets.

Peter Van Ness: In working on the blog, we’ve tried to keep a list of those initiatives that are possibly most fruitful. The investigation by Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper, investigating the war-time responsibility of Japan, is a most important project, of which Tennichi-san has been a part.

Takahiko Tennichi: Yomiuri Shinbun initiated a war-responsibility investigation. This investigation surprised many people, as this is a somewhat conservative newspaper. The paper has criticized Japanese militarism and our younger generation’s insensibility to the war.

[See Tennichi paper]

Basically, Yomiuri is conservative, and takes the nation state as very important. As for nationalism, Yomiuri has a negative view of narrow-minded nationalism, yet a positive view of patriotism.

Richard Tanter: This is very important, thank you to Yomiuri for your leadership, and for embracing a controversial position. Although there will be great debate, this is important, and needed across the board.

Tessa Morris-Suzuku: What about the response from readers, and the response from advertisers? What response is there, on a controversial view and topic? Is it positive or negative?

Takahiko Tennichi: The response from readers is positive, and they say they learned a lot from the campaign. So it is a very positive response. Overall, we aren’t deeply concerned about reactions in terms of advertising and revenue.

Shi Yinhong: I don’t know what is Japanese traditional way, but we in Asia and SE Asia know that Japanese behavior was aggressive. And what standard by which should we judge Japanese behavior? And what are Japanese national interests? In seeking reconciliation, you should not seek out Japanese interests.

Tomoko Akami: Although I found some approaches in the stories as problematic, I thought the initiative was great. My question is related to Tessa’s - Yomiuri has the biggest circulation in the world, what was the impact of the study, and what has been the peripheral impact?

Takahiko Tennichi: Mr. Shi’s point is very important, I understand that he says in the Sino-Japanese war, in 1895, in those days Japan was very aggressive. There is a big debate in Japan about this. Yes, there is a militaristic element in Meiji era, but after 1930 Japan changed very dramatically, since the 1930s it was different. Since last year of June, we published some big editorials saying that the Japanese government should build a new memorial in place of Yasukuni. Abe visited the company, and asked ‘what is the meaning of the editorial’? It was said that we must reconcile the war past, and Abe understood this.

Mindy Kotler: From my perspective, in the last few years, regarding China, what is significant is that the word ‘responsibility’ is being used in modern Japan. Using the word ‘responsibility’ is very important and commendable. Will Japan finally take responsibility? It is more than making a new memorial. It is legislation on comfort woman, and a House resolution in which it says there should be ‘responsibility’. These are small changes, but the word is very significant. It is a movement toward Japan being responsible for the damage that was caused.

Chris Braddick: I have some problems with the history contained in the report, but I think what is more important is that Yomuri is doing this. My biggest problem is that it is taking a narrowly Japanese perspective; for example, only counting the Japanese deaths, not total deaths. And I have a problem with #5, in terms of questioning Allied equality.

Horiuchi Yusaku: I think Yomiuri’s stance has changed, even though it is said that it hasn’t. I also highly doubt that Yomiuri doesn’t care about business or popular opinion. My hypothesis is that Yomiuri is following a current trend moving away from the right.

Jin Xide: There was a shock in Chinese academia over this, and the view is changing on Yomiuri. I criticized an editorial of the paper two years ago, but I agree that it is changing. What is the future of this project, and what is the role of Japanese scholars in this? Are conclusions being written by the scholars or by others? What is your plan for exchanging the views with other countries, or the media in other countries?

David Hundt: I think the most interesting word used is ‘campaign’, which maybe means this was a political decision made last year, by the paper, to raise questions about the war. Are we trying to shed old light on the war, or new light on the war? Are you conducting new research using scholars, or are we clarifying or highlighting what is already in the public sphere? And what comes next? Will a book produced? Or are there other investigations that can be made? Like investigations on Nanjing, which may resonate throughout the region.

Malcom Cook: I think the focus on national interests is good, for tactical reasons, because essentially it is a battle within Japan against the right. Using international norms as a standard simply doesn’t hold water, because no other country’s history can live up.

Richard Tanter: Yes, in this respect discussing national interests is important.

Tessa Morris-Suzuki: The Yomiuri series is great because it has inspired others to do something similar, and because it involved an investigation and criticism of the media during the war. And, as a plea, what can Yomiuri do next? Also, in your presentation, you mentioned that the key factor in Japanese nationalism is North Korea. Yet a large part of that nationalism has to do with the way that North Korea is reported in the media. I think the next step for the Japanese media is to be more balanced in that debate, maybe by focusing more on the ‘normal’ people in North Korea. I think Yomiuri could do much in terms of balancing the debate.

Chen Mumin: What the paper is doing is very positive. We should also expect the Chinese media to play a similar role. When special reports are done on certain dates, they are too often used by the Chinese government to refresh people’s memories of the war. In Taiwan, our government does not rehash old events for the younger people. The Chinese media could do more.

Richard Tanter: Yes, what would be some comparable initiatives that others could do, in the political or media system?

Ryosei Kokubun: At the break of the Iraq war, all the papers in the U.S. supported the war. But now things are changing. I think in some ways Yomiuri changes, but in other ways it has never changed. Yomiuri has never strongly supported the Yasukuni visit, and Yomiuri has also criticized Chinese pressure on the issue and said this is a Japanese domestic issue. We are so encouraged by recent Yomiuri's active efforts on historical studies about Japan's past activities in war.

I would like to mention one thing. I have met Mr. Koizumi several times before in my capacity of a member of the 21st Century Commission. In our conversation, Mr. Koizumi has never demonized China and consistently said he is pro-China. I think he is not simply a rigid nationalist.

Takahiko Tennichi: First, I would like to say that Japanese militarism is the cause of much disaster, not only to Japanese people, but to the people of the world. But my personal view is that the world has two views, one is that it was an aggressive war, another is that it was an imperialist war. I don’t think Japan was wrong for everything that happened, but of course we must apologize not only to the Japanese, but to the people of the world. The era of imperialism, then, was very complicated. In those times the world was imperialist and imperialism ruled; Japan followed the rules of the world. Today I didn’t say much about the result of the report. You can read those later when the book comes out.

We must emphasize that this was a disaster to Japanese people, and also that Japan is responsible to the people of the world. Today, as a national issue, I emphasize the national interest of Japan. Yomiuri does not necessarily stress national interests. Three or five years ago, Yomiuri advocated Japanese SDF should go abroad and be a part of UN efforts.

As for advertisements, Yomiuri in 1994 proposed that the Japanese Constitution should be changed, which was shocking. Also, the President of Yomiuri cannot interfere with the editorial board, so the campaign has no real concern of advertisement.

Richard Tanter: You’ve raised a whole series of issues, particularly about national interests, the place of those, what is meant by those, and how do we square those with global ethics. There is a dialectical dance that will move here and there, bear that in mind.

Jin Xide: There is a discussion on how to improve our relations and public opinion with Japan in our media. We have made efforts. We have made proposals to improve public opinions to Japanese. I think Yomiuri is providing a positive environment for Abe to stop Yasukuni visits, and we try and promote that in China as well. I wrote a short article on Abe’s Asian policy, and he is now observing whether to visit or not visit. We will only know after the elections. China is trying to send a clear signal on the Yasukuni issue, that until visits stop there will be no improvement in relations. We also see that the Japanese want to solve this problem by themselves, which is complicated. The Chinese are prepared to make a positive reaction to Abe.

Richard Tanter: It is good to look for the cracks that make movement possible.

Proposals for Tracks 1, 2, and 3

Mel Gurtov: With regards the handout being passed around, we need an answer for what it is we are producing, what have we done, and what we are putting forth. Many of the items in the matrix we have are illustrative, though many of your comments from our initial proposals are in the box. Although Track 1 has three separate areas - unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral - in truth those three areas could also apply to Tracks 2 and 3 as well. What we now want to do is change the format, in the interest of efficiency if nothing else, to divide us into three tracks. We have somewhat arbitrarily divided or assigned you into one of the three tracks. Each group will take a track. The groups will meet, then come back together and report to larger group. Be both as realistic and idealistic as possible, and as specific as possible. This will help to concretize our discussion and enable us to have something to show for our efforts.

Richard Tanter: Please think creatively, but also with a political eye. What has to happen in order for ‘that’ to happen. And we can put these things in a melting pot, for we are making a menu of ideas.

Mel Gurtov: It would be perfectly acceptable to think in terms of immediate, mid-term, and long-term goals.

Tomoko Akami: What about incentives for reconciliation, which are important?

Richard Tanter: Yes, like with Mark’s work, we must think about incentives, encouragement, etc, to make things happen – to find pathways and cracks in the wall.

Friday, August 18^th, Afternoon Session

Mel Gurtov: Welcome back everyone. Willem will start.

Willem van Kemenade: First, what is the re-Asianization of Japan? It actually started with the Nixon shock and the end of the Vietnam war, but this idea of re-Asianization is only recently being seriously reconsidered. I spoke about this to Kobayashi Yotaro, a former CEO of Fuji and Zerox, who still plays a large role in politics. He said that if you look at the Meiji Restoration, what happened then was the de-Asianization of Japan. He said that, at the time, Westernization was a very clever strategy, but in looking to the future, the key for Japan is re-Asianization. Everybody views Japan as not part of Asia, even though Japan’s future interests lie there. In the Meiji Era, the U.S. - Western model was the role for Japan to follow. Western nations have always believed that their role was to extend the benefits of Western Civilization to the rest of the globe, and Japan picked up on that role. This model led to disaster.

Now, for re-Asianization, there is no real engine for this in East Asia because of the poor political relations. In European terms, this would be as if Germany and France could still not get along even fifty years after WWII. This is absurd; relations must improve. Japanese officials often say that integration is much more difficult in East Asia than in Europe, for a number of reasons, many of which are true. But there were also a great deal of differences and disparities in Europe.

If the political elites fail to deliver, than the business sector can take some charge and deliver at the economic level. A separation of politics and economics has been attempted, if only so politics don’t block business. The re-Asianization movement has made several attempts in different forms. If politics warm, then the governments can take charge again. Kobayashi was optimistic about Abe, in spite of certain political views. In the long term I think there is reason for optimism.

Leadership is also most important. Looking at post-war Europe, there were strong leaders with great determination, which has enabled the peace and prosperity of the past sixty years. There was dialogue, there was communication. Strong leaders are essential. The excuse by the Japanese that there is no commonality with China is not necessarily true. Look at the differences between Germany and Poland. Would strong Japanese leaders of this nature please stand up?

Also, Japan must proceed with re-Asianization as U.S.-Japan relations are not as good as they seem; they are only good between Mr. Koizumi and Mr. Bush. There is also the view that Japan will always be a junior partner, to either China or the U.S., so the U.S. is preferable. But is China really requiring that Japan accept subordinate status? I do not see clear indication of this.

The U.S. needs to rethink its own version of US-East Asian alliances and dependence. Japan is a civilian power that prefers to assert its role in the world in a peaceful manor. Germany should serve as the model for Japan’s reconciliation with history, and the European Union should be the model for East Asia. To conclude, Japan owes it to the world to do more to build a decent relationship with China, and the onus for this is on Japan.

Jenny Corbett: A few words about the economic relationship between China and Japan, as it feeds into the reconciliation issue. There are two key issues. First, there is the question of whether economics are an incentive that encourages reconciliation. And two, can economics give us some idea about what the cost of not reconciling is?

Economics do and don’t drive political relations, but we need to understand more about the nature of the economic relationship. It is, in some sense, a glue that holds things together while politics suffer. But the glue may or may not be strong enough to prevent it from exploding. The economic actors present also have a role feeding back into politics, and where they are in the political debate is important. But there is very little actually being done on this question. It is a conventional view that if the economic relationship is well there no need for discussion. But in reality we know very little about the nature of the economic relationship. There aren’t many books about it or other great sources, such as research institutes. The wider world knows almost nothing about this.

After quickly looking at papers that have come to me, what strikes me is that there is a near consensus suggesting that the relationship is not as close as one would predict, on simple economic grounds. There are studies on the extent to and the direction in which bilateral trade flows, and how it is affected by political issues. How much really is there, economically, to be put at risk if the relationship does not go well? This needs to be researched, which we plan on doing. The relationship is multi-faceted and trade is not simply in final goods, but it is more a trade along production networks among many countries. If this trade were to be seriously interrupted, it would affect not just China and Japan, but really the whole region. The question is, what would be the economic impacts if politics do not allow for reconciliation?

One final thought, on regional integration, is that there is much more room for the discussion of East Asian regionalism, which is dependent on China and Japan. There is indeed some sophisticated East Asian regional institutional building happening, and there is competition on how these will be formed and whom they will favor. What we can say though is that regional integration is going ahead, whether or not China and Japan come closer, but the nature or architecture of it will be different depending on how the two countries relate to one another. For better or worse is not known.

Peter Van Ness: If one looks at the U.S.-China relationship as an analogy, I think it is fair to say that when the U.S.-China relationship went sour, the big economic players literally went to the White House and said ‘this cannot happen’. I don’t see that at all in the relationship between Japan and China, with the exception of a recent statement by the business group Keidanren. Economic relationships must also facilitate political relationships, not just the other way around. It is very important in China and Japan that the big corporate interests involved with trade and investment not only bring pressure in support of the relationship in their own countries, but they also need to work together between countries to better the relationship.

I don’t believe that East Asian economic integration will happen anyway. After World War II, Japan went out and built economic relationships throughout East Asia that were mutually beneficial. I think that needs to happen again to improve political relations.

Jiang Wenran: Where is it all going? We talk about economics between the two countries, and the two are becoming much more important to each other. But we are looking at a China that is diversifying its trade with more parts of the world, while Japan is becoming more dependent on China. So the balance is shifting in favor of China, and if politics get worse it will affect the economic relationship. For example, China is not involving Japan in any discussions of railroad building, but if the political relationship were better, they would probably be more involved.

Also, with the East China Sea energy dispute, this area is becoming more competitive, not complimentary. This needs to be replaced. We need to talk positively about what should happen. The ODA may not have done a lot, but there are more opportunities. Put in place a bilateral relationship for environment and energy cooperation, which both sides want badly and which would help both sides. There are huge oil importers who are talking about making an oil-importing block of countries, to bring prices down. There should not be negative comparisons between Japan and Germany, but positive comparisons in terms of how Germany recovered and grew.

Willem van Kemenade: On political damage to economic relationships, there are already negative impacts in Chinese consumerism. Many Chinese don’t want to buy Japanese cars…look at railways, look at nuclear power.

Richard Tanter: Which reminds me…How many psychiatrists does it take to change a light bulb? One, but the light bulb really has to want to change.

On raising the question of a bilateral relationship within the context of regional integration, the comparison with Europe is both good and bad. The positive part of the European framework is economic cooperation as a springboard to regional security. Just as we made the jump from looking at the bilateral relationship to regional relations, the elephant in the room is again the US role in all of this.

On a negative note, the depth of the threat is not just the costs or benefits foregone, but to take the real chance that it is more likely that in the next five to ten years nuclear acquisition will become more in the forefront of discussions in Japan. North Korea likely has nuclear weapons. The questions we’ve talked about over the years, about nuclearization, are becoming much more of a possibility. Also, it is not making too much of leap to get to the point that the American role in not facilitating the relationship is related to US interests in nuclearizing Japan.

Horiuchi Yusaku: I agree with Jenny, there are lots of things that we have to study, and too many important things that are not studied. If companies are shifting from China to Malaysia, how do we know that this is driven by politics? We need to study more about the relationship between politics and economics.

Mindy Kotler: Investments levels have remained the same before and after the anti-Japanese riots.

Jenny Corbett: Thank you for the comments.

Jin Xide: The 2003 event when Chinese people boycotted the Beijing and Shanghai railways, on the internet. That time the Chinese government could separate politics and economics, but it is getting harder because of Koizumi’s continued Yasukuni visit. Abe wants to visit Yasukuni and still say to separate politics and economics. Such separation will not be possible.

See Powerpoint On Track I, II, and III Ideas

Comments on the Track 1, 2, and 3 Proposals

Mindy Kotler: Disagrees with the use of wording of ‘re-address compensation issue’ and language of ‘charity’. There needs to be some all-encompassing commission that is not running from the issue.

Willem van Kemenade: A saying on war compensation/ODA feelings is ‘Japan cannot say sorry, China cannot say thank you’.

Chen Mumin: Institution building is critical. There aren’t any, and they need to be built.

Jiang Wenran: The May conference in Kyoto between China and Japan needs to be built on into the ‘climate joint partnership’ initiative discussed.

Mel Gurtov: Now for student comments…

ANU Graduate Students: Our discussions were more Track 3, but with realizing that Track 1 political efforts are the most important. With Track 3, one idea is that in Japan there is the JET program, and in Germany there is a similar program. Why not an exchange of S Korean, Japanese, and Chinese teachers?

And also, some kind of social studies teachers’ conferences and meetings, so that teachers can develop links and take those experiences back to the classroom.

Tessa Morris-Suzuki: We have talked about the experience in Australia where it has been so helpful to have Japanese taught in schools. What if there were more Chinese language programs in Japanese schools, and vice versa?

Horiuchi Yusaku: What if Koizumi didn’t go to Yasukuni? Do you think that Track 3 would all of a sudden work?

ANU Graduate Students: What about anti-Japanese education in China, is it true or not? I wonder if there is still anti-Japanese education in China?

Jin Xide: I know the stories about anti-Japanese education in China, but these are old stories that I’ve heard many times. I would say that there is not anti-Japanese education, even though the invasion of China by Japan is a big part of modern history. So students and Japanese neighbors don’t like wartime militarism.

Jiang Wenran: There are observations that today’s younger generations of Chinese are more anti-Japanese than previous generations. There are also observations that anti-Japanese nationalism is a means of legitimacy. But the bigger picture has to do with the fact that decreased, decentralized, and lessened control over the past few decades has maybe enabled the rise of anti-Japanese feelings. One diagnosis is that old style CCP propaganda, for many decades, was a grand picture painting about CCP liberation. Now, today, there are more human stories about war. This is a change. Maybe our pictures today are too black and white, and there are many more dimensions to the causes of resentment. The de-doctrinization of the CCP has led to more human responses.

Richard Tanter: I want to push a little harder on the Track 3 part, in a different more political way. It seems to me that if we’re talking about this level of danger, and the need to transcend the borders of these issues, it is important to look to the non-state political organizations that are looking at these issues. Nautilus is one example of this. Looking at Northeast Asia, it is important for us to identify and encourage those campaigns that are trying to act in a political way, and some of them may confront governments. Today, as an example of one organization, we have circulated a document by GPPAC [GPPAC is Global partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict: http://www.gppac.net/].

It is an offshoot of an NGO that originated looking at civil society. In Northeast Asia, a coalition of groups involved in this project have evolved and continued working on these issues, through academic connections, political connections, etc. In each case they are pragmatic in relieving tensions.

Also, we need to see civil society groups as stakeholders, taking active steps, building networks to ameliorate crisis. We all know this that wider question of capacity building, in civil society, requires direct political intervention, action, funding, etc, and needs to be restored to our agenda.

Tessa Morris-Suzuki: In Track 3, we didn’t talk about NGOs and civil society networks enough. And there is another layer that is not as political, that is networking between environmental groups. Another is the networking over migration and refugee issues. The other touchy one is human rights issues, and there are a number of such networks throughout Asia (including Australia). These Track 3 groups need to be expanded.

Mindy Kotler: Amnesty and other groups have made statements on this, and if their resolutions ever see the light of day, these organizations could bring pressure to bear.

Katherine Morton: An add-on, in terms of the NGO network, is that there is much more space today on the China side, and there are many NGOs working in China.

Richard Tanter: A comparable network is the global green network, of which there is now a Northeast Asia one. These types of cross-border networks are growing and are important. Civil society networks need to grow.

Mel Gurtov: Where do we stand in all this? What I would like us to give some thought to is that our powerpoint is not a finished product, but how can we refine these ideas, how can we improve them, how and which do we want to be associated with?

Also, Richard has drafted a statement that he will put up that might serve as a preamble for more focused policy recommendations. This will require some common agreement. We still have work to do, what do we want to come out of it with?

Friday, August 18^th, Final Session

Peter Van Ness: Here we are, with an hour and a half to go. This has been a wonderful two days, with so many great ideas. We all have our own images of what this is about. Mine is that this is a probe or beginning of something. Many are asking ‘what will we produce’, ‘what will be the product’? My own vision is that it should be 100 flowers blooming– we should write op-eds, academic articles, go on TV, etc. We want to assist, support, and encourage you, and we will do all we can. Then there is another strong feeling, and that is, can we as a group say something, in general terms, about what we’re trying to do with this enterprise? Could we, in some general terms, talk about a direction or some hopes that this workshop might stand for? We all have our own priorities and disagreements, but lets talk about this statement by Richard, and Track 1, 2,and 3 ideas and what we’d like to see happen.

Richard Tanter: The idea for all of us at the workshop was to have key elements brought out of this, about what needs to be done. This statement is a preface, which would be followed by recommendations in abstract terms. Can we all agree on this statement? First, we are all specialists that are coming together because we are deeply concerned. But we don’t want to underestimate the complexity of the problems and challenges in governance. But we also believe this is a very serious threat to the security of both countries, nationally and humanly. As a group of international specialists, we are urging the governments to control the risks, and recognize that there are real risks.

Beyond that, governments can do positive things in spite of apparently intractable problems. We need the governments to take positive initiatives. We also believe that these conflicts not only endanger Japan and China, but are also a risk to the security of all. It is quite genuinely a matter of global consequence, and not only a regional problem. China and Japan have a responsibility to the rest of the world, but equally, countries that are friendly to the two have a responsibility to foster reconciliation.

Clearly, no single action, or what we suggest alone, will loosen the blockage, and no one track will do it alone. But we believe that the initiatives we’ve explored should be undertaken by a wide range of organizations and groups.

The language is intentionally loose.

Shi Yinhong: Maybe there should be one or two sentences about the long-term perspective. There should be progress toward a kind of long-term settlement, which should accommodate national interests, feelings, and aspirations.

Tessa Morris-Suzuki: One matter of significance is what exactly we do with this statement. Also, I would change the wording from ‘failure’ to ‘lack of progress’.

Horiuchi Yusaku: Most of these statements are not talking about what ‘we’ should do. We are asking governments to do things, but what are ‘we’ supposed to do?

Mel Gurtov: Yes, I think there could be language of ‘on our part’ or ‘we commit ourselves to do our part to working for constructive solutions’.

Mindy Kotler: Using as a model the seven-page Armitage Report, we should list our concerns and list our proposed solutions. These are only suggestions, which we don’t all agree on, but they are something. This is too vague.

Jiang Wenran: If we are the scholarly community, we should add that the international scholars of the world have not paid close enough attention to this matter, and have only treated it as a bilateral issue. We should add our community to the list of other ‘lacks of progress’, and call on our colleagues from around the world to join us. I also agree that maybe we can do something a little longer, but if it is followed with other suggestions this is very good. This would be catching.

Peter Van Ness: These are some ideas, and we would encourage further development of these ideas. Also, maybe we should not say ‘join us’, but use some other language along this line.

Mark Valencia: I’m concerned that what following list will look too much like a laundry list.

Jiang Wenran: We do need to put forward the rationales for these remarks and statements, then list why we are making these calls.

Richard Tanter: What follows needs to be thought of quite carefully, and will be built on. We will explain the Track 1-3 suggestions, and why these actions are relevant and necessary. I would though like to stick to something very close to this formulation, without tampering too much, and the focus on what comes next. This introduction is vague, but it is expressing the intentions.

Ryosei Kokubun: I have a different feeling about the statement. We are confident that problems like these will be solved in the future between the two countries. People may think what Kokubun is doing involving the outside world. The Japan-China problem is basically a bilateral one. I am still sure that we are enough matured, and we can solve these. It’s an international concern, but maybe this is basically our problem, maybe this issue shouldn’t be so internationalized. I am just wondering how this statement will be used?

Shi Yinhong: In the last session, I told Mel that this workshop produced fruitful, productive ideas that focused on reconciliation. But on the other hand, I feel we are not fully, in a strategic way, dealing with this problem. Maybe we talked too much about non-political issues. We should focus on the basic causes of this problem. Maybe we talked too much about history issues, because history disputes are symbolic. Some things are more fundamental than others. Maybe there is a little too much focus on short-term suggestions, which are important, but maybe we should look more at middle and long-term ideas, possible ideas that could accommodate national interests, national feelings, etc. China has national aspirations, so does Japan; China as a great power, Japan as a normal nation. How to accommodate these national interests is the long-term national issue. But first of all this is a Japanese and Chinese concern. Too much conflict will indeed hurt very deeply and profoundly in East Asia, but we should look at long term Sino-Japanese relations, 15-20 years later.

Peter Van Ness: Personally I disagree with both of you. Bilaterally, it will of course have to be sorted out at the governmental level. But what I would like to convey is that it is not just your business, the stakes are too high. Everybody in the region has a stake in trying to help you to cooperate.

Shi Yinhong: Of course, but primarily this is China and Japan’s business. If we have success it is both our success, if we fail it is both of ours.

Jiang Wenran: Perhaps the sensitivity is that if we produce some statement here, and we are not using appropriate language, that it is suggesting that the Chinese and Japanese cannot solve they’re own problems. We don’t have that intention or belief, but it is good to not imply in any way that this is the case. Second, I agree that this is not a two country problem. It has profound regional and international implications, and we will all suffer, so we all want to see the two countries get along. We are not saying ‘you cannot manage this’, we are trying to help. How can we help? How can we facilitate? That ANU is funding this is an indication that we care, that we are not intervening.

Shi Yinhong: This is primarily China and Japan’s problem, secondarily the world’s.

Peter Van Ness: Shi Yinhong, I’ve been following your country's international relations for many decades. I wrote my first book on Chinese support for wars of liberation many years ago. I appreciate current Chinese foreign policy and its support for multilateral institutions, its negotiations with all its neighbors, the way China has become so participant in building mutually beneficial institutions. In this regard, my own personal opinion is that in effect you’ve helped build up a great deal of mutual benefit for the rest of us in the region. If, in a worst-possible-case situation of military conflict, the whole system would be very seriously damaged, and we would all suffer. The countries and governments have to work things out. We’re not saying that its up to us or we have better ideas than you. What motivates me is that there is great potential and great hope for an East Asian Community that is based on mutual benefit. We want to encourage and support this.

Takahiko Tennichi: I came here to discuss the Yomiuri report, with permission from my company. I came here because I think the right dialogue is very important. But I didn’t come here to make a statement. My suggestion is that I’m skeptical to make a statement, so maybe we should introduce our discussion.

Ryosei Kokubun: This is maybe a personal concern. I’m also partly working for our government, in such organization as the 21st Century Commission for the Sino-Japanese Friendship. It seems difficult for me to write my signature here. It seems too political

Shi Yinhong: Whether we are from China or Japan, there is no problem that we are here, we are not representing our countries.

Jin Xide: I agree with the opinion that this is a third party statement, and that we make an amendment that we are not representing our governments. Maybe a summary of the workshop is better. A formal statement should exclude the people from China and Japan. But I don’t think that it sounds like a statement by countries.

Mel Gurtov: Ryosei, it sounds like you would be opposed to signing a statement as an individual. Would you be in favor of this going out in the name of the workshop? Would it be better without individual names?

Mindy Kotler: Or just put on the blog what we discussed?.

Shi Yinhong: I have no problem with that because both our governments won’t pay attention.

Richard Tanter: The question and solution Mel put to Ryosei, would that be acceptable to both parties from China and Japan?

Jiang Wenran: People will associate the workshop with the organizers.

Shi Yinhong: Concrete proposals may be best.

Chen Mumin: This looks familiar to me, when I worked for the Taiwanese government. At a summit hosted by our government, the government issued a statement and asked the participants to sign, but many of them did not want to sign it, saying it was not the purpose of their participation. We want to make this influential, and make available what we have been talking about. This will produce information on our findings.

Katherine Morton: I think that capturing the spirit of cooperation of the workshop is a good thing, while bearing in mind the sensitivities. What is most important are the concrete proposals. What we didn’t have time to do are the short, medium, and long term proposals, so maybe we should divide these different proposals up in that respect.

Tomoko Akami: I think the fifth paragraph should indicate that it is not just about two countries, but other countries are all part of the problem (as well as solutions). I also suggested that, as I noted to Pete, that ‘reconciliation’ should not be a search for one single ultimate solution. It should be a framework in which on-going various efforts can be made in various forms for betterment of future dialogues.

Peter Van Ness: The subhead of the blog, ‘a search for solutions’, should be left out. We need to clarify that there are solutions, but this is a process, and will go both good and bad at times. It’s a good point.

Horiuchi Yusaku: I feel uncomfortable putting what we discussed on the blog. There are lots of things we did not discuss, and some we did discuss. I propose a next round, for we did not reach enough conclusions here.

Tessa Morris-Suzuki: Maybe it would be useful to put down ideas we have discussed, in the course of the workshop, in the space of three or four pages, as if they are preliminary issues which were discussed.

Mark Valencia: We should put this out in the name of the project, yes?

Peter Van Ness: Yes, a statement in the name of the organizers, about what we discussed, and the proposals put forward. It is most readily done in the name of the workshop and the organizers. What is important are the concrete proposals and this discussion.

Mel Gurtov: I’d like to get a sense from the group in terms of what needs to be done. For example, would we circulate the edited version?

Peter Van Ness: No, there would then be twenty editors. We have created community among us, but its limited in terms of how we see the world. The three of us should edit this, and talk about some specifics, and put it out in our name. For people who were here but disagree, their name is not on it. If I could shift things, it would be that the three of us could knock this around and put it out in our name.

Richard Tanter: I think that Pete’s proposal is a workable solution, but the real purpose is the issues we brought out, and then doing something with them. The question is to work out in different frameworks what we want to do on our own.

Peter Van Ness: Okay, stage 2. Its important that we all do our own thing, and if we can help, we will. Mel edits the Asian Perspective, and is interested in good pieces for his journal.

Mel Gurtov: It is an academic journal, it is peer reviewed, and full texts from the past five years are available at www.asianperspective.org. As Pete said, I would be interested in having an issue that would be entirely devoted to our work here. So if you would like to submit a scholarly article, 25-35 pages, we’d be delighted. What we would like to do with that issue is to include a statement from the three of us to indicate the origins of the workshop, including the ‘statement’ and its policy ideas. We’d like to include the Yomuri editorial, and other documents.

Peter Van Ness: Malcolm Cook mentioned he is in touch with a whole range of editors, Tessa knows TV people, and Wenran gave me the DVD for the project on China’s Rise - maybe there could be something like that on reconciliation. There is a lot to do.

Richard Tanter: I think there is much more to do, and more forms of doing it, and what is appropriate varies in different countries. When we actually produce material on this, it should come together somewhere, academic or otherwise.

Peter Van Ness: The blog will continue, and there will be the second workshop, which will be on the theoretical realm of cooperative security, which is very important to the concept of an East Asian Community. You all have your own projects, to which reconciliation relates, and we can’t all do everything. But these spin-offs and cooperative efforts are very important.

Mel Gurtov: A statement of appreciation to Peter Van Ness, who bore the burden of putting this together, including raising money. A round of applause. A thanks to Joe and Tim, and a thanks to Gil.

* * *

Proposals for Tracks I, II, III prepared by Tim Stoddard

2006-11-30T16:51:00.000+11:00

Track I:

Unilateral:

Yasukuni Shrine issue is important and change is possible. Japan could freeze official visits by top Japanese leaders to ease Chinese concerns.
PRC support of Japanese Security Council seat would be met by Japanese concessions on other issues.
ODA is outdated. Japan should initiate a “Joint Development Program” where China is an equal partner rather than a recipient of “charity”.
U.S. policy evenhandedness and Japan reassurance on 2+2 is too difficult to achieve.
Japan should readdress compensation issue for war victims.

Bilateral:

Resumption of summit meetings is critical. CBMs, security meetings, and preventive diplomacy must be included in these meetings.
Military movement is unlikely, but codes of conduct on security issues are possible.
Global warming initiative is difficult to address, but an institution could be established to initiate this project– e.g.- Global Warming Joint Partnership.

Multilateral:

NE Asia FTA dialogue must be initiated. Unclear of U.S. role.
DPRK issue.
Taiwan issue will be difficult, but encouragement of CBMs must be made.

Track II:

• Initial discussion of limitations of track II diplomacy due to political constraints.

• Need to take it as given that Track II initiatives can only really work if Track I is working.

• 1) What constitutes a Track II and where does it fit in the overall framework of cooperation.

We thought it wasn’t just sufficient to look at issues, but to also find way to elevate the Track II agenda to the Track I level.

That it is also important to have a downward channel to the Track III non-official sector, with potential to play in intermediary role.

• 2) Sites for dialogue. What would be the most appropriate format for a Track II dialogue and who would be included.

Thought it would be most beneficial on a small group basis, in which senior official could work in an unofficial capacity. It would have to be under Chatham House Rules, in academic settings. The point was raised that under this format there would be no duty to report findings, which would ease the openness of the dialogue.

AGENDA:

Energy.

· We discussed having an Energy Policy Dialogue between China and Japan, and the feasibility of including Taiwan. But it seemed that this would only be possible in the first instance on the basis of private sector involvement.

Environment.

· Similar to cooperation in the economic sector, there are challenges to environmental cooperation that need to be addressed. Common ground initiatives that have mutual benefit are most important, such as reforestation and pollution control. Ground-up initiatives that would have to be linked to the Track III dialogue were also stressed.

Economic Cooperation.

· Even under economic cooperation, there are still many challenges, such as trade security, the need to improve customs facilities, etc. The same caveat was made on environmental cooperation as well.

· Positive initiatives on the economic side would include sustainable development, local development institutions, agricultural credit, etc.

· In light of the Japanese ODA ending in 2008, how would such initiatives be funded? The model of the “Know How Fund” for economies in transition set up in Europe, which provides financial support for technical experts to offer support for economic institution building. This would need to be recipient driven.

The history project.

· Discussed the benefits of the project, which would provide a common sense of regional community. The limitation is that some of the nuances need to be suppressed in order for it to work. There was the idea that it would be beneficial to bring in different perspectives, such as European and American scholars to expand the dialogue.

· Also, on the issue of follow-up, a practical step would be to link up with Yomuri Shinbum. Alternatively, to have some kind of documentary produced by the NHK. There is also the idea of dealing with the history of modernization in both countries, and perhaps a project that looks objectively at the impact of Japanese aid to China.

Legal, Constitutional, Political Reform Framework

· We thought missing on the list was a framework for addressing legal, constitutional, and political reforms.

· There was a feeling that there was a lack of understanding of the constitutional issues in Japan, and likewise an insufficient understanding of the challenges of developing legal and political reform in China.

· There would be a need to bring legal professionals into the dialogue, which would also be useful in addressing historical and environmental issues as well.

What would be the most desirable (idealistic) objectives?

• Achieving a minimum consensus between China and Japan over the history question, and then shelving it.

• Creation of an East Asian Security Regime, which would incorporate energy, the environment, and economic issues.

• Acknowledgment of diversity and multiple interlinking of Track II dialogues.

• Corporate exchanges involving Taiwan, China, and Japan.

• Commitment from Track I for Track II diplomacy.

• The establishment of an East Asia Multilateral Environmental Forum.

• Putting politics aside and addressing the global environmental crisis and all its ramifications for the region.

• The point was made that this agenda could be seen as practical, incremental steps towards facilitating an East Asian Policy Forum.

Track III:

• Cooperation of mass media through joint T.V. programs.

• Less national influence on newspaper reporting--move to more local views/issues.

• Youth exchange programs (high school).

• Encouragement of positive images through entertainment industry including: “manga”, pop-stars, movie stars.

• Funding from academic circles/international organization.

• Bilateral exchange in education (language & history).

• ODA funding steered toward volunteer exchange (JICA).

• Non-governmental & independent surveys/opinion polls.

• 35th Anniversary of China-Japan Reconciliation and 2008 Olympics.

• Continue reconciliation workshops.

• Publish the outcome of this workshop’s proceedings. Publish the outcome from the Australian point of view.

• Joint exhibitions of art.

• Writing contests supported by private corporations or newspapers.

• Strengthening of city-to-city relationships. Launching of initiatives.

• Creation of a database which documents all the current activities and initiatives dealing with reconciliation.

• On-line reconciliation site giving users access to historical documents and photos.

Tennichi Takahiko on the Yomiuri War Responsibility Project

2006-11-30T16:25:00.000+11:00

A Paper Prepared for the Workshop “Reconciliation between China and Japan: A Search for Solutions”,Canberra,August 16-19,2006.:Do not cite
Reconciliation between China and Japan: Yomiuri Campaign and Its Result

Takahiko TENNICHI
Editorial Writer, The Yomiuri Shimbun

Introduction

It was a great surprise for both rightists and leftists that we, the Yomiuri Shimbun, started a year-long campaign to clarify responsibility for the war from August 2005.
In Japan, there are five major papers, Yomiuri, Asahi, Mainichi, Nikkei and Sankei. In terms of historical issue, it was said that Asahi, Mainichi and Nikkei stood for left and Yomiuri and Sankei stood for right. When we started the campaign, people thought that Yomiuri had changed its position from right to middle at least. However if you check our editorial of these ten years carefully, you will realize that our basic position has not been changed. Indeed, we have raised a lot of questions on Tokyo International Military Tribunal for the Far East, what is called Tokyo Trial. At the same time, we have consistently criticized Japanese militarism. Our editorial on April 13th in 1997 was a typical example.

Japan should calmly scrutinize the regrettable aspects of its history. Criticism of the Tokyo Tribunal should not lead to a theory that accepts Japan's wartime aggression in East Asia or to the revival of the historical view that the Emperor is a living god who should rule the nation based on Shintoism.
For example, the decision to annex Korea was legal from Japan's standpoint based on the international situation at that time, the region's historical background and the approval granted by other major powers.
But it is also a fact that for the Korean people, the annexation was forced upon them under the threat of Japanese military power.
As for China, Japan must accept the fact that its actions there, on the whole, constituted an act of aggression, although this could certainly be debated in a number of specific cases.
The war Japan waged against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands in Asia eventually resulted in independence for the Asian nations, although Japan did not start the war solely to gain their independence.
Despite these facts, looking at Japan as the sole villain is too biased a viewpoint from which to judge Japan's history.

Five Questions

Nevertheless, we are now more enthusiastic to criticize Japanese leaders who caused the war. We started our campaign by our editor’s initiative. The editor, Tsuneo Watanabe, who experienced the Second World War as a soldier, has a serious concern about young generation’s insensibility towards the war. He is a realist. From his point of view, Japan’s foreign policy led by Prime Minister Koizumi is hazardous. Former Prime Minister Nakasone’s view to Koizumi is almost the same. In order to set up Japan as a trustworthy power in East Asia, Watanabe advocated that we must clarify Japanese leader’s responsibility of the war.
He raised 5 questions.
1, -- Why did Japan extend the lines of battle following the 1931 Manchurian Incident, plunging the country into the quagmire of the Sino-Japanese War ?
2, -- Why did Japan go to war with the United States in spite of extremely slim prospects for victory?
3, -- What foolishness caused the Japanese military to employ "banzai attacks," or die-but-never-surrender action, and "kamikaze" suicide aircraft attacks, after the rapid deterioration of Japan's position shortly after victories in the initial phase of the Pacific War?
4,-- Were sufficient efforts made to bring the war to an end and was it possible to prevent the civilian devastation caused by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
5,- What problems were there with the Tokyo Tribunal in which Allied Forces tried Japanese political and military leaders charged with war crimes?
As for the questions from 1 to 4, you can get essence of our answer by reading our copies of August 13, 2006 and those of August 15, 2006. In addition, we will publish our report of English version in coming December. Briefly speaking, our conclusion is as follows. Some people say that the war with America was defensive war pointing out the Hull Notes that required Japan total withdrawal from China. But we did not agree with such an argument. We think that Japanese leaders’ misjudgment caused the war.
Some ambitious military leaders who did not have calculated strategy led Japan to disastrous war. Some moderate leaders who did not want the war eventually yield to those ambitious leaders. Media that advocates the war was also responsible for the war. Many class-A war criminals at the Tokyo Trial overlapped with figures judged “mainly responsible” by the committee. And some are not overlapped.
In terms of the Tokyo Trial, we still keep critical position. Our editorial on May 2, 2006 pointed out some problems of the Tokyo Trial.

Questions should also be raised about the eligibility of the nations that accused and tried the defendants. The Soviet Union, whose representatives sat on the judge's bench and at the prosecutor's table during the tribunal, had been ejected from the League of Nations as an aggressor in December 1939, three months before World War II broke out.
It should also be noted that the Soviet Union breached the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty to fight with Japan toward the end of the war. The Soviets sent 600,000 Japanese soldiers and others to Siberia as prisoners of war, and tens of thousands died in forced labor camps there.
This means that the Tokyo Trial was in session while the Soviet Union was flagrantly violating international law.
British, Dutch and French troops were reinvading some Asian countries during the days of the tribunal, in which these nations were judging Japan's "acts of aggression" in invading Asian neighbors. It took the Netherlands until 1949--one year after the tribunal delivered verdicts on the accused--for the country to conclude a peace deal with Indonesia's national independence forces. For its part, France never abandoned its ambition to retake Vietnam until 1954, when it suffered a crushing military defeat.

If Tokyo Trial is considered to have had many highly questionable and unfair elements, it may be advisable for the Japanese people to reconsider who bears responsibility for the war. This is our position.

The First Challenge

Our campaign must be the first approach that comprehensively clarified the responsibility of the war by Japanese media. In fact, there were few approaches to clarify the responsibility for the war comprehensively by Japanese. Immediately after the end of the Second World War, some Japanese political leaders took it on themselves to apportion responsibility for the war. The cabinet of Prime Minister Naruhiko Higashikuni considered opening a trial on war criminals. He thought that our government, not the allies, should punish war criminals. But the allies did not agree with such an idea. His successor, Kijuro Shidehara, established a government panel charged with uncovering the truth about Japan’s entry into the war. The U.S government accepted this idea But the Soviet Union halted the activity of the panel criticizing that Japanese government was going to study the lessons of the Second World War in order to revenge the allies. In effect the panel was terminated by the allies. In 1951, Japanese Foreign Ministry made a secret report analyzing why Japanese foreign policy made serious mistakes. It’s reviewed only the responsibility of Japanese diplomacy. Japan recovered its sovereignty when the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect on 28th April in 1952. Even after that, Japanese government did not make any effort to clarify Japanese responsibility of the war. The reasons were partly because Tokyo trial had already clarified Japan’s responsibility of the war and partly because we were very busy in setting up our economy. Although almost all of the Japanese media has been very critical to leaders who initiated the war, it has not dare to make campaigns to accuse those leaders because many leaders were punished by Tokyo trial. A lot of historians have clarified Japanese responsibility for the war. However, those works have tended to focus on some specific issues, topics or events of limited years. Actually if some historians clarified Japan’s responsibility of the war comprehensively, such a study would not be so influential. In this sense, Yomiuri campaign is very unique.

The Change of Japan

　Japan has changed very much throughout recent ten years. Namely Japan is now trying to change its position from handicapped state to normal state. This is a famous phrase of the constitution of Japan: We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. Of course we have U.S-Japan security treaty and Japan also has Self Defense Force. Nevertheless we tended to trust in “the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.” And we tended to think that Japan should be constrained as a handicapped power because we were afraid of a ghost of Japan’s militarism. However the situation is now rapidly changing. A momentum was September 18th in 2002 when North Korea had admitted to carrying out the abductions. In addition eight Japanese who were abducted by North Korean agents were confirmed dead. At this moment some leftists who had tried to defend North Korea’s position as our friend and had been unwilling to accept the fact lost their credit.
Ａcording to a Yomiuri Shimbun survey in April 2006, 56% of respondents said the basic law should be revised. It was 47% in 1996 and 22% in 1986.
In April 2004, three Japanese were abducted by Islam militants who argued “If Japanese Self Defense Force does not withdraw, they will be killed.” Public opinion supported Japanese government’s refusal and it also criticized three hostages saying that they entered into Iraq without much thought. It reminds me of another contrast case. In 1977 Japanese Red Army hijacked Japan Airline plane and required Japanese government to release their colleagues who had arrested by Japanese police. The Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda yielded to their requirements, saying that human life is heavier than the earth. Public opinion supported his decision. The two cases symbolically reflect change of Japan through 30 years. Now people expect strong Japan.
In this situation, Prime Minister Koizumi has visited Yasukuni shrine where 14 A-class war criminals were enshrined. His intention is simply to mourn Japanese soldiers who fought for Japan. He also said that he visited Yasukuni not for Class-A war criminals but for people who had died the war. According to a survey by Yomiuri in October 2005, 51.2% of respondents supported his visit to Ysukuni Shrine. Another survey by Yomiuri shows that 68.1%of respondents recognized the war with China as aggressive war and 10.1% of respondents did not. As for Tokyo Trial, 60.8% of respondents did not know what it was. According to Mainichi survey to Diet members, 61% of respondents answered that Tokyo Trial was unreasonable but we had no option. Anyway, majority of Japanese want “strong Japan.” In this situation, there is a possibility that Japanese people will see Tokyo Trial more critically for future. In this sense clarifying our responsibility of war by us is very crucial.
,
Debate on Our Memorial

In order to settle the Yasukuni issue, LDP leaders are now proposing some ideas. One idea is to remove the class-A war criminals from the list of the war dead honored at Yasukuni shrine. However, Yasukuni Shrine has dismissed such an arrangement “impossible”, saying doing so would go against Shinto teachings. Yasukuni Shrine was a state-run facility, but after the Second World War it was forced to be a private religious corporation by the allies. If the government pressures Yasukuni Shrine, a religious corporation, to remove the class-A war criminals from its list of the war dead, it would be against the principle of separation of religion and politics. Foreign Minister Taro Aso has proposed transforming Yasukuni Shrine into a state-run facility. But it is impossible to carry out his proposal unless Shinto shrine agrees to be given such status.
Another option is to erect a state-run memorial for the war dead. Some people who oppose this idea says that Yasukuni Shrine should be the only national memorial for Japan. However, the only national memorial should be under the control of the state. In this sense the idea of erecting a state-run memorial for the war dead is reasonable. But this is not a perfect idea. If Japanese leaders like Koizumi visits both the new memorial and Yasukuni, China will criticize Japan again.
Now Japanese leaders are discussing about our memorial. It is very important issue. However more important thing is our position towards the war.

Our identity

The historical issue between Japan and China is the issue of our national identity. I understand that China cannot easily concede Japan because it is the issue concerning their national identity. As for Japan, mourning victims of war in the war is the issue of our national identity. Tokyo Tribunal is a issue of our national identity also. However, the Second World War itself was apart from Japanese traditional way. Some leaders who led the war eventually offended Japan’s national interest. Throughout our campaign I am convinced of this idea.
It is symbolic that Emperor Showa stopped visiting Yasukuni Shrine after Class-A war criminals were enshrined. The emperor was quoted as saying in the memorandum dated April 28, 1988, "Class-A [war criminals] have been enshrined [with the war dead], even including Matsuoka and Shiratori." The emperor was likely referring to former Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka and former Ambassador to Italy Toshio Shiratori, who were among the 14 Class-A war criminals enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine. They played key roles in establishing the nation's alliance with Germany and Italy during the war, which resulted in a serious confrontation with Britain and the United States. There is some debate whether the Emperor displeased all the Class-A war criminals enshrined in Yasukuni or he displeased only some limited Class-A war criminals of those. In fact he once described Koichi Kido, a Class-A war criminal as “a person who has done distinguished service to our country, although the United States sees him as a criminal.” Quoting this phrase, some rightist argue that the emperor was not displeased with all the class-A war criminals. That could be. But this is not a point. The point is that he was very critical to the war. Clarifying responsibility for the war by ourselves is a work to clarify our identity.

Conclusion

Yomiuri campaign was the first comprehensive approach by media to clarify the responsibility of the war leaders. It may be difficult for our government to do the same approach. However, it clarified the responsibility of Japanese leaders who waged the war apart from Tokyo Trial. Our campaign shows that the war was against our national interest. Today people tend to want strong Japan and also tend to be nationalistic. In this sense I believe that our campaign was very important.
.

Brief biographies of workshop members

2006-11-13T16:58:00.000+11:00

“Reconciliation between China and Japan: A Search for Solutions”

August 17 and 18, 2006, at Australian National University

Amitav Acharya is Professor and Deputy Director and Head of Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. His recent publications include Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (Routledge, 2001, reprinted 2003; Chinese translation published by Shanghai People's Press, 2004), Age of Fear: Power Versus Principle in the War on Terror (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish; New Delhi: Rupa, 2004), Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (co-editor, MIT Press, 2005), and articles in International Organization and International Security. He is a founding member and co-president of the Asian Political and International Studies Association (APISA), and a member of the editorial board of the journals Pacific Review, Pacific Affairs, and European Journal of International Relations. His current research interests include Southeast Asian and Asia Pacific security, regionalism and multilateralism, normative change in world politics and international relations theory. ISAAcharya@ntu.edu.sg

Tomoko Akami is Lecturer and currently Head of the Centre for Asian Societies and Histories at the Faculty of Asian Studies at the College of Asia and the Pacific of the Australian National University. Her main interest is ideas in the history of international relations in the Asia-Pacific region, and she uses cases from Japan in her analysis. She has been working on welfare liberalism, broad notions of security and soft power of information. Her publications include: Internationalizing the Pacific, London: Routledge, 2002; and “In the name of people: welfare and societal security in modern Japan and beyond”, Asian Perspective, vol.30, no.1 (Spring, 2006), pp.157-190; “Nation, state, empire and war: problems of liberalism in modern Japanese history and beyond”, Japanese Studies, vol.25, no.2 (September 2005), pp.119-140. tomoko.akami@anu.edu.au

Chris Braddick. My interest in Sino-Japanese relations began in 1980 when I read International Politics at University College Wales, Aberystwyth. My understanding of the relationship deepened after undertaking an MA at SOAS/LSE, University of London in 1983-84. I spent two years at the University of Tokyo (1987-89) researching the trilateral Japan-China-Soviet Union relationship, before taking up a position at Musashi University, where I eventually became Professor of International Political History. My D.Phil, completed at the University of Oxford in 1998, examined the effect of the Sino-Soviet Alliance on Japan from 1950-1964. It was subsequently published by Palgrave/Macmillan in 2004. I have been a visiting fellow at the ANU since 2001. chris.braddick@anu.edu.au

Mumin Chen, Ph.D. is currently assistant professor at the Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Changua University of Education (NCUE), Taiwan. Dr. Chen received his doctoral and master’s degrees in International Studies from the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, USA (2004 and 1997, respectively), and bachelor’s degree from National Taiwan University, Taiwan, with a major in Political Science (1992). His doctoral dissertation research (“Prosperity but Insecurity: Globalization and China’s National Security, 1979-2000”) received the “China Times Cultural Foundation Young Scholar Award” in 2001. From 2001 to 2002, Dr. Chen was a visiting scholar at the School of International Studies, Peking University (PKU), China, and taught as adjunct lecturer at PKU. From 2002 to 2004, he worked as special assistant to Vice President Annette Lu of Taiwan, in charge of drafting English speeches and analysis of foreign/cross-strait relations. He joined NCUE as a full-time faculty member in September 2004. Dr. Chen’s research focuses include: international security, Chinese foreign policy, and Taiwan-China relations. mumin@cc.ncue.edu.tw
Chris Chung (Ph.D.) is Acting Director of Studies, Graduate Studies in Strategy and Defence, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University. His primary research interests are Asia-Pacific maritime affairs, transnational security and foreign policy analysis. Prior to entering academia Dr. Chung worked for 15 years in a variety of public and private sector organisations, most recently for a decade in the Environment Directorate of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). There he managed the Organisation’s Asia regional and the China country programs of environmental co-operation as well as undertaking environmental policy analysis in central and eastern Europe and OECD member countries. His latest work is “Australia and Non-traditional Security Threats in Southeast Asia” in Brendan Taylor (ed.), Friendships in Flux? Australia as an Asia-Pacific Power, RoutledgeCurzon, London, (forthcoming). chris.chung@anu.edu.au

Malcolm Cook, Program Director Asia Pacific Region at the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, completed a PhD in international relations from the Australian National University, and holds an MA in international relations from the International University of Japan and an honours degree from McGill University in Canada. Before moving to Australia in 2000, Malcolm lived and worked in the Philippines, South Korea and Japan and spent much time in Singapore and Malaysia. Before joining the Institute in November 2003, Malcolm ran his own consulting practice on East Asian risk analysis. mcook@lowyinstitute.org

Mel Gurtov is Professor of Political Science and International Studies in the Hatfield School of Government at Portland State University, Oregon. He is also Editor-in-Chief of Asian Perspective, an international quarterly. He previously served on the staff of the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, Calif. (1966-71), where he was a co-author of the Pentagon Papers, and at the University of California, Riverside (1971-86), where he was professor of political science. He has published twenty books and numerous articles on East Asian affairs, U.S. foreign policy, and global politics. His most recent books are Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy (Rienner, 2006); Pacific Asia? Prospects for Security and Cooperation in East Asia (Rowman & Littlefield, 2002); Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Perspectives from Asia-Pacific, co-edited with Peter Van Ness (Routledge, 2005); and Global Politics in the Human Interest, 4th ed. (Rienner, 1999). Mel is a frequent visitor to East Asia, where he has been a visiting professor—at Waseda University in Tokyo and Hankuk Foreign Studies University in Seoul—and has lectured at universities in South Korea, Japan, and China. He is fluent in Chinese. mgurtov@aol.com

Yusaku Horiuchi is a Senior Lecturer in ANU's Crawford School of Economics and Government. A native of Japan, Dr. Horiuchi received a master's degree in Economics from Yale University, and his doctoral degree in Political Science from MIT. Before joining ANU, he taught for three years at the National University of Singapore and supervised many graduate students from China. From 1991 to 1993, he was a loan officer of Japan's governmental agency and in change of ODA loans to China. One of his research interests is comparative public opinion, in particular public opinion in one country about another country (e.g., China about Japan; Japan about China; non-US countries about US). yasuku.horiuchi@anu.edu.au

David Hundt’s main areas of interest are Political Economy, Economic Development, and International Relations of the Asia-Pacific/East Asia. He has a particular interest in the history, politics and economics of the Korean peninsula. Dr. Hundt received his doctorate in 2005 from the University of Queensland in Political Science, with a thesis that re-examined the power relations between the state and capital during the industrialisation of South Korea. He is currently working at the University of Queensland as a Research Officer on a project focusing on Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia. d.hundt@uq.edu.au
Wenran Jiang (BA, Peking University; MA, International University of Japan; Ph.D., Carleton University) is associate professor of political science and acting director of the China Institute at the University of Alberta in Canada. He is twice a Japan Foundation Fellow, visiting scholar to Tokyo University, Hitotsubashi University and Sophia University over the years, a senior fellow of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, Vice President of the Canadian Consortium on Asia-Pacific Security, and a BusinessWeek online columnist. He is currently completing a book on Sino-Japanese relations.

Jin Xide, born on May 22,1954 in Jilin Province, China, deputy director and professor of the Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He got his MA degree on the History of Japanese Modern Philosophy in 1985 from Yan Bian University, China, and a Ph.D. degree on Japanese Diplomacy in 1994 from the University of Tokyo, Japan. Since June of 1994, he has worked at the Institute of Japanese Studies, CASS, doing research on Japanese diplomacy, Sino-Japanese relations and situation of North East Asia. His major publications include: A History of Modern Japanese Philosophy, Japan-US Axis and Economic Diplomacy, The Japanese Way of Official Development Assistance, Sino-Japanese Relations in the 21st Century. jin_68@hotmail.com

Ryosei Kokubun (Ph.D.) is Director of the Institute of East Asian Studies and Professor of the Political Science Department at Keio University. After completing graduate courses at Keio, he began teaching there in 1981, and became Associate Professor in 1985 and Professor in 1992. He was a visiting scholar at Harvard University, The University of Michigan, Fudan University, Beijing University and National Taiwan University. His research interest is Chinese politics and foreign relations and international relations in East Asia. He is also President of the Japan Association for Asian Studies (2005-2007), Vice President of The Japan Association of International Relations (2004-2006) and Japanese side Director of the 21st Century Commission for Japan-China Friendship (2003-). He edited Challenges for China-Japan-US Cooperation, Japan Center for International Exchange and The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order, JCIE. His publications (Japanese) also include Politics and Bureaucracy in Contemporary China (2004, Suntory Prize for Social Sciences and Humanities) and Chinese Politics and Democratization (1992). rkokubun@iris.ocn.ne.jp

Mindy L. Kotler is founder and director of the Asia Policy Point (APP), formerly the Japan Information Access Project, a membership nonprofit research center in Washington, DC studying the US policy relationship with Japan and other countries in Northeast Asia. APP’s members include leading American scholars, policy officials, analysts, and journalists who follow the region. APP has over 15 years of experience introducing new research, analysis, and information to the American Asia policy community. Ms. Kotler received her Master of Arts degree in International Relations from Yale University and her Bachelor of Arts degree in Government and History with High Honors in Chinese History from Smith College. home@jiaponline.org

Tessa Morris-Suzuki is Professor of Japanese History in the Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University. She convenes the Asian Civic Rights Network, and edits its online journal Asiarights. Her research focuses on frontiers and migration in Northeast Asia and issues of history and memory in Japan. Her recent books include The Past Within Us: Media, Memory, History (Verso, 2005) and Exodus to North korea: Shadows from Japan’s Cold War (Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming 2006). She is also a co-editor of the eight-volume series Ajia Taiheiyô Sensô [The Asia Pacific War], published by Iwanami, 2005-2006. tessa.morris-suzuki@anu.edu.au

Katherine Morton is a Fellow in the Department of International Relations, RSPAS, ANU. She is a China specialist and her research interests include global civil society, international environmental politics, international development, and the influence of international norms and interventions on domestic political and socio-economic change. She is presently engaged in a study of transnational advocacy at the grassroots in China and its impact on the struggle for social and environmental justice. Her recent publications include ‘Surviving an Environmental Crisis: Can China Adapt?’ The Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol.XIII, issue I, Summer/Fall 2006, 'The Emergence of NGOs in China and their Transnational Linkages: Implications for Domestic Reform', Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol.59, no.4, December 2005, and International Aid and China's Environment: Taming the Yellow Dragon, Routledge Studies on China in Transition, Routledge, 2005. katherine.morton@anu.edu.au

Shi Yinhong, Professor of International Relations, Director of the Center for American Studies, Renmin University of China in Beijing. He spent nearly three years in research at Harvard University, the Federal Institute for Eastern European and International Studies in Cologne, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and taught graduate courses at the University of Michigan, Aichi University in Nagoya, and the University of Denver. He has published eight books and more than 300 articles in academic journals, foreign affairs magazines, and newspapers. Many of his publications have had wide influence in China and some have also been influential internationally. y.shi@263.net

Richard Tanter is Professor of International Relations, RMIT University, Melbourne, and Senior Research Associate, Nautilus Institute in San Francisco and Acting Director of Nautilus@RMIT. Within Nautilus he has particular responsibilities for the Global Collaborative and Global Problem-Solving project, and is coordinator of Nautilus@RMITs Austral Peace and Security Net (http://nautilus.rmit.edu.au/). Richard has worked on peace, security and environment issues in East and Southeast Asia as analyst, policy advocate and activist, and also as a radio producer and election campaign director. His most recent books on East Timor are Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military and Violence in East Timor in 1999, [co-edited with Gerry Van Klinken and Desmond Ball] and Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia and the World Community [edited with Mark Selden and Stephen Shalom].
http://nautilus.rmit.edu.au/staff/richard-tanter.html

Takahiko Tennichi was born in Tokyo, 1957. He has worked as an editorial writer for the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper since 2003. He joined Yomiuri in 1981, after receiving his B.A. in Law from the University of Tokyo. He received his M.A. from Johns Hopkins University's the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in 1995. He is a coauthor of "Challenges for China-Japan-U.S. Cooperation" published by the Japan Center for International Exchange. He has written many articles on historical issues, Japanese foreign policy and international relations. tent6048@yomiuri.com

Mark J. Valencia is an internationally known maritime policy analyst, political commentator and consultant focused on Asia. He was a Senior Fellow with the East-West Center for 26 years where he originated, developed and managed international, interdisciplinary projects on maritime policy and international relations in Asia. He has a M.A. in Marine Affairs from the University of Rhode Island and a Ph.D. in Oceanography from the University of Hawaii. Before joining the East-West Center, Dr. Valencia was a Lecturer at the Universiti Sains Malaysia and a Technical Expert with the UNDP Regional Project on Offshore Prospecting based in Bangkok.
He has published over 150 articles and books and is a frequent contributor to the public media such as the Far Eastern Economic Review, International Herald Tribune, Asia Wall Street Journal, Japan Times and Washington Times. Selected works include The Proliferation Security Initiative : Making Waves in Asia (Adelphi Paper 376, International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2005), Military and Intelligence Gathering Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone :Consensus and Disagreement (co-editor, Marine Policy Special Issues, March 2005 and January 2004); Maritime Regime Building: Lessons Learned and Their Relevance for Northeast Asia (Martinus Nijhoff, 2002); Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea (with Jon Van Dyke and Noel Ludwig, Martinus Nijhoff, 1997); A Maritime Regime for Northeast Asia (Oxford University Press, 1996); China and the South China Sea Disputes (Adelphi Paper 298, Institute for International and Strategic Studies, 1995); Atlas for Marine Policy in East Asian Seas (with Joseph Morgan, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992); and Pacific Ocean Boundary Problems: Status and Solutions (with Douglas Johnston, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991).
Dr. Valencia has been a Fulbright Fellow, an Abe Fellow, a DAAD (German Government) Fellow, an International Institute for Asian Studies ( Leiden University) Visiting Fellow , an Ocean Policy Research Foundation (Japan) Visiting Scholar and a U.S. State Department–sponsored international speaker. He has also been a consultant to international organizations and NGOs ( e.g., IMO, UNDP , UNU, the Nautilus Institute, PEMSEA); government institutions and agencies ( in, e.g., Brunei, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Vietnam and the USA); and numerous private entities (e.g. , Shell, CONOCO, and legal firms handling maritime issues). mjvalencia@hawaii.rr.com

Willem E.C. van Kemenade is Senior Fellow, Clingendael Institute of International Relations, The Hague; and Senior Research Consultant, European Institute of Asian Studies, Brussels. He studied History and Chinese in Amsterdam/Leiden and obtained M.A. degree in 1977. From 1977 through 1997 he was based in Hong Kong, Taipei and Beijing as a free lance journalist, writing mainly for Dutch/Belgian and occasionally international newspapers.
His book, “China, Hong Kong, Taiwan Inc., The Dynamics of a New Empire”, New York, Knopf, was published in 1997/1998. (Also published in Dutch, German, Turkish and Chinese).
Other publications include:
Articles: The Washington Quarterly from 1998-2001 on Cross-Straits Relations. Will China’s Rise be Peaceful ? IIAS News Letter, Leiden, # 37, June 2005.
Reports: What is left of the One-China Formula ? Party Politics, Reunification and Taiwanese Nation Building, International Crisis Group, Brussels, Spring 2003.
The Political Economy of Northeast Asian Integration, Policy paper for the European Commission, European Institute of Asian Studies, Brussels, August 2005.
China and the European Union: Commonalities, Limitations, Potential 2006-2010; XRG China Dialogue Network, Hong Kong, December 2005.
For more articles, lectures and papers see my website: www.willemvk.org; and www.clingendael.nl; www.eias.org;

Peter Van Ness (PhD, Berkeley) is a visiting fellow at the Contemporary China Centre and the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University . Van Ness is a specialist on Chinese foreign policy and the international relations of the Asia-Pacific region, and he has served as a member of the board of directors of both the National Committee on US-China Relations and the Human Rights in China organization. Awarded two Fulbright fellowships to Japan, he has taught at four Japanese universities, including Keio University and the University of Tokyo. He has been a research fellow at the Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC, and the Inter-University Program for Chinese Language Studies in Taipei. His most recent book is Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific, edited with Mel Gurtov (RoutledgeCurzon, 2005). pvan@coombs.anu.edu.au

Reconciliation between China and Japan: Short Papers

2006-09-09T14:23:00.000+10:00

Reconciliation between China and Japan:
A Search for Solutions

Australian National University
17th and 18th August 2006

All participants in this workshop were asked to respond briefly to the question: "In your opinion, what are the three most promising things that can be done to advance reconciliation between Japan and China, and why?" They were asked to list their three suggestions and to explain their choice of each.

Answers were contributed by the following workshop participants:

Amitav Acharya
Tomoko Akami
Chris Braddick
Chen Mumin
Malcolm Cook
Mel Gurtov
Horiuchi Yusaku
Wenran Jiang
Jin Xide
Mindy L. Kotler
Tessa Morris-Suzuki
Katherine Morton
Shi Yinhong
Tamamoto Masaru
Richard Tanter
Takahiko Tennichi
Mark Valencia
Willem van Kemenade
Peter Van Ness

Separately available are longer papers by Chris Chung; David Hundt and Roland Bleiker; Jin Xide; Kokubun Ryosei; Takahiko Tennichi; Mark Valencia; and Willem van Kemenade.

* * *

Amitav Acharya

I consider the history book and Yasukuni controversy to be the two most important issues in the bilateral relationship. But military confidence building also needs to be taken into account.

My suggestions for addressing the mistrust in Sino-Japanese relations include the following steps:
1. A working group of scholars from China, Japan as well as other specialists in East Asian history to suggests ways to addressing the "textbook" controversy.
2. Removal of commemorative items related to the 14 Class A war criminals at Yasukuni Shrine.
3. A ban on visits to the Yashukuni by Japanese prime ministers and cabinet members.
4. Creation of an alternative war dead memorial which where Japanese leaders can pay there respects to the victims of war.
5. Institutionalisation and regularization of meetings between Chinese, Japanese and Korean leaders on the margins of all regional groups of which they are members, such as APEC, ARF, ASEAN-PMC and EAS. This could be a prelude to the creation of a regular Northeast Asian forum.
6. A hot-line between Chinese and Japanese prime ministers to nip controversial developments in the bud before they escalate into public recriminations and reproach.
7. Development of a network of citizen groups and civil society leaders in China and Japan to promote understanding and prevent popular venting of anger during sports or cultural events involving the two sides.
8. Bilateral summits, at least two a year, between the leaders of the two nations.
9. Invitation to China to observe and sometimes participate in US-Japanese military exercises.

* * *

Tomoko Akami

1) Bringing diverse opinions in each country on key and controversial issues of China-Japan relations more into public domains.
Diverse opinions exist on key and controversial issues in each country, while the government line and policy may only reflect one section of these opinions. More sensationalist and outrageous views are also often more reported. No government would like to appear as too divided, as it would consider this as a sign of the weakness domestically and internationally. The exercise of putting diverse views in public forum will be also more difficult in China. Yet, at least in Japan, the government or semi-governmental organizations as well as independent organizations could facilitate this trend more. These views are not official views, and could oppose governmental views, but the other side of the nation-state could see that while the government policy is one thing, there are many other views, which could be influential in Japan. They could also found many may hold views that are very similar to the views of many in the other country.
This could be brought into as a book project, presenting diverse views of each country with evidences on several specific issues that are key for the reconciliation.

2) Citizenship of the East Asian Community.
In the book, Multitude, Negri seems to present a new kind of citizenship in a broader community beyond the nation-state boundaries: if a certain policy within a broad community (such as EC) affects one's life, one has a right to have a say on the policy despite its national origin. The East Asian Community is very very remote from the reality of the EC. Yet there are some key and fundamental issues on which many people in the region can agree for the future of the region (peace, environment ...). If they can identify these issues, they should have a say on policy matters on these issues, even that are originated in the other nation...

3) A broader and comparative framework of reconciliation is useful.
While reconciliation of China and Japan needs to be understood within a specific historical context, as Funabashi's book on reconciliation argues, most nation-states on the earth have a serious issue or two of reconciliation. It is important that this forum is held on a third ground, and a similar perspective as well as a comparative perspective will be also useful.

* * *

Chris Braddick

I could suggest literally hundreds of things to advance reconciliation, but I will confine myself to just three:
1). Short-term: the LDP should select a leader to replace Koizumi who is willing to abjure from visiting Yasukuni Jinja while Class A war criminals are still enshrined there. This would be viewed as a positive step by most Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese.
2). Medium-term: the PRC should support Japan's campaign for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This would acknowledge Japan's substantial contribution to the organisation and international stability during the past half century, and give it greater responsibility to help maintain world peace.
3). Long-term: the Chinese and Japanese governments should embark on a campaign to educate the younger generation about the realities of past and present Sino-Japanese relations, beginning for instance with the publication of history textbooks that contained translated extracts from each others' perspective on controversial topics.

* * *

Mumin Chen

Approaches to reconciliation between China and Japan

In March 2005, a series of anti-Japan demonstrations erupted in several Chinese cities. Demonstrators attacked and damaged Japanese consulates, supermarkets, and even restaurants, prompting the Japanese government to demand an apology and compensation for damages. The Chinese government allowed the demonstrations to occur in the first place, and then ordered state media to calm down the protestors. The crisis finally ended when Ministry of Public Security declared any "unauthorized marches" to be illegal.
The crisis is just one of the contentious events in China-Japan relations in recent years. Despite of the fact that China and Japan are now biggest trade partners with each other, political relations between both countries are rapidly deteriorating. Many in China show serious concerns over potential Japanese military resurgence, while more people in Japan worry about China's military modernization and growing nationalism. The causes of the existing tension between China and Japan are complicated, but one can label them to either psychological or strategic factors.
From psychological point of view, people from China and Japan can hardly consider each other as friendly mainly because both societies are still haunted by past war experiences. From 1874 to 1945, Japan and China fought three times (1874, 1894-1895, 1931-1945), but the wars generated different interpretations in both societies. The memories of Japanese war brutality have deeply influenced the way Chinese people look at Japan-even today a movie or novel that portrays how Chinese people bravely fought against Japan during WWII is still popular in China. On the other hand, Japanese people today generally consider that war crimes were done by previous generations, and they shall not be responsible for those mistakes. Different interpretations of past experiences constitute the primary cause for mistrust between both societies.
From strategic point of view, China and Japan are two major powers in East Asia, and the strategic interactions between the two will definitely determine the security environment of the region in the future. Japan has become very active in international affairs in recent years. The most famous developments include deployment of armed forces overseas and re-definition of the area covered by US-Japan Security Treaty. The policies have been largely supported by Japanese people who are convinced that Japan should play a dominant role in maintaining peace and stability of the region. On the other hand, thanks to the success of economic reforms in the past two decades, Chinese has been rapidly rising to be another superpower with enough capabilities to challenge status quo power balancing in Asia. More people in China presume that Japan is China's primary competitor, and defeating Japan, being it politically or militarily, will be inevitable if China wants to achieve supreme status in Asia.
Discussion of China-Japan reconciliation should take above two factors into considerations. In my view, three most promising things that can be done to advance reconciliation between Japan and China are removing major war criminals from Yasukuni Shrine, forming a joint team to supervise and draft history textbooks, and establishment of strategic dialogue between China and Japan.
Since the late 1970s, Japanese politicians' visit to Yasukuni shrine has given Chinese an excuse to blame Japanese government for tolerating resurgence of militarism. If Yasukuni shrine is wrongly interpreted by Chinese people as a symbol of militarism, why not removing the names of those main war criminals from the shrine? Japanese people could still visit the shrine to mourn the dead in past wars, but without the tablets of war criminals, the visits will be less controversial.
Approval of a controversial history textbook by Japan's Ministry of Education was the main reason of the eruption of massive anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in 2005. To avoid similar incidents in the future, Chinese and Japanese government, and perhaps independent scholars from both sides, may consider forming a team or organization to provide "standard interpretations" about WWII and the relations between both countries, and forward them to both sides as guidelines for drafting new textbooks. The purpose is to create a neutral team to carefully examine the historical events that may cause misunderstanding and even hatred in both societies. By doing so both countries may also prevent the other side from using textbooks to promote xenophobia or hyper-nationalism in the society.
To create a stable and peaceful strategic environment in Asia, Chinese and Japanese government may also consider forming a second-track security dialogue mechanism, to meet and discuss security-related issues that both countries consider as strategic interests. This mechanism may consist of strategic analysts, policy-makers, and independent scholars from both sides, with the purpose of creating a new strategic culture that no longer sees power-balancing as the only way to keep peace and stability of the region. If China and Japan can work together to create a strategic partnership, I would suggest both countries to consider including Taiwan into such a strategic mechanism.

* * *

Malcolm Cook

Ideas to Promote Japan-China Harmony

I believe each one of these three ideas is feasible in the present climate of bilateral relations. None require either government to significantly change its approach to the other. None of these would likely have much immediate impact beyond a symbolic one. In the longer-term, each would strengthen politically salient ties between the giant neighbours and help take some chill out of the present climate.

Chinese immigration stream to Japan: One of Japan's most significant challenges is the decline of its working age population and the need to open up much more significantly and systematically to foreign workers. On the other hand, as shown in the early stages of the Australia-China FTA, the Chinese government is keenly seeking greater access to Australia's labour market. Given this powerful convergence of interests, Japan could announce - with appropriate political fanfare on both sides - a much larger intake program for working age Chinese. This immigration change would highlight the intense economic complementarity of the two economies, help Japan shift towards a more globally open labour market and provide a political deliverable to both sides that emphasises their shared interests. This should not be a guest worker program but one that would allow participants the right to apply for permanent residency and it should not too limited in its sectoral scope.

Joint work on demographic change: Focusing on common problems rather than trying to overcome problems that divide the two countries would seem to be more feasible and less open to political backlash. One of if not the largest common problems facing Japan and China is preparing for the social, economic and fiscal ramifications of aging populations. Japan is already facing population decline while China will face it soon while still being a poor country. The two relevant lead agencies could establish a joint research centre to be opened by both political leaders and provided with substantial funding so the centre does not quickly become forgotten. South Korea could also be invited to participate in the centre given its similar problems. Including South Korea could also limit the centre's risk emanating from upsurges in bilateral tensions between China and Japan. This centre - if properly resourced - could also provide key research for the global search to answers to demographic change. The establishment of such a centre could also send a powerful domestic message to each participating country about the urgency and importance of demographic change.

Regular two-party talks on North Korea: While Japanese and Chinese positions on how to deal with North Korea's testing strategic behaviour are certainly not the same, North Korea is a significant problem for both countries. For China, North Korea is one of the litmus tests (Iran is another) of its status as a "responsible stakeholder." For Japan, North Korea's missile diplomacy is a serious strategic threat that exposes its military shortcomings. Regular, closed-door and low-key consultative meetings between either ministers or top-level bureaucrats from the foreign affairs and defence agencies on North Korea would provide very useful information-sharing opportunities. They could also increase the pressure subtly on North Korea by showing that China - taking a relatively soft line on Pyongyang - is willing to talk with Japan who is taking a harder line. Such meetings could also help minimise the chances for bilateral problems over the ways to deal with North Korea such as we witnessed over responses to the latest North Korean missile tests.

* * *

Mel Gurtov

Three Paths to Conflict Management

Resumption of High-Level Diplomacy
There has not been a Japan-China summit since 2002, and China has deliberately avoided direct conversations with Koizumi at multilateral venues because of the Yasukuni issue. It is essential that direct dialogue resume, both for its symbolic importance and for its practical possibilities, such as issuance of a new joint statement of friendship and cooperation.

Preliminary Talks on a Northeast Asia Security Dialogue Mechanism
The Sept. 2005 joint statement of principles issued at the conclusion of the Six Party Talks in Beijing held out the prospect of a multi-party security forum that might evolve from the Talks. Although making headway on such a forum clearly depends on a satisfactory ending of the current nuclear impasse with North Korea, preliminary discussion of the scope and organizing principles for a dialogue mechanism could begin now. It would be one way to engage China and Japan on East Asia security issues.

Track II Gatherings
Apart from high-level diplomacy, the peacemaking possibilities of Track II activities should be considered. Chinese and Japanese media, business, academic, and scientific circles have much that they could explore with each other. A gathering of such specialists, together or on separate occasions, might promote mutual understanding, reduce stereotyping, and change popular opinion in both countries that currently has very low regard for the other. Track II gatherings might also encourage particular groups to lobby their governments for improvements in China-Japan relations-as Japanese business groups have already done on the Yasukuni issue.

* * *

Horiuchi Yusaku

In my opinion, the most promising thing that can be done to advance reconciliation between Japan and China is to have many close and good friends. This may sounds too simplistic but after spending 13 years outside my home country (i.e., Japan) and having met many friends and colleagues from many countries (including China, of course), I found that this is the most effective way to improve our mutual understandings, which, I believe, lead to reconciliation between Japan and China. The logic is simple: If we have a good friend from a particular country, we tend to build a good image about that country and its people. If we have another close friend from the same country, we tend to update our belief that people from that country are nice and trustworthy. By contract, if you meet many people from a particular country and they tend to be nasty, even when the truth is that you (unfortunately) happen to meet nasty people by chance, you update your belief that people from that country are bad. This psychological process of "information update" (know as, "Bayesian inference" in the literature of statistics) is, I think, an inevitable fact of life, and something that I want to test empirically as part of my research projects. There is an important implication of this argument: All people, particularly those outside their home county, should realize that their behavior can critically shape images, of their home country, among people from other countries. We are all "private diplomats" and should take responsible actions.

* * *

Wenran Jiang

1. In the short term, Japanese leaders should stop visiting the Yasukuni Shrine so the two countries can put their relationship back on track for the "second normalization" process, that is to have regular bilateral meetings at all levels, especially the summit.
Why - First, the Yasukuni Shrine remains the central issue of the current deadlock in Sino-Japanese relations. Second, Yasukuni has damaged Japan beyond its relations with China. Third, solving the Yasukuni issue, even temporarily, will form the basis for further efforts of reconciliation.
Why promising - First, Beijing has been seeking a way out in improving relations with Tokyo. Second, there are growing forces in Japan against visits to Yasukuni by future Japanese PMs. Third, Emperor Showa's comments, as the recently released memo indicates, adds further pressure for stopping the prime ministerial visits. Fourth, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is stepping down, leaving the door open for Shinzo Abe and other potential successors not to make a firm commitment for visiting the shrine.

2. In the medium term, Japan and China should establish a number of mechanisms to manage the bilateral relationship in the new century: institutionalized official dialogues that address bilateral differences; private sector associations that deals with bilateral business ties; regular track-two style meetings that bring government officials, business, academics and public opinion leaders together.
Why - First, while history issues may dominate the headlines, China-Japan relations are multi-dimensional and require much more extensive care at many levels. Second, the existing institutions are either outdated or ineffective. Third, meaningful and effective working institutions will improve communications, benefit mutual understanding and lead to reconciliation.
Why promising - First, there is growing realization in both countries that communication channels established in the 1970s and 1980s are no longer suitable for the 21st century, and something new has to be worked out for the new generations. Second, while coping with pressing issues such as the East China Sea energy dispute and the North Korea nuclear crisis, there are already existing management mechanisms (although not institutionalized) between Tokyo and Beijing. Third, both countries have a much younger and more professional diplomatic, business and academic work force that can facilitate such tasks.

3. In the long term, Japan needs to go through a thorough national reflection on its war past while China should be a lot more self-reflective and forgiving in order to establish a future-oriented, healthy bilateral relationship; but this must be an international effort.
Why - First, true reconciliation must be based on soul-searching and nationwide reflections of the past. Second, both countries must confront negative nationalism and leaders of both countries should resist the temptations of using nationalism for political gains. Third, both peoples need to come to terms with each other at the emotional level, and manage the "superiority-inferiority complex." Fourth, external forces, international institutions and world opinions can affect the behaviours of Japan and China, even though both are powerful states.
Why promising - First, a nationwide debate is going on in Japan about its own past while internal and open debates about China's Japan policy have also been going on for some time in China, both healthy signs of long-term reconciliation efforts. Second, China continues to grow economically and open up politically while Japan is stabilizing as one of the largest economies, laying foundations for both as equal players on the world stage. Third, world opinion, assisted by rapidly growing communication technologies, will have more and more impact on the leadership and the public in both Japan and China.

* * *

Jin Xide

The Three Things of Top Priority for Reconciliation between China and Japan

Recent years relations between China and Japan have been in a state of "worst situation since 1972" or "cold political relations and hot economic ones". This aroused deep concern among not only in various circles of Chinese and Japanese society but also in the international community.
As many results of research and observation show, China-Japan relations have been undergoing a long process of structural readjustment. It doesn't seem any simple measure could have immediate effects for realizing total reconciliation between them. Even so, trying best to find out a way leading to reconciliation has become common task and responsibility for the government and people in both countries.
In my opinion, the following three things will be most promising for achieving the above purpose.

1. To control and manage the history problem.
The history problem has become the main reason for provoking political frictions and mutually deteriorating the public opinion and the feeling of the people in the both countries. But the reasons behind this problem are so complicated that to thoroughly solve this issue in a morning seems like a mission impossible.
Based on this judgment, an intermediate solution will be to control and manage this problem. The following measures will be necessary for the solution.
The first one is to hold dialogues in various levels between them to make clear and confirm the contents of the history problem and try to find out solutions for resolving them.
The second one is to mutually adopt the principle of controlling and managing this problem under the framework of their bilateral political relations and restricting themselves from taking any actions to further worsen the situation.
The third one is to try hard mutually to separate history problem with the other bilateral issues in economic relations, the other non-political fields and people-to-people exchanges.
The meaning of this suggestion lies in an assumption to stop the trend of sliding down into a worse situation of history problem and change it into an improving track.
To compare with some other radical suggestions the above one may seem too conservative. However it is the most realistic and promising one in present time the effectiveness of which has been proved by the practice of last decade of China-Japan relations.

2. To hold comprehensive strategic dialogue
Recent years some kinds of political and security dialogues between the two governments have been in progress.
The top leaders of the two countries have met in the third countries several times but failed in reaching consensus on the main issues especially the history problem. The meetings even worsened the atmosphere of the political relations between them.
There also have been some foreign ministerial meetings held by Li Zhao-xing and his Japanese counterparts Machimura Nobutaka and his successor Aso Taro. But no any meaningful breakthrough was made in the meetings.
In vice foreign ministerial level, there have been five times dialogues called "strategic dialogue" by China and "comprehensive policy dialogue" by Japan with Dai Bing-Guo and Yachi Shotaro as the leaders of both sides.
In vice foreign ministerial level there has been another dialogue channel called security dialogue. The leaders of the two sides in the recent tenth meeting were Wu Da-wei and Nishida Tsuneo.
Dialogues have also been held on the Issue of East China Sea. The recent sixth negotiation was held between Hu Zheng-yue and Sasae Kenichiro both of who were chief of Asian Bureau of Foreign Ministry.
From these dialogues we can see how difficult they are! Under the circumstances of lacking favorable internal and external conditions and strong political wills and good methods, these dialogues have had little gains for both sides.
Nevertheless a high level framework or mechanism of regular comprehensive and substantial strategic dialogue will be absolutely necessary for the present relations between them. The purpose of the dialogue will be multiple.
The main contents of the dialogue will be: confidence building, exchanging views and information, preventing conflicts, mutually improving public opinion, and making grand design for their overall cooperation in bilateral as well as multilateral cooperation.
To compare with the hitherto ones the suggested strategic dialogue needs at least the following improvements.
Firstly, it is necessary for both sides to have the sincere wills to hold a meaningful strategic dialogue.
Secondly, the rank of the dialogue should be high enough to influence the both sides' decision-making.
Thirdly, the contents of the dialogue should be comprehensive and substantial.
Fourthly, the dialogue should keep stability and consistency.

3. To improve the people's mutual feeling
Recent years the worsened public opinion and the people's feeling have become one of the new and main obstacles for China-Japan relations. Without improvement of this situation it will be very difficult to make substantial compromise for the leadership and government of both sides in the main issues between them.
In the other side, the general political posture of the leadership and government will also be one of the basic factors for improving the public opinion and the people's feeling.
For this end the leadership and government of the two sides should take very cautious attitude towards the sensitive issues between the two countries so as to preventing the public opinion being stimulated in negative ways. They should actively push forward all kinds of people-to-people exchanges beneficial for improving the mutual understanding in the fields of business, academic activities, mass media, culture, tourism, education, etc.

Conclusion
By pushing forward the above things it is expected to change the situation of bad circulation into a good ones between government and public opinion inside the both societies and between the two countries.

* * *

Mindy L. Kotler

Geo-political considerations of regional economic and military competition notwithstanding, social and cultural anxieties appear at the heart of Sino-Japanese tensions. The Chinese and Japanese people share many of the same societal dislocations, economic uncertainties, and personal insecurities. One view of rising nationalism in these two countries is that it is a convenient distraction from these issues that has been engineered by political elites. Another is that nationalism's manifestations in China and Japan are the result of incomplete nation building where social change encourages an idealization of a mythic past.
Both China and Japan are ancient societies forged into nation-states by foreign ideologies. Both have citizens with weak national identities and leaderships that aspire to build stronger ones. Both are confronting inward-looking, individualist trends that distance their citizens from the state. Both societies are struggling with expanding personal responsibilities after a period of rigid conformity. In short, both China and Japan have witnessed a decade of social change brought about by rapidly transforming economies in an era of acultural globalization.
China and Japan now share a unique period in their nation building. The central governments are faltering in their ability to provide social stability and cohesion-a sense of safety and material well-being. Security is being defined by making Chineseness or Japaneseness a civil, rather than an ethnic quality. It is the "national" in national security with which both societies are grappling.
Solutions are sought in pursuing moral reeducation. For the majority of Japanese leaders this is found in retelling the glory days of Imperial Japan and the Greater East Asian War. For Chinese leaders, this is found in the saga of struggle in War against Japanese Aggression. Each sees these times as nobler of purpose and clearer of duty than those of today. Leaders in both countries want to pursue a form of "patriotic education" in order to relive their pasts to regain their futures. Interestingly, both see nobility in the retelling of these "failures." In identifying themselves as "victims" though their dogged support for losing causes, Chinese and Japanese find proof of moral sincerity.
The Chinese and Japanese people are beset with anxieties about their future. Their leaders both want to restore and confirm pride and prestige to their people. As interactions increase between the two, the tendency to project these fears upon the other is great. Until the Chinese and Japanese governments recognize and respond effectively to these worries and foster a sense of national confidence and security internally, the current negative perceptions of the other will persist. Significant progress in Sino-Japanese relations is unlikely. Once popular concerns are met, however, we can likely see a more balanced relationship between the two countries.
Current Sino-Japanese tensions reflect more each country's domestic stresses than they do any inherent regional strategic competition. Restoration or the establishment of prosperity and social certainty in both countries is necessary before China and Japan can have any meaningful resolution of their historical and geo-political issues. Indeed, reconciliation between China and Japan is less a history issue than a future issue.
I believe that reconciliation between China and Japan must first be found in internal national reconciliations. The process of rebuilding social cohesion, however, must equally develop trust between these two countries. Ways must be found that make the future less frightening and insecure. First measures must be immediate, tangible, and mutually understandable.
Japan needs to come to terms with loss of the war and confirm its commitment to democracy. Toward this end:
a. Legislation similar to that in Germany that restricts hate speech, denial of wartime misdeeds, and protects those who try to educate about the war are important. For example, positioning a guard at the comfort women museum in Tokyo would be a powerful symbol. Removing the uyoku trucks and people from Yasukuni would be another.
b. A national day of remembrance should be established, similar to Memorial Day in the US or ANZAC day in Australia.
c. A government restitution commission similar to those in Germany and Austria should be established to address grievances by comfort women, POWs, slave laborers, non-Japanese nuclear victims Japanese orphans left in China, and others. Legalistic solutions to these issues have engendered contempt and distrust.
d. Memorials to the victims of the war should be created that school children can visit. Examples include: plaques at the docks where the Hellships and Korean laborers arrived; an interactive museum created from one of the Mitsubishi or Mitsui mines (the best being Battleship Island), and greater recognition of the Juganji Buddhist temple near Osaka that holds annual memorial services for foreign POW dead.
China and Japan must recognize that the time of empire is over. As the Europeans have learned, borders change and principalities come and go. Lingering historical claims over islets and boundaries are formulas for trouble and opportunities for demagogues. Every effort should be made toward practical, ahistoric resolutions all territorial disputes. Allies of both countries need to indicate that they will not support or defend every territorial claim.
China needs to show appreciation for Japan's efforts and seek ways to reassure Japan of its intentions. China too needs to confront it wartime history. Not all Chinese were freedom fighters or heroic. Popular culture should be encouraged to present a more balanced picture of Japan and Japanese history. China also needs to take the high ground and not react to every provocative action by Japan.
Yasukuni seems to be a separate issue. It is symbolic of all that is wrong with the Sino-Japanese relationship. More important, it is a Japanese issue representing all of Japan's unresolved national identity and war angst. It is world of mythic history and state religion. In many respects, it is on its way to being resolved. The subtle but clear involvement of the imperial house will go far to define the role of Yasukuni in Japan. After all, the Shrine was created by and for the Imperial house to glorify death in war for the Emperor. It his job to depoliticize the memorial.
Shinto is theologically unbound. If there is a consensus that the 14 Class A War Criminals (crimes against peace) should be dis-enshrined, it can and will happen. More difficult is to decide whether Yasukuni is a religious or state site. There are excellent arguments for both. In either case, the Yushukan (museum) must be removed or substantially altered. The argument that the site is private falls apart when claims are equally made that it is a national place of mourning.
One area of discussion would be the acceptability of the PM or Emperor visiting the Chinriesha Shrine at Yasukuni. This Shrine enshrines all those who fought against the empire. It is to pacify their souls. Although they are enshrined collectively they receive twice daily, Shinto rites and have their own festival day July 13. For now, the Chinriesha is fenced off and to the side of main shrine. The symbolism of the Chinriesha being unfenced, recognized, and guarded against right-wing fanatics has promise as a dramatic symbol of reconciliation.

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Tessa Morris-Suzuki

This is a huge and complex question, and much thought would be needed to provide a good answer. However, as quick response and as a starting point to provoke discussion, I would suggest the following three (in no particular order):

The United States should enter into direct negotiations with North Korea, in order to re-start the stalled regional process of dialogue on the problems of the Korean Peninsula. - This may seem a counter-intuitive response, as it does not directly involve Japan or China. However, in the long run I think that the greatest risk to future China-Japan relations lies in the danger of a violent or chaotic end to the North Korean crisis. On the other hand, restoring the possibility of regional dialogue on North korea would provide a good basis for further developing regional dialogue on other issues. However, at present it seems that this will not happen until the US overcomes its reluctance to negotiate directly with North Korea.

Japan should create a secular "peace memorial" to the war dead as an alternative to the Yasukuni Shrine - This should be based on widespread debate and consultation, both inside and outside Japan. It should draw on the recent rich experience of the design of memorials developed particularly in countries like Germany, but also embodied in existing Japanese memorials such as the Okinawa "Cornerstone of Peace"

Japan, China and Korea (possibly in cooperation with other parts of the region such as Mongolia and Far Eastern Russia) should cooperate in establishing a jointly-managed East Asian TV network - The network would show news and entertainment material from all parts of the region, including co-produced programs, language education programs etc. One of its main purposes would be to overcome the grass-roots mutual fear and misunderstanding between the countries of the region, particularly amongst younger generations.

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Katherine Morton

Reconciliation between China and Japan

Suggestion one: Establishment of an Integrated Environmental and Energy Conservation Cooperation Framework
For over a decade, scholars and policymakers in Japan have stressed the importance of developing environmental cooperation with China. By the late 1990s it was seen as a way of expanding beyond the bilateral relationship to enhance regional cooperation. This vision has yet to be realized. But environmental cooperation on a bilateral basis is developing fast, largely driven by Japan's ODA program. It is no longer the Japanese side that is pushing the agenda. Environmental concerns are now taken seriously in Beijing and it is widely recognized that Japan's experience and expertise in pollution control is highly relevant in the China context. Both countries also share a deep interest in energy conservation. For China, rapid growth in energy consumption on such a vast scale means that it has little choice but to improve energy efficiency and re-orient its economic development towards the sustainable use of resources. As an energy resource poor nation, Japan is also keen to promote energy conservation amongst its neighbouring countries to reduce the risk of regional competition for energy supplies.
An agreement between the two governments has already been reached to initiate a policy dialogue on energy conservation. My suggestion would be to establish an integrated framework for environmental and energy conservation cooperation. This could help to facilitate a common agenda for addressing the nexus between environmental protection and energy conservation. In the case of most other countries these areas are treated separately - for example the US-China Energy Policy Dialogue or the EU-China Environmental Policy Dialogue. Past experience has shown that efforts to reduce industrial pollution in China are most effective when linked to incentive schemes for improving energy efficiency. Likewise, in order to achieve long-term results, energy conservation needs to be linked to broader environmental concerns such as afforestation and the rehabilitation of wetlands (ie: carbon sinks).
Such a cooperative framework would need to involve the private sector on both sides. Without the support of corporations new initiatives will not succeed. Japanese yen loans to China will cease in 2008 to coincide with the Olympic Games. Hence corporate investment will be necessary to sustain specific projects at the operational level.
Cooperation in an area that promises mutual benefits can strengthen dependency and moderate hostility thus reducing the potential for conflict. However, Sino-Japanese differences will not simply fade away on the basis of functional cooperation. To help mend relations and build trust it is also necessary to address sensitive issues (perhaps on an incremental basis) within a broader framework of cooperation. Such issues include the disposal of chemical weapons left by the Japanese military in northeastern China, intellectual property, and the development of gas fields in the South China Sea.
Suggestion two: Establishment of a Third Sector Dialogue
Over the past decade, both China and Japan have witnessed a rapid increase in civil society organizations working to improve social welfare, environmental protection, gender equity etc. These organizations differ widely with respect to their degree of autonomy from the government, organizational capacity, and scope of activity. The development of civil society, also known as the third sector, is of interest to both the Japanese and Chinese governments. However, there has been very little cooperation within this sector on a bilateral basis. This is largely because Japanese aid to China has tended to circumvent NGO participation. It is also because bilateral relations have tended to be centered at the elite level.
The benefit of such a dialogue lies in its potential to infuse more public involvement into the bilateral relationship. A bottom up approach to building trust at the societal level can help to expand openness, reduce tensions, and promote longer-term interests. Fostering a thicker web of connections between the two countries may also help to increase interdependency.
Ideally, the dialogue should be broad based and inclusive of NGOs, networks, media, artists, scientists, etc. The Internet could provide a means of building networks and soliciting common concerns. A public forum could then be organized (perhaps every two years) in cities outside of Beijing and Tokyo hosted by local mayors. This would provide a source of alternative ideas to be channeled into central policy decision-making in both countries. On a practical basis, it may also be possible to set up volunteer programs for Japanese volunteers to spend time working in NGOs in China and vice-versa.

Suggestion three: Co-sponsored Research Project - Japanese Aid to China 40 years On
As mentioned above, Japanese aid to China is planned to end in 2008 to coincide with the Olympic Games. Historically Japanese aid to China has been seen as de facto war reparations. It therefore has a high symbolic value which explains the difficult negotiations that took place between China and Japan over the planned 25% reduction in aid to China in fiscal 2001. Many Japanese remain deeply suspicious that ODA to China is somehow linked to increases in military spending. There also exists a common feeling that ODA is not appreciated in China. A fully transparent research project that looks back over the past forty years at Japanese aid and its contributions to the Chinese economy may help to assuage some of these suspicions. This could be carried out on a similar basis to the World Bank 50 years on project that brought in independent researchers to look at the role of the Bank on an objective basis with a balanced assessment of actual outcomes on the ground. The benefit of such a project is that regardless of some of the limitations involved it would help to highlight some of the contributions that remain invisible to the public eye. The project would need to be co-sponsored by both countries with the aim of publishing a book in Japanese and Chinese.

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Shi Yinhong

Three Things to Advance Reconciliation between China and Japan

To control the confrontational dynamics in China-Japan relations by setting rules of "status quo maintenance", "fields de-linkage", "agents de-linkage", "case by its own merits", and "initiative in making concessions"
One might say without too much exaggeration that there is already between China and Japan a kind of political/strategic cold war situation, with some prominent features of a classical Cold War. The political relationship between the two countries seems to have become a "zero-sum" game, whether in terms of its fundamental structure or of those concrete disputes, resulting at an protracted and almost total stalemate because of the consistent refusal of either side to make any substantial concession first to the other. Especially, the problem of visiting Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese prime minister has become the paramount test of strength or the chief battleground, over which either side has confronted the other for months and years, and on which according to their fixed perceptions enormous symbolic and substantial significances are at stake. By the very nature of "zero-sum" game, every major effort by one in the game aimed at a significant "gain" will be surely resisted strongly by the other who is to suffer a significant "loss" if no counteraction is done to neutralize effectively the striving of the former in the first place. The result of the contention and stalemate in this manner will be the increasingly aggravation of mutual suspicion, apprehension and hostility.
Between China and Japan, lasting tensions may of course escalate into protracted cold war confrontation or even armed conflict. If the escalating deterioration of the China-Japan political relations not mitigated or stopped, it will surely bring grave dangers to the vital interests of these two nations and to the East Asian stability and security. Therefore, at the present and in a relatively long period of the future, the imperative and practicable task in general is not (or at least not primarily) to solve the major dispute, but to mitigate tensions, to strive for stability, and to control as much as possible the confrontational dynamics in China-Japan relations, which are inherently unstable and potentially dangerous.
For this, the two national governments in Beijing and Tokyo are required to set in urgency a most essential rule for dealing with their major disputes and striving for the fundamental stability: the rule stipulating that neither country should take any action aimed at changing the status quo unilaterally on any issue over which there is major dispute between them. Besides this first priority in importance, there are four other basic rules that need to be established step by step. These are: To differentiate as firmly as possible four distinct major fields of China-Japan relations, i.e., the history disputes, strategic rivalry (including territorial disputes and various security problems), diplomatic intercourses, and economic interdependence, for the purpose of preventing or "interdicting" as much as possible such development that the grave tension or crisis happened in any one of these fields influences excessively the other fields; To differentiate without reservation the statements and acts of national government from those of private persons or institutions and local governments, taking the former as the only standard for assessing and judging the intentions and policy of the other country, for the purpose of preventing, "interdicting", or reducing the impact of the private or local anti-Chinese or anti-Japanese actions respectively in Japan and China upon the working relationship between the national governments; To treat the statements and acts of the national government on the other side concretely, mainly in a manner of case by case according to its own merits, not escalating the nature of things in official assessment or governmental public comments without strict limitations; On the basis of reasonable success to control the grave tensions, both sides should realize that it will be helpful to take initiative to offer some limited and appropriate concessions on the existing major disputes, at least for exploring the other's intentions and creating chances for their possible mitigation or solution.
In short, it is imperative to set the above basic rules of "status quo maintenance", "fields de-linkage", "agents de-linkage", "case by its own merits", and "initiative in making concession" for controlling the dangerous confrontational dynamics. In order to generate and implement these rules, a kind of much more comprehensive, concentrate, regular, and intensive China-Japan Strategic Dialogue and its institutional mechanisms must be created and developed as soon as possible. Moreover, in view of the existing tensions, especially in the sea areas between China and Japan resulted from serious territorial and natural resources disputes and military activities, together with other potentialities for conflict, including those from the Taiwan problem and the increasing forward existence of U.S.-Japan military alliance, formal regular dialogues on the higher political, functionary institutional, and professional military levels for setting rules and procedures of crisis management are also imperative and relatively urgent. So much in national and international security is at stake in their launching, progress, rule-formation and implementation.

To prepare to accommodate the respective core interests, national sensibilities, and aspirations of both China and Japan by partially restructuring the fundamental regime of bilateral relations ("the 1972 regime")
For three decades since 1972 when the China-Japan diplomatic normalization dramatically began and quickly realized until the most recent years and months, there had been a political and almost legal regime for China-Japan relations which was defined and most authoritatively demonstrated by the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement of September 29, 1972 as well as the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded on August 12, 1978 as the former document's legal completion.
This regime, called by many prominent Japanese scholars and political leaders as well as some Chinese experts on the Japanese studies as "the 1972 regime", takes its stipulation on the issues of history and Taiwan as its core norms, which defines in both words and spirits Japan's war against China in 1930s and 40s as totally unjustifiable armed aggression and Taiwan as part of China and under China's sovereignty. As to the broader power realities which generated such a regime three decades ago, U.S.-China rapprochement and the so-call "Nixon shock" suffered by Japan are the most important. And strategic purpose of the both sides then in checking the Soviet geopolitical power and "hegemonism" had provided one of the major dynamics for the regime. It is obvious that the 1972 regime has been highly favorable to China (and one might also say that it much more so to China than to Japan), whether in consideration of its core norms or of its power relationship background and even the primary strategic purpose held by the both sides at the time of its birth. It has been more so because of the passiveness and reactivity of the Japanese government in the related decision-making under the international political circumstances then drastically emerged following Nixon's visit to China.
Since then, due to China's dramatic rise in recent years the structure of power relationship between China and Japan has changed and continues to change, becoming much more favorable to China even than what it was temporarily as it like in 1970s due to the particular circumstances then existed. However, the 1972 regime that had been highly favorable to China have not been strengthened or more solidified, but on the contrary impinged seriously by the various actions of the Japanese government under Koizumi in the past three years or so. Why? Because not only there has been no common strategic purpose between China and Japan since the drastic decline and then collapse of the Soviet Union, but these two nations, in the context of the rise of the former and the increasing change of national will of the latter in a rightist and nationalistic direction, has been developing mutually conflicting strategic purposes. In terms of the 1972 regime, China is a one hundred percent status quo power, while Japan has become one that strongly inclines to revisionism. Moreover, it has virtually begun to treat, both explicitly and implicitly, the revision of this regime with its core norms on history and Taiwan as a major component of its new state will to pursue political status and military rights as a "normal state".
The 1972 regime very clearly stipulates and upholds two of the vital interests of China in her relations with Japan-those on the issues of history and Taiwan. However, it seems not to do so (or at least far from in a same degree) for Japan. The vital interests of Japan defined by herself was ambiguous at the time of regime birth and is recently in major change or redefining. The 1972 regime is bound to be difficult in maintaining intact without change, because of both the change of Japan's basic willingness and those have happen for most of the fundamental circumstances since 1972. It would not be possible to maintain the status quo one hundred percent. However, the problem of this regime is definitely not that it has become fundamentally out of date, even not that it needs any change in its stipulating and upholding the vital interests of one of its parties (China), or that China could tolerate that change. Any possible new regime of China-Japan relations must still provides and upholds China's lasting vital interests on the issue of history and Taiwan in her relations with Japan, and therefore must inherit the principles provided by the 1972 regime on these two major issues. Otherwise there will be no possibility that China would consider or accept any new regime for her relations with Japan or she should do it at all.
But on the other hand, because of the changes that have happen for most of the fundamental circumstances in the past three decade, the 1972 regime has indeed become quite insufficient or inadequate. It should be expanded. In other words, beside the existing core norms on the issues of history and Taiwan, three sets of new norms should be added, or at least the following first set of new norm added as soon as possible: (1) the norms for controlling the China-Japan confrontational dynamics and establishing "crisis management"; (2) those for helping to produce the constructive political/strategic effects from the economic interdependence between China and Japan; (3) those concerning East Asia security, involving the military strengths and their development of the two countries, China's relations with the U.S.-Japan military alliance, the scope and extent of Japan's "military rights" that could be accepted by China, peace and stability in the Korean Peninsular, and regional non-proliferation. Of course, this last set of norms is most difficult to be constructed, with most numerous and greatest uncertainties. Meanwhile, it is obvious that Japan's aspiration to become a "normal state" that with a peaceful normal relations with its neighbor countries, together with her legitimate rights as a sovereign state and one of the very important nation in Asia and beyond would be addressed or even respected in the expanded new regime.

3. As far as possible to prevent the establishment among the Japanese people of an image of an "increasingly powerful but strongly hostile China"
This is an advice exclusively for China and the Chinese ourselves. Whatever strategy China pursues and however negative the state of the political relations with Japan becomes, the "thesis of differentiating (the people from the small minority of militarists)" which had been raised and relentlessly implemented by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in treating the history of the Japanese aggression and conducting PRC's Japan policy and which is characterized by its political and strategic feature as reasonable, expedient, and moderate must be insisted firmly and practiced with the greatest possible sophistication as one of the primary working guiding principles of China's policy toward Japan and of almost all her activities in the relations with Japan. It is in this dimension that China's performance in the recent years up to know has left too much to be desired. Both the Chinese government and public must do their best in ways that are reasonable and capable of winning gradually the hearts and minds of the majority of the Japanese public for (to say it prudently) contributing to the cause of preventing them accept the Japanese rightists' outlook on history and political affairs and establish fixedly in their own minds a image of a China which is becoming more and more powerful while strongly antagonistic toward (or even hating) Japan, and alter thereby a series of their fundamental notions concerning national security. For these purpose, China's great efforts to strive for mitigating the tensions and controlling the potentially dangerous confrontational dynamics in her relations with Japan are also quite important and capable of generate substantial effect.
As to the Japanese public opinion about China and their attitude and perception on a series of major related issues, China is certainly not in a position of being able surely to realize what she wants without major discount. However, this does not mean at all that there is no need to try very seriously with great care for its realization to an extent as great as possible. China should try in this manner and do her best. This kind of efforts is indeed an important factor in participating the shaping of Japan's national orientation and her future state of affairs, and a demonstration of being highly responsible for China's security environment and vital interests. Moreover, It itself is an major aspect of the struggle against the Japanese rightists, for it closely relates to the imperative of preventing those people to obtain the evidences of "China's threat" to facilitate their endeavor of capturing as much Japanese public as possible. It also closely relates to the winning of international opinions, making them sympathize with China's just attitude toward Japan. Empathic understanding of both the Japanese public and the international "audiences" is indispensable for any wise major policy and behavior on the part of China toward Japan, and the sense of proportion based on sophistication in political actions and moderation in moral judgment a precondition for strategic success.

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Masaru Tamamoto

Wanted: An Elite Conspiracy

The Problem
There needs to be the recognition that, for the first time in East Asian modern history, Japan and China now live in the same world, bound by and sharing the logic and rules of global capitalism. Relations are interdependent to a degree not seen before. Such interdependence has only become evident during the last fifteen years or less, with the rapid integration of China into global capitalism. There is an identity of the future of Japan and China, and of Japan and China in the world. The problem is insufficient recognition in both countries of this seemingly obvious phenomenon. Instead there is talk of rivalry and competition and exclusivity.

Comparison with France and Germany, of Europe and East Asia
The basic of European integration has been economics with two conditions: the approximation of per capita wealth and middle class development. (When a critical mass of society turns middle class, more democratic governance comes. Property rights are key to a stable middle class, and a set of social and political rights flow from property rights.) Now there is a Europe whose pillars are denationalization and demilitarization of politics.
East Asia will not be ready for a European-type integration until China's per capita wealth approximates the Japanese, which will take several decades. During this process, interdependence will deepen and tend toward integration; borders will become increasingly porous and eventually open. And inter-state relations will become increasingly functionally differentiated, as relations between advanced economies already are.

"Elite Conspiracy"
Before the current regimes in Tokyo and Beijing, there was certain understanding between the elites of the two capitals. The 1985 Nakasone visit to Yasukuni shrine is indicative; the Japanese premier secured prior consent of the Chinese president. When mass protest erupted in China, to "save" the Chinese president, Nakasone ceased any further visit.

Reconciliation entails the establishment of justice. The meaning of justice must be shared. Historical justice is a demand of politics. With populism and nationalism on the rise in both Japan and China, needed is an elite construction of a commonly shared value of justice.

Things that can be done
Cooperation on environment and related health issues. (from Japan to polluting China)
Cooperation on energy security including nuclear power development and safety.
Cooperation on labor migration. (from China to ageing Japan)
These three issues are central to further Chinese economic development, to improve the welfare of both societies, and to the eventual integration of the two societies by capitalist logic.

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Richard Tanter

1. Recognize that reconciliation depends ultimately on civil society, not governments. This is not to avoid questions of state authority and capacity, but to specify the optimum conditions under which they may be activated. Governments have only acted to facilitate reconciliation in other cases where civil society actors have so transformed the public sphere as to create a structure of interests whereby state-managers perceive an interest of their own or no alternative. Accordingly, impediments to transnational civil society opinion formation and public influence on the informational miliieu relevant to reconciliation must be addressed. This includes recognition of government coercion and repression. Using methodologies developed for the mapping of global civil society, one preliminary research task is a mapping of transnational civil society networks involving China and Japan, their characteristics and strength over time, and historical contribution to reconciliation - positively or negatively.

2. Recognize that the failure of reconciliation and its manipulation by governments is a threat to both national and human security within the region and beyond. Accordingly states and civil society outside the region have a right to demand changes within it. Failure of reconciliation between these two countries is a problem of global consequence. As a starting point researchers should document the costs and dangers to the rest of the world of this ongoing failure and blockage of change - both by economic analysis of benefits foregone and costs incurred, and by standard risk analysis of potential cascades of political, military, economic and cultural negative sequences. Such analyses should become the basis for regional and external civil society and state pressures on the governments of the two countries that their behaviour is a risk to the security of all.

3. Recognize that the thwarting of reconciliation has been assisted and aggravated by both civil society actors and by national governments within the region and beyond. Accordingly researchers can contribute to reconciliation by documenting the historical and ongoing activities of the formateurs of a state of non-dialogue. This could include the activities of the Chinese government and its organs, the Japanese government and especially the Ministry of Education, nationalist groups operating through and on the LDP and comparable organisations and movements within China, and the wider framework of American hegemony both through the structuring of domestic political possibilities and active intervention to inhibit dialogue.

4. Conversely start by documenting and publicising the positive initiatives and achievements of governments (including sub-national) and civil society in both countries over the past half century. Going further, actively look for and encourage initiatives from both, based where possible on an identification of overlapping interests in the amelioration if not resolution of the issue.
5. Recognize that an effective politics of reconciliation cannot take place absent a widening and thickening of civil society relations between the two societies on all matters of social concern. China and Japan are no different from any two other neighbouring advanced countries where the component groups of civil society in fact share a number of sets of interests, especially in regard to global problems the causes of which are largely external to their societies but the results of which are only too evident locally. Accordingly movements for reconciliation will flourish when they exist within a wider context of normalised transnational civil society-based politics. This may appear to be putting the cart before the horse, but in fact it is not. Given the level of active blockage on the reconciliation issue, broadening the avenues of communication and bases for the formation of trust will buttress direct work on reconciliation. This is in large part a matter of social movements reframing their expected arenas of action and influence on a global and regional scale.

6. My own very rough suggestion on one such matter is as follows:
Where power and ethnicity overlap in international relations, sexuality will engage with both. Much has been written on the western version of this regarding "the Orient". The same set of factors is relevant to relations between China and Japan. The damage this issue can cause can be seen in the explosive Chinese reaction to the Japanese corporate party over a number of days in September 2003 in a Guangdong hotel to which several hundred Chinese sex workers were brought to service visiting Japanese company workers. The fact that this took place on the 72nd anniversary of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, with the inevitable reminders of wartime sexual slavery, increased the resonance.
If one had to choose one single policy initiative by which the Japanese government could improve relations with China, it might well be to impose effective Japanese regulation on Japanese involved in the organization of sex tours outside the country, and prosecute such acts even when committed outside Japan. Even better, both in terms of the basic politics and the rapid expansion of Chinese international tourism, would be if both countries were to initiate such legislation controlling the activities of their citizens abroad.
It would be relatively easy to form a coalition of civil society and state actors in the two countries, in concert with international groups and the United Nations, for example through the UN Office on Drugs and Crime and its Trafficking in Human Beings Initiative. The Japanese government has been involved in positive cooperation with the UN and other bodies on studies of trafficking, but while Japan is a signatory to the Protocol To Prevent, Suppress And Punish Trafficking In Persons, 2000, but has not yet ratified the Protocol. China has neither signed or ratified.
The Australian legislation on prosecution of sex crimes against children by Australian citizens committed outside the country may well be a useful guide here. The point is to be seen by China to be willingly doing something of substance to the limits of practical possibility.

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Takahiko Tennichi

Redefine the relationship between Japan and China
In recent 10 years the relationship between Japan and China has deeply been changed. China is remarkably growing. We, Japanese, are now reviewing our systems, namely the Constitution, security system, intelligence and so on, because some Japanese argues that our systems are not suitable for the world today. If Japan and China see each other as their unchangeable old friend, they will be disappointed. Both Japan and China should accept the fact that they are changing. Today, East Asia has two great rivalry powers, Japan and China. This is the first experience for our region. In this sense, we should redefine our relationship between Japan and China

China should not say much about history and Japan should consider its history.
Since history of international relations is very complicated, it is difficult for different countries to have exactly the same perception towards history. In this perspective, it may be wise for China not to say much about Japanese history. However, the Second World War was disastrous not only for Chinese but also for Japanese. We, Japanese, should consider Japanese leader's responsibility for the war not because China condemn us but because the war was wrong.

A high-level trilateral meeting should be institutionalized among Japan, China and the United States.
There are a lot of key issues in East Asian region, namely energy problems, democracy, common rules of conduct in East China Sea. And US-led regional order is slowly transforming. At this point, roles of these three powers are crucial for the stability of this region. Exchanging views among these three countries is very important.

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Mark Valencia

Possible Ways To Advance Reconciliation Between Japan and China

Premise
The relationship between China and Japan has soured because of several inter-related fundamental dichotomies: competition for regional political, economic and cultural leadership/dominance; Japan's alliance with China's potential enemy (the United States); and growing domestic politys that support a narrow-minded nationalistic leadership. Indeed, the two countries appear to be caught in an escalating action/reaction warp of history that may well lead to conflict. I am thus not optimistic that the relationship will improve. However, there are several key changes that could be the sine qua non for an improved relationship.

Suggestions
Japan should stop reminding China of World War II. For China and Chinese, Koizumi's Yasakuni Shrine visits are the manifestation of a nationalist pro-remilitarization movement in Japan which thus generates fear of another wave of Japanese aggression.
Instead of strengthening the military terms of its alliance with the United States, Japan should distance itself from the United States' more aggressive, anti-China policies and actions, particularly those that involve Taiwan. Otherwise China has little choice but to plan its defense against both Japan and the United States in the event of a crisis over Taiwan.
China should be more transparent as to its defense spending and preparations and their rationale, and refrain from military activities around Japan. Otherwise Japan and its domestic polity have little choice but to perceive China as a threat and to react accordingly.
A change in leadership attitude and style in both countries may be necessary for an improved relationship. Current leadership is supported by and panders to a nationalistic polity. It needs to be transformed to one that is more pragmatic, and that emphasizes complementarities and co-operation between the two nations.
Urgently needed is a greatly expanded, robust cultural and education exchange program between the two countries at all levels. Both Chinese and Japanese are rather culturally arrogant and ethnocentric, believing that they are superior to all and especially to each other. Yet there are obvious links and similarities between the two cultures and these should be emphasized while differences are muted or at least better understood.

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Willem Van Kemenade

Three Issues:
Sino-Japanese Reconciliation through the "Re-Asianization" of Japan;
Sino-Japanese Reconciliation through a de-politicized Rule of Law;
Sino-Japanese Reconciliation through Civilian Soft-Power Europe.

1. In the first piece, I argue that relations between the political classes of the two countries have for the time being, deteriorated beyond repair. Although some analysts pin some hope on the very different personality of Koizumi's likely successor, Abe Shinzo, it seems difficult that he can reconcile his ultra-conservative patriotism with a new non-ideological pragmatic line towards China.
In that case "Cold Politics - Hot Economics" will continue for some time. This need not necessarily be disastrous. Chinese president Hu Jintao has set the trend. He didn't get dinner at the White House and was insulted in all possible ways by a devious or incompetent White House. However, he got his dinner at Bill Gates' mansion in Seattle where everything was chummy.
Bill Gates will still be around for two decades or so and Bush will probably spend his post-presidential life in ignominy.
Something similar is going to happen in Sino-Japanese relations if the politicians don't do their job, as my interview with Kobayashi Yotaro illustrates. The Trilateral Commission, which in another era used to bring together the business (and political) elites from Europe, North-America and Japan has been expanded in that Japan no longer only represents this part of the world. It has transformed into a committee representing the Asia Pacific, Europe and North-America, in which China is well represented.
As Kobayashi said: "We have to make Japan part of Asia again". He knows better than politicians whose trade is to coin simple slogans to win the next election.

2. The Franco-German model of post-WWII reconciliation is often upheld as a blueprint for China and Japan. Japanese usually don't like it and that's why the Chinese love it. The German and European approach in Japan is not to promote their post WWII experiences actively. Japanese officials say that due to the very poor political relations and the absence of democracy and civil society in China, improvement of relations from people to people is severely hampered.
However, there is at least one area where Chinese citizens, - former forced laborers, victims of atrocities and comfort women with the help of Japanese lawyers working pro bono and of civic groups - have won cases for redress and compensation in Japanese courts. The victories are not too many and Japanese lower courts have regularly been overruled by higher courts invoking constitutional, international law or political factors that in Europe would be fully unacceptable.
The Chinese government also has obstructed a number of cases and treated redress activists generally as political dissidents. The Chinese government also obstructed that Japanese legal activists would work in compensation cases with Chinese individual activists on the ground that these were opposed to official state-level Sino-Japanese friendship and used foreign media to publicize their concerns.
Some of the Japanese lawyers, working for the victims have become folk-heroes in China. One of the major inhibiting factors for further progress is Japan's statute of limitations of 20 years. In Germany there is none, and Germany has even, after the end of the Cold War in 2000 introduced a new law to enable forced laborers of former Soviet satellites to still claim compensation and the burdens will be shared between the state and the companies.
Japan should take heed and seize this opportunity to improve its image in the world and consider ways to introduce a similar law. This is a question of civil courage of politicians.

3. A European perspective on the prospects for Sino-Japanese reconciliation: Europe hasn't played a role in regional security in East Asia since the liquidation of its colonial empires in the 1940s and 1950s. Since the 1980s, Northeast Asia, in particular the three nations of China (including Taiwan), Japan and South-Korea together emerged as one of the three major hubs of economic dynamism, i.e. comprehensive technological development, trade- and investment flows in the world, the other two being North-America and Europe. The European Union is already a fully integrated trading bloc and as such the Union as a whole has huge interests in this region. Since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the EU has been developing a Common Security and Foreign Policy and is increasingly acting as a global player, but only as a civilian soft power engaging in multilateral, incrementalist, consensus-seeking negotiations, global rule-making and global governance reform.
The European Union is not exerting influence by playing a pro-active role per se, but just by being a distant role model, sometimes cooperating with the hard power of the United States (Afghanistan), sometimes distancing itself from it (Iraq). China is following a distinctive soft power model in regional and global affairs by active membership of the global network of the UN and its agencies and the WTO. Its approach is similar to the European Union. China shuns military alliances and the only regional organization it participates in as a leading member, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is not a military pact, but a civilian organization for regional security and cooperation.
Japanese and Chinese government officials stress that they want to learn from the European Union and more specifically the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe in setting up a permanent Northeast-Asian multilateral security mechanism.
Civilian power EU and the OSCE are always reminders to East Asians and others that there is an alternative to the American approach of military alliances, unilateralism and misguided preemptive war.

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Peter Van Ness

1. Paradigm change in how we think about resolving conflict. One important example, in my opinion, would be to encourage policy-makers to think in terms of the opportunity costs of the diplomatic positions that they take.
Wikipedia defines opportunity cost as "the cost of something in terms of an opportunity forgone (and the benefits that could be received from that opportunity), or the most valuable forgone alternative".
For example, more than 60 years after the end of World War II, there is no formal peace treaty between Japan and Russia because of their lingering territorial dispute over several of the Kurile Islands northeast of Hokkaido. Moreover, when you ask Russian and Japanese diplomats and analysts about the problem, they typically tell you how difficult it would be to make the concessions needed to achieve a resolution of the dispute. Never discussed, at least in my experience in observing this situation, is the opportunity cost of the lost potential benefits that cooperation might have brought to the two countries if they had resolved their differences. Think, for example, of the immense potential mutual benefit that might have been gotten over those many years from creating a positive diplomatic environment for a greater linking of Japanese capital and technology with Russia's immense natural resources to create projects for joint exploration and development.
This dispute over the Kurile Islands is, in my opinion, a classic case of what happens when government officials limit themselves to pursuing status-quo policies of confrontation. It is especially common with respect to contested issues where the continuing confrontation is perceived to be virtually inevitable, despite the substantial benefits that mutual cooperation might provide to both parties to the dispute. In other words, there is an insufficient accounting for the price of failure to resolve the conflict, i.e., the opportunity cost of maintaining the confrontational status quo.
If one were to apply the concept of opportunity cost to the East China Sea dispute between Japan and China, for example, it would be important to compare the potential benefits for both countries of a collaborative exploitation of the resources of the area, with the price of the current contestation and confrontation over competing territorial claims. Such an analysis would include both an evaluation of the lost opportunity to benefit and the cost of continuing to mobilize forces to defend the current competing claims. Thinking this way might help to break the vicious cycle of reinforcing confrontation, on the one hand, and help to build a positive cycle of reinforming mutual benefit, on the other.

2. Cooperation between major business interests in each country that have extensive trade and investment interests in the other country. Some steps have been taken in Japan in this direction. For example, the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyukai) has asked PM Koizumi to stop making visits to Yasukuni Shrine and has proposed the building of an alternative memorial to the war dead; and Akio Mimura, Vice Chairman of Nippon Keidanren and President of Nippon Steel Corporation, has called for dialogue and cooperation with China in the fields of environment and energy conservation. But what about the business interests on the Chinese side?
If one compares Japan's relations with China to Sino-US relations, one finds that whenever the political relationship between the US and China goes sour, the US-China trade council and American businesses with major interests in China begin to actively lobby the White House to contain any deterioration in the general Sino-US relationship. This kind of lobbying activity in both Japan and China (and between business interests in the two countries) could have a major influence on reconciliation.

3. Symbolic Initiatives by Emperor Akihito. Recent events suggest that the Emperor might take steps to enhance reconciliation. In July, the diary of Tomita Tomohiko, grand steward of the Imperial Household Agency during the reign of Emperor Hirohito, revealed that the late Emperor was opposed to the enshrinement of Class-A war criminals at Yasukuni Shrine, and that is why he no longer made visits to the shrine. And, last year, his son, Emperor Akihito, visited a memorial for Korean war dead when also paying his respects to other victims of the battle for Saipan, and he also commented on a different occasion that he thought Japanese loyalty to the national anthem, Kimigayo, and the national flag, Hinomaru, should not be compulsory but voluntary.
One might say that these are only very modest steps, but no other person in Japan has the same potential influence as the Emperor to help resolve important historical disputes of the past and to symbolize new beginnings for relations with Japan's Asian neighbours. Perhaps these recent events indicate that Emperor Akihito might be receptive to suggestions for initiatives he might take to enhance reconciliation.

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